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Life Insurer Risk-Based Capital: An Option Pricing 
Approach 
Samuel H. Cox* and Arthur M.B. Hogan t 
Abstract 
This paper uses an option pricing framework to estimate life insurer risk-
based capital. Stock market data and statutory asset and liability data are 
used to calculate the implied level of statutory risk-based capital for each of 18 
insurers. We calculate the level of risk-based capital required to avoid subsidy 
from the guaranty fund. Our results suggest that less capital is required than 
that required under the New York actuarial risk-based capital formula. Firm 
rankings, however, are similar under both methods, although the methods are 
not directly comparable. We also determine the level of capital required if the 
subsidy provided to the sample of insurers by a guaranty fund is the same 
as that provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to U.S. 
banks. This level of capital is chosen because of the dominance of investment 
products for life insurers. When the results are compared with those found 
from a similar study of U.S. banks, it appears that the sample life insurers hold 
relatively greater capital than do the sample banks. 
Key words and phrases: guarantee fund, deposit insurance, bankruptcy cost, 
solvency, New York formula 
* Samuel H. Cox, Ph.D., F.S.A., is professor of actuarial science and risk management 
and insurance at Georgia State University. He earned his B.A. and M.S. degrees at Texas 
Christian University and his doctorate at Louisiana State University, all in mathematics. 
Professor Cox serves on the Council of the Society of Actuaries Education and Research 
Section and is the editor of the North American Actuarial Journal. 
Dr. Cox's address is: Department of Risk Management and Insurance, College 
of Business, Georgia State University, Atlanta GA 30302, U.S.A. Internet address: 
samcox@gsu.edu 
t Arthur M.B. Hogan, Ph.D., is a senior financial economist in the risk management 
division of the Office of Thrift Supervision in the U.S. Department of Treasury. He is 
responsible for modeling the interest rate process and the off-balance sheet positions 
for the division's risk model of thrifts. He received his doctorate in financial economics 
from the University of Texas in 1989 under the direction of the late Robert C. Witt. 
Dr. Hogan's address is: Office of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G Street NW, Washington 
DC 20552, U.S.A. Internet address: amhogan@maiI.erols.com 
5 
6 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In return for receiving policyholders' premiums, insurers promise 
to pay claims, contingent upon the occurrence of specific events dur-
ing the insurance contract period. As these premiums are invested, 
policyholders provide the insurer with financing that is similar to a 
bank deposit (Quirin and Waters, 1975). Thus, both banks and insur-
ance companies assume liabilities, thereby creating pools of assets that 
they invest. Banks and life insurers are competitors. l Both make their 
money by investing the funds they generate at rates higher than their 
costs. As a result, the principal risk faced by banks and life insurers 
stems from their ability to maintain investment spreads and not suffer 
disintermediation2 in times of changing interest rates. This similarity 
is reflected in their financial structure. Both have similar capital/asset 
ratios: 6.2 percent for commercial banks and 6.6 percent for life insur-
ers as of December 31, 1989, and both have liabilities that are interest 
sensitive.3 
It is current public policy to protect the liability claims on both 
banks and insurance companies. The U.S. federal government provides 
bank deposit insurance, while states have established guaranty funds 
for policyholders. Risk-based capital and/or guarantee fund assess-
ments that reflect the insurer's risk of insolvency limit the incentive 
that stockholders have to increasing asset risk following the issuance 
of liabilities. An incentive for firms to increase risk arises because the 
guaranty funds alleviate policyholders' concern about firm risk (Babbel 
and Hogan, 1992).4 Cummins (1988) derive a method of determining 
risk-based assessment for guaranty funds that models guaranty fund 
1 For 1989 the American Council of Life Insurers reported in the Life Insurance Hand-
book that 70 percent of life insurer premiums were for annuities and investment prod-
ucts, which compete with bank certificates of deposit. 
2 Disintermediation refers to the movement of funds from low yielding accounts from 
traditional banking or insurance institutions to higher yielding investments in the gen-
eral market. 
3This excludes the Mandatory Securities Valuation Reserve (MSVR) held by life in-
surers. The MSVR is a reserve held against fluctuation in the insurer's asset portfolio. 
It is required by state regulations. 
4In a competitive market with perfect information and no regulation, the cost of an 
insurer's debt capital (underwriting) would vary directly with the risk of the insurer. 
All other things being equal, customers only would be attracted by riskier insurers' 
products if the premiums were lower. Guaranty funds have weakened this market 
discipline. The guaranty funds reimburse policyholders and third party claimants of 
insolvent insurers. This reduces policyholder concerns about insurer risk. 
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assessments as put options. In this paper we show that by modeling 
the value of the guaranty fund to an insurer as a put option, there is 
an equivalence between the risk-based guaranty fund assessments and 
risk-based capital. 5 
1.2 Risk-Based Capital 
Risk-based capital is the theoretical amount of capital needed to ab-
sorb the risks of operating a business having financial obligations to 
customers. A higher risk business requires more capital than does one 
of lower risk. Specifically, risk-based capital is the amount of capital 
necessary to insure that the business has an acceptably low expecta-
tion of becoming insolvent. Failure to recognize the consistency of risk 
measurement may produce unintended market displacements, such as 
reduced product availability. Because the measure of solvency risk can 
be described as the expected value of policyholder deficit before guar-
anty fund recoupment, this measure is equivalent to using the proba-
bility of insolvency impairment, provided the probability distribution 
remains the same. 
U.S. regulators of the banking and thrift industries recently have be-
gun phasing in a risk-based capital measure as one component of a new 
set of supervisory ratios that will be used to assess capital adequacy. 
The new standards are based on a framework, referred to by some as 
the Basle Accord,6 developed by an international group of bank regu-
lators. Similarly, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) has developed risk-based capital standards for insurers'? Under 
the NAIC Risk-Based Capital Model Act, there are four levels of statu-
tory surplus (the difference between statutory assets and liabilities) that 
trigger required actions by management and regulators. These surplus 
level triggers are based on threshold risk-based capital multiples under 
which successively more severe regulatory activity is indicated. The 
thresholds of the risk-based capital multiple are as follows: 
1. Company action level event threshold is 100 percent of the for-
mula risk-based capital value. A company action level event re-
5 An insurer's expected cost to the guarantee fund varies with its risk. If there is a 
fixed risk-based capital level that is the same across all firm, this cost can be priced 
using risk-based assessments. If there are fixed assessments, the risk of different firms 
can be made equivalent by requiring different levels of risk-based capital. 
6The Basle Accord is an agreement by the G-? countries and the European Union 
which implements risk-based capital standards for banks. 
7Some European countries have had risk-based capital requirements for their do-
mestic insurers for more than 20 years. 
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quires a company to submit a business plan to the state, to show 
how the risk-based capital value will be improved; 
2. Regulatory action level event threshold is 75 percent of the for-
mula risk-based capital value. A regulatory action level event 
could, in addition to the requirements under item 1, trigger a state 
investigation or examination; 
3. Authorized control level event threshold is 50 percent of the for-
mula risk-based capital value. An authorized control level event 
enables a state to take the company under supervision, although 
it is not required to do so. 
4. Mandatory control level event threshold is 35 percent of the for-
mula risk-based capital value. A mandatory control level event 
requires the regulator in the state to take the company under su-
pervision. 
If the surplus falls below 20 percent of the calculated risk-based capital, 
then the insurance commissioner must move to place the company in 
conserva tion. 
The advantage of using risk-based capital over risk-based guaranty 
fund assessment is that it is compatible with current guaranty funds. 
With the exception of New York, insurance guarantee funds are based 
on post assessments. The assessment to cover a failed insurer is pro-
rated by line of business across the remaining insurers in the state. 
There is an annual cap on assessments to each insurer, but required 
funds in excess of the cap can be rolled over to the following years. 
New York, on the other hand, charges each insurer a premium each 
year for coverage against their failure. Thus, insurance guaranty funds, 
except in New York, operate on a post-assessment basis, i.e., the sol-
vent companies are assessed an amount equal to the shortfall in assets 
of the insolvent firm. The assessment for a solvent company is a flat 
percentage of premium volume. The guaranty funds, like bank deposit 
insurance, have the industry as the primary obligator. The guaranty 
funds differ from bank deposit insurance, however, in that there is no 
contingent obligator and bank deposit insurance requires prior assess-
ment premiums. 
In many states the assessment that a solvent company pays to the 
guaranty fund is credited against its state premium tax. The effect is to 
pass the cost of insolvencies to the taxpayers because the premium tax 
revenue is reduced by the cost of the insolvency. In other states policy-
holders bear the cost through increased premiums charged by solvent 
companies. Thus, the losses arising from insurance insolvencies pass 
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through the insurance system either to the taxing authority by reduced 
insurance company taxes or to the policyholders by higher insurance 
premiums (Barese and Nelson, 1991). 
If it is not politically feasible to create a prior assessment system for 
insurance, then there are only two means of reducing costs of the incen-
tives for risky strategies: (i) rigid control of the asset and liability risks 
of insurers; or (ii) adjustment of the leverage through the application 
of risk-based capital adequacy standards. 
1.3 Objectives 
Merton (1977) pioneered the application of option pricing to deposit 
insurance. Ronn and Verma (1986) use Merton's approach to study 
risk-adjusted premiums for deposit insurance for U.S. banks. Cummins 
(1988) extends the option pricing approach to the calculation of risk-
based premiums for insurance guaranty funds for U.S. property-liability 
insurers. The model used in this paper also is based on option valuation 
principles. Although our aim is to establish risk-based capital levels 
rather than guaranty fund premiums, we show that there is an inverse 
relationship between capital levels and guaranty fund premiums: the 
higher the level of capital per unit of claim an insurer has, other things 
being equal, the lower the likelihood of default and, hence, the lower 
the risk-based guaranty fund premium. 
The objectives of this paper are as follows: (i) to develop a model 
based on option valuation principles; (ii) to illustrate an equivalence 
between risk-based capital and risk-based guaranty fund assessment 
using an option-based model; (iii) to determine capital adequacy stan-
dards for a sample of 18 publicly traded insurers using the model; (iv) to 
compare the risk-based capital calculated from the option model with 
statutory value capital standards; and (v) to compare the level of risk-
based capital held by life insurers with the level calculated by Ronn and 
Verma (1988) for banks. 
2 The Option Pricing Model 
The liabilities of life insurers are composed of term life and invest-
ment products. 8 If a firm underwrites a suffiCient number of term life 
policies the value of the liability is essentially fixed. Insurer investment 
8Whole life, universal life, and variable life are contracts composed of term life in-
surance and investment products that can be used to pay premiums. 
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offerings such as annuities are driven by the same market forces that 
affect the insurer's assets. Thus, we assume that only one stochastic 
process drives the change in the life insurer's financial position. This 
is unlike Cummins' model for property/casualty insurers that has sep-
arate processes for both assets and liabilities. The advantage of using 
the one stochastic process approach is that all of the variables in our 
model are observable. In Cummins' model there are no dividends paid 
to stockholders, so we have used the method of Roll (1977) to adjust for 
dividends. Cummins' notation is used to the extent possible to allow 
the reader to compare the models. 
Let us assume that an insurer's asset/liability ratio follows a diffu-
sion process: 
dx = (r - 8)xdt + (J'xdz(t) for 0::; t::; T (1) 
where 
A The value of the insurer's assets; 
L The value of the insurer's liabilities; 
x Insurer's asset/liability ratio, i.e., x = AIL; 
z(t) A standard Brownian motion process for x; 
8 Dividend payout rate per dollar of assets; 
r Rate of change in capital structure for this company; and 
T Time until expiration of option, i.e., time until 
the company's next examination. 
The change in the asset/liability ratio, dx, is a function of the return 
on the insurer's equity less any dividend payments, (r - 8)xdt, with 
the addition of a white noise error term, (J'xdz(t). The term 8x repre-
sents a decrease in assets as dividends are paid. Dividend payout rates 
normally are given as a percentage of equity. If f3 is the dividend rate in 
terms of equity E, then the initial annual rate of dividend payment can 
be calculated in two ways, giving the same result: f3E = 8A. Thus, f3 
or 8 can be calculated from the other given initial values of assets and 
equity. 
Each year the state insurance regulators ascertain the values of eq-
uity. If the equity of the company falls below the required capital, the 
company is placed into conservatorship by the regulator. If the com-
pany cannot be rehabilitated, the assets will be used to pay obligations 
to policyholders. 
Policyholders are protected by a promise from the guaranty fund to 
pay the excess, if any, of the liability value L over the asset value A. 
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This is similar to a financial put option written on x with striking price 
of one. The guaranty fund payment is 
max(O,L - A) = Lmax(O, 1 - x), 
which is the same as the put option payment. 
3 The Pricing Formula 
3.1 Assumptions 
The single premium for coverage until the next audit9 at time T, 
given current levels of assets A and liabilities L can be derived in the 
same way Black and Scholes derived the formula for the price of a Eu-
ropean option on a stock. For a derivation of the formula in its original 
setting, see Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973), or Merton (1990). 
The Society of Actuaries monograph by Boyle (1992) includes a good 
discussion of the economic content of the assumptions underlying the 
Black Scholes model. 
There are six major assumptions underlying the Black and Scholes 
(1973) formula. Boyle (1992) discusses all of these, although he ex-
plicitly lists only the first five assumptions. Hull (1993) gives a simi-
lar discussion. IO These authors also give the arguments leading to the 
Black and Scholes formula. For a precise mathematical treatment of the 
implications of these assumptions, see Duffie (1992). The assumptions 
are: 
1. The asset liability ratio x on which the option is written follows a 
geometric Brownian motion, as described in the previous section. 
The volatility parameter is denoted by 0'. 
2. The security pays dividends at a constant known rate 8. 
3. There is a constant, default free rate of interest r. 
4. There are no taxes or transactions costs. All traders can borrow 
and lend cash at same rate r. Securities are infinitely divisible. 
The ratio and the option written on it can be bought and sold 
short by all traders. 
9 All insurers annually file audited statutory statements with state regulators. Stock 
insurers file annuallO(k) statements with the Securities Exchange Commission. Regu-
lators examine insurers every three to five years depending upon the state of domicile. 
All audits and examinations are paid by the firm. 
IOThis textbook appears on the Society of Actuaries education syllabus. 
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5. The ratio and the option on it can be trade continuously. 
6. There are no arbitrage opportunities. This implies that two Euro-
pean style securities (or combinations of securities into portfolios) 
that have the same payoff at time T must have the same market 
value at time t < T. 
The option in our model satisfies these assumptions (or fails to satisfy 
them) to the same degree as options on stocks, with one notable ex-
ception: our option is not traded. The option pricing formula gives a 
market value which traders would agree on, if it were traded. The op-
tion formula for stocks works well and is widely used, which suggests 
its use in this model. 
3.2 The Formula 
The Blackand Scholes (1973) formula is adapted to our situation as 
follows: let p(x, t) denote the premium at time t, given x = AIL. At the 
time T of expiration, p(x, T) = max(O, I-x). The boundary conditions 
are 
p(O, t) = eY(T-tl and p(x, T) = max(O, 1 - x). 
The Black and Scholes (1973) formula for the price p of a European put 
option on a security with market value x and with striking price equal 
to one is 
where 
d 
_ In(x) + (r - O)T 0--jT 
- 0--jT + 2 . 
Here N(·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, i.e., 
and T = T - t. 
f
y e-s2/2 
N(y) = --ds 
-00 J2ii 
(2) 
The price of the guaranty in terms of the original variables is found 
by multiplying by L: 
P(A, L, T) = Le-rT N (-d + o-JT) - Ae-oT N (-d) (3) 
where 
d 
_ In(A/L) + (r - O)T 0--jT 
- 0--jT + 2 . (4) 
Equation (3) relates the price P of guaranty fund insurance to the vari-
ables A, L, r, 0, and T, which are known at the beginning of the insur-
ance period, and to 0-, which is the unknown volatility parameter. 
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4 Estimation of Volatility Parameter (J" 
Because the guaranty is invoked when the insurer falls below the re-
quired level of capital, the variability of all liabilities, not just the guar-
anteed liabilities, will affect regulatory action. To estimate the volatility, 
we consider the position of the stockholders. The value of their rights 
to the company amounts to an American call option on the assets with 
exercise price equal to the liabilities expiring at time T. The notion that 
equity of a levered firm (Le., a firm financed in part by issuing bonds) 
can be thought of as a call option appears in most introductory cor-
porate finance textbooks; see Brigham and Gapinski (1991, p. 700), for 
example. Equity-financed life insurance companies typically do not is-
sue bonds, but borrow instead from their customers. The life insurer's 
liabilities consist of obligations to pay benefits, in effect repaying its 
debt to policyholders. 
If the assets AT at time T are worth more than the liabilities LT, 
then the shareholders have a net value of AT - LT > O. If the assets 
are less, AT < LT, then the shareholders can abandon the firm, leaving 
it to the policyholders (lenders), and have no further obligation. Thus, 
the shareholders' value at time T is max(AT - LT, 0), the payoff of a 
European call option. As it usually is not optimal to exercise a call early 
(see Hull, 1993, p. 235), we assume that the option will not be exer-
cised early. In this case, the American call can be priced as if it were 
a European call. The value of the call option C at time t depends on 
A = At, L = Lt , and T = T - t. The Black and Scholes formula for the 
call option is derived in the same way as the put option formula for 
P(A,L, T), which we discussed in Section 3. The boundary conditions 
are C(A, L, 0) = max(A - L, 0) and C(O, L, T) = O. The firm pays divi-
dends continuously at a rate of 6; it has volatility 0- 2; and the valuation 
interest rate is r. By multiplying through by L, the Black and Scholes 
call option formula gives the market value of the insurer's equity E, 
which is equal to C (A, L, T) in the option notation: 
E = C(A,L, T) = Le-<hN(d) - Ae-YTN(d - o-JT) (5) 
where 
d 
_ In(A/L) + (r - 6)T °o-ft 
- o-ft + 2 . (6) 
The call option's value is equal to the firm's equity before the intro-
duction of the guaranty fund. As insurer guaranty fund assessments 
are ex post, the introduction of the guaranty funds does not, in anr: of 
itself, change the variance of the portfolio. The value of the insurer's 
14 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
equity E is known at the beginning of the insurance period, as are all 
of the other variables in the call formula except cr. Hence, this deter-
mines cr implicitly (Latane and Rendleman, 1976). Given the values of 
E, A, L, D, r, and T, the implied asset liability ratio volatility cr 2 can be 
calculated by simultaneously solving equations (5) and (6). In this way 
we solve using the Newton-Raphson methodll for the value of cr for 
which the calculated price equals the observed stock market price.l 2 
We then use the implied value of cr to find the level of capital A by 
solving equations (3) and (4.) This determines the desired level A using 
the statutory accounting value of the assets and liabilities. The solution 
again is found by using the Newton-Raphson method. 
We examine the case where the guaranty fund provides no subsidy 
to insurers. Because most life insurer premiums now are derived from 
investment grade products, we have set the guaranty subsidy equal to 
that used by Ronn and Verma (1988) in their study of banks. They use 
a guaranty fund premium of 1/1200 of assets to find the implicit level 
of required capital. In this model we use the stock price the day after 
the deadline for filing statutory statements in 1990 and use an option 
life of one year, which is the next time that statutory statements will be 
filed and the next time that regulatory monitoring may be performed. 
5 Estimates of Capital Adequacy Standards 
The method described in Section 3 is applied to a sample of 18 stock 
life insurers for which data are available. The characteristics of the 
sample firms are shown in Table 1. The firm selection criteria are that 
there are no material operations in the holding company's operations 
other than life insurance, that the statement blanks can be obtained by 
the authors, and that the firm is not a First Executive company (because 
they were placed in conservation by regulators in the following year). 
llThe Newton-Raphson method is used to determine the roots of an equation; see, 
for example, Burden and Faires (1985). 
12 An added benefit is that the technique avoids the problem of non stationarity of the 
variance. 
n 
0 x 
Table 1 llJ 
Sample Firm Characteristics 
::J 
c.. 
Statutory I 0 
Price Number Dividends per Statutory Statutory Guaranteed 
10 
llJ 
Name l2er Share of Shares Share Assets Liabilities Liabilities 
::J 
Acceleration Life 7.50 4,946,934 0.28 104,737 84,073 30,602 
;;JJ 
VI 
American Heritage Life 27.38 5,948,862 0.90 770,915 697,148 612,095 ;:;' OJ 
American National 36.25 27,476,757 1.89 4,079,900 3,083,802 2,534,885 llJ VI 
Chesapeake Life 12.00 963,764 1.00 43,953 40,910 37,187 
It> 
c.. 
Durham Life 31.00 8,457,900 0.92 732,195 632,483 521,798 n llJ 
Equitable Life of Iowa 52.75 7,087,440 1.27 1,842,833 1,609,512 1,311,888 "0 ,... 
Financial Benefit Life 16.25 5,061,833 690,079 666,169 548 ~ 
Independent Life & Accident 21.25 6,658 0.87 1,080,502 977,675 882,934 
Integrated Resources Life 12.50 1,853 77,874 58,383 79,036 
Jefferson Pilot Life 55.25 35,757,482 1.36 4,284,743 3,424,165 2,729,960 
Kansas City Life 36.00 7,143,056 1.28 1,694,614 1,557,459 1,099,084 
Kentucky Central Life 8.75 13,439,765 0.40 1,303,927 1,218,565 1,197,728 
Lincoln National Life 56.13 43,042,771 2.92 23,530,710 22,475,823 16,764,837 
Manhattan Life 5.75 6,584,069 471,793 434,454 425,148 
National Western Life 36.75 6,955,724 2,100,663 2,017,469 1,779,068 
Presidential Life 8.88 28,612,869 0.20 2,069,631 1,931,711 2,202,648 
Protective Life 25.88 13,611,646 0.83 2,495,755 2,318,470 1,596,399 
Washington National Insurance 24.88 20,292,856 1.08 1,577,842 1,387,665 
f-' 
U1 
16 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
Table 2 presents the results of the option model calculation for each 
firm when there is a guaranty fund subsidy equivalent to that of banks. 
A detailed example of the calculations for the first firm is shown in 
the appendix. The results are shown for two different types of guaran-
tees: the column entitled guaranteed risk-based capital assumes that 
the guaranty funds only will cover policyholder liabilities; the other as-
sumes that all liabilities are covered. We examine the level of risk-based 
capital for covering all liabilities because the nonguaranteed liabilities 
may be held by sophisticated investors who may cashout their claims 
before regulators are able to act. The sample firms carry from 22 per-
cent to 61 percent more capital than required. Ronn and Verma (1988), 
in their study of 43 banks, find that capital infusions of 5 percent to 
43 percent are required to meet this implicit cost of deposit insurance. 
This indicates that the subsidy received by the sample banks from de-
posit guarantees is greater than that received by the sample of insurers 
from policyholder guarantees. On the other hand, Table 3 presents the 
results of the option model calculation for each firm when there is no 
guaranty fund subsidy equivalent to that of banks. 
Table 4 shows the results of the calculation of the required risk-
based capital using the actuarial formula implemented in New York. 
We examine the New York model because it is used as the basis for the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model, and 
unlike the NAIC formula, it can be calculated using publicly disclosed 
information. 13 
In the formula-based models, the amount of risk-based capital for 
each source of risk (e.g., underwriting, investment, or credit) must be 
such that the risk of insolvency (or other applicable impairment) is di-
rectly proportional to the amount of risk-based capital for each source 
of risk. The formula has multipliers for the accounts (sources of risk) 
that appear on the statutory statement. The amount of risk-based cap-
ital is the sum of the products of the multiplier and the item amounts. 
The actuarial risk-based capital formula considers each account as a 
separate risk that can be evaluated separately and that total risk is the 
sum of the standard errors.14 
13The NAIC is concerned that the insurers would use the ratio of their capital to re-
quired risk-based capital in marketing promotions. They feel that this could mislead 
consumers into thinking that there are material differences between firms for which 
none exist. Therefore, the NAIC has decided that risk-based capital results for individ-
ual companies should not be public. 
14For this type of additivity to hold, pairs of risks X, Y must have correlation coeffi-
cient equal to one, i.e., PX.Y = 1. In other words, provided the second moments exist, 
the standard deviation of X + Y is equal to the sum of the standard deviation of X and 
the standard deviation of Y if and only if P x, y = 1. 
Table 2 
Option Model Estimates of Risk-Based Capital Assuming Guaranty Fund 
Guaranteed Guaranteed % Capital 
Implied Capital Excess Excess Excess 
Name Variance {Deficiency) {Deficiency) (Deficiency} 
Acceleration Life 0.26 53,084,261 47% 53,006,216 
American Heritage Life 0.12 253,480,724 38% 253,007,045 
American National 0.17 2,018,834,565 52% 2,016,068,098 
Chesapeake Life 0.21 18,036,117 41% 18,004,768 
Durham Life 0.02 251,012,643 34% 250,469,370 
Equitable Life of Iowa 4.70 559,086,609 33% 557,752,727 
Financial Benefit Life 0.16 142,267,125 25% 141,849,889 
Independent Life & Accident 0.21 430,826,041 42% 430,101,247 
Integrated Resources Life 0.17 45,042,047 40% 44,955,558 
Jefferson Pilot Life 0.31 2,161,564,584 55% 2,158,874,522 
Kansas City Life 0.00 963,463,689 52% 962,091,518 
Kentucky Central Life 0.03 380,373,973 29% 379,395,984 
Lincoln National Life 0.01 5,211,303,291 28% 5,197,229,745 
Manhattan Life 0.00 119,725,355 25% 119,354,135 
National Western Life 0.00 1,154,902,839 61% 1,153,738,870 
Presidential Life 0.00 518,036,998 22% 516,279,542 
Protective Life 0.00 527,312,539 28% 525,869,501 
Reliable Life 1.19 219,063,236 57% 218,818,457 
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Table 3 
Option Model Estimates of Risk-Based Capital 
Assuming No Guaranty Fund 
Guaranteed Guaranteed % Capital 
Capital Excess % Excess Capital Excess Excess 
Name (Deficiency) (Deficiency) (Deficiency) (Deficiency) 
Acceleration Life 51,604,853 46% 51,526,807 46% 
American Heritage 220,258,828 33% 219,785,112 33% 
Life 
American National 1,307,755,545 34% 1,304,988,248 33% 
Chesapeake Life 16,016,556 36% 15,985,206 36% 
Durham Life 167,229,558 23% 166,686,160 23% 
Equitable Life of 312,095,070 18% 310,760,531 18% 
Iowa 
Financial Benefit 140,680,341 25% 140,263,103 25% 
Life 
Independent Life & 397,514,797 39% 396,789,972 38% 
Accident 
Integrated Resources 31,568,690 28% 31,482,146 28% 
Life 
Jefferson Pilot Life 1,947,590,616 50% 1,944,900,292 50% 
Kansas City Life 467,200,586 25% 465,827,244 25% 
Kentucky Central 331,336,111 25% 330,358,058 25% 
Life 
Lincoln National 4,289,858,928 23% 4,275,783,945 23% 
Life 
Manhattan Life 90,218,902 19% 89,847,599 19% 
National Western 1,123,218,068 59% 1,122,054,076 59% 
Life 
Presidential Life 470,986,004 20% 469,228,467 20% 
Protective Life 384,294,881 20% 382,851,483 20% 
Reliable Life 212,789,180 56% 212,544,396 56% 
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Table 4 
New York Formula Calculated Risk-Based Capital 
Formula Capital Excess % Formula Capital 
Name (Deficiency) Excess (Deficiency) 
Acceleration Life 15,394,363 14% 
American Heritage Life 88,567,275 13% 
American National 628,316,718 16% 
Chesapeake Life 7,510,633 17% 
Durham Life 65,102,344 9% 
Equitable Life of Iowa 226,956,248 13% 
Financial Benefit Life 10,624,307 2% 
Independent Life & Accident 191,536,623 19% 
Integrated Resources Life 3,448,566 3% 
Jefferson Pilot Life 465,811,716 12% 
Kansas City Life 210,042,906 11% 
Kentucky Central Life 210,623,736 16% 
Lincoln National Life 1,455,672,163 8% 
Manhattan Life 24,318,229 5% 
National Western Life 106,808,768 6% 
Presidential Life 134,899,050 6% 
Protective Life 187,268,805 10% 
Reliable Life 36,846,203 10% 
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In contrast, the option-based model, which examines the risks as a 
portfolio, makes no assumption about the correlation of the risks. The 
excess or deficiency of capital as a fraction of the book value of the 
firm's assists is reported. 
The New York formula requires more capital than that imposed by 
the option-based model. All other things equal, the lower level of capi-
tal required by the New York formula would provide a relatively greater 
subsidy. There is a difference, however, in the regulatory actions as-
sumed in developing the models. The option model assumes that the 
regulator liquidates the insurer when there is insufficient capital. On 
the other hand, the New York actuarial model provides for several lev-
els of regulatory response that culminates in placing the insurer under 
supervision when the insurer has less than 20 percent of its required 
risk-based capital. 
The New York formula requires an average of 37 percent more cap-
ital from the sample firms. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
between the option and actuarial risk-based capital calculations is 0.21. 
The difference between the New York formula and the option model 
does not appear to be affected by firm size, because the correlation 
of the difference of firm rankings by the two models with firm size is 
0.01. This is probably due to the dominance of investment products (li-
abilities), which are correlated with the assets because of their shared 
market risk. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper develops a risk-based capital calculation model for insur-
ers, as ongoing concerns, by equating the cost of one year guarantees. 
The model assumes that the asset to liability ratio can be described by 
diffusion processes and that the guaranty fund will pay its obligations. 
The differences in the calculated levels of capital by the actuarial-based 
models, such as those used by the states of Minnesota and New York, 
and the option-based models appear to arise from the difference in reg-
ulatory action assumed by the models when a firm has a capital short-
fall. The divergence in firm rank between the two risk-based capital 
models does not appear to arise from differences in measuring portfo-
lio risk. 
An additional application of our option model is to provide a means 
of assessing the relative levels of required capital across financial inter-
mediaries. The model provides guidance to regulators in determining 
levels of capital and/or premiums to guaranty funds to create a level 
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playing field across financial intermediaries. Thus, disintermediation 
between financial institutions and the waste from economic friction as-
sociated with transaction costs of disintermediation could be avoided. 
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Appendix 
Using Acceleration Life as the example provides 
E $37,102,005; 
A $112,572,000; 
L $91,233,000; and 
d O. 
Substituting into equations (5) and (6) yields an equation for the volatil-
ity parameter (T: 
37,102,005 = 112,572, OOON(d) - 91,233, OOOOe-O.OB N(d - (T) 
where 
d = In(A/89, OO~ 000) + 0.08 + ~. 
Using the Newton-Raphson method to find the implied variance yields 
(T2 =- 0.26. Solving for the required level of risk-based capital by sub-
stituting into equations (3) and (4), setting the exercise price equal to 
the guaranteed liability value of $89,022,000, and setting the expected 
cost to the guaranty fund to be 1/1200 of the firm's assets gives 
98,310 = 89,022, OOOe-O.OB N( -d - -J(i) - AN( -d) 
where 
d _ In(A/89, 002, 000) + 0.08 ')0.26 
- ')0.26 + 2 
Using the Newton-Raphson method to solve for the required level of 
capital A yields A = $59,487,739. 

Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
Surveillance of Life Insurer Solvency: A Comparison 
of Stock and The Multiple Scenario Cash Flow 
Financial Stress Tests 
Ronald W. Spahr* and Paul L. Gronewollert 
Abstract* 
The solvency of life insurance companies may be threatened by interest 
rate risk when the maturities of assets and liabilities are mismatched. The Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) multiple scenario cash-
flow test (MSCFT) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) net portfolio value 
model (stock) approaches to financial stress tests are illustrated and analyzed 
with respect to their capacity to estimate the impact of potential changes in 
interest rates on life insurance company capital and surplus. Each approach 
is illustrated with the assets and liabilities of three hypothetical life insurance 
company capital levels (high, average, and below average) and realistic interest 
rate scenarios spelled out in the NAIC's standard valuation model law. 
The supplement to the standard valuation law requires the appointed ac-
tuary to serve a dual employee/regulator role in which he/she is required to 
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Dr. Spahr's address is: Department of Economics & Finance, University of Wyoming, 
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two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
25 
26 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
develop an expert opinion concerning the prospective solvency of his/her em-
ployer. The numerical examples point out that the recommended MSCF ap-
proach may not identify problem companies. In addition, each appointed ac-
tuary's opinion will be based on a unique set of operating assumptions that 
may preclude the results from being compared cross sectionally or to an abso-
lute regulatory standard. For the stock approach, the OTS specifies the analytic 
methodology and the set of consistent assumptions. The OTS staff performs 
the calculations and interprets the results. 
Key words and phrases: solvency monitoring, insurance regulation, standard 
valuation law, thrifts, option pricing 
I ntrod uction 
One key function of insurance regulation is to collect, analyze, and 
distribute relevant information to assure the solidity or solvency of 
insurance companies (Kimball, 1961). This function presents a diffi-
cult challenge to regulators, however, who must balance the conflict-
ing interests of insurers, insureds, and guarantee fund contributors. In 
practice, regulation often evolves toward protecting the interests of the 
insurers.} In this context, development and implementation of effective 
solvency surveillance methods are necessary to minimize the potential 
detrimental impact of insolvency for insureds and guarantee funds. 
Recent trends in life insurance company insolvencies and expecta-
tions of future insolvencies provide sound incentive for analyzing and 
redirecting the solvency surveillance mechanisms employed by regula-
tors. In response, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) has moved to strengthen solvency regulation in the life insur-
ance industry. In 1990 the NAIC adopted the Actuarial Opinion and 
Memorandum Regulation as a supplement to the standard valuation 
law which mandates financial stress tests for life insurance companies.2 
Prescribed testing methods and assumptions subsequently have been 
developed and adopted by the Actuarial Standards Board, in Actuarial 
Standards of Practice No.7, Performing Cash Flow Testing for Insurers, 
and No. 22, Statutory Statements of Opinion Based on Asset Adequacy 
by Appointed Actuaries for Life and Health Insurers. The Actuarial Opin-
ion and Memorandum Regulation requires an opinion by an appointed 
ISee, for example, Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), and Becker (1983). 
2The NAIC's standard valuation model law specifies the mortality and interest rate 
assumptions to be used when valuing reserves. Either the current model law or similar 
legislation has been adopted by every state. 
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actuary regarding the adequacy of a life company's assets to retire its 
liabilities.3 Opinions will be required to accompany annual statements 
for all accounting periods following adoption of the supplement.4 The 
supplement essentially adds a significant and different regulatory re-
sponsibility to the appointed actuary's managerial responsibilities. 
The framework of the Actuarial Opinion and Memorandum Regu-
lation prescribes, but does not limit the actuary to, a methodology to 
be used in analyzing the adequacy of a life company's assets to retire 
expected liabilities under designated interest rate scenarios.s The prob-
lem addressed in this supplement is interest rate risk or the impact of 
changing interest rates on the value of assets and liabilities when their 
durations and maturities are not matched. The NAIC's method, known 
as multiple scenario cash-flow testing (MSCFT), requires forecasting the 
cash flows of present and expected future assets and liabilities for pre-
scribed interest rate scenarios and then comparing cash inflows to cash 
outflows over their expected lives. 
Prior to the NAIC's development of its financial stress test approach, 
similar efforts were underway at the Office of Thrift Supervision6 (OTS) 
to measure interest rate risk exposure of thrift institutions. The OTS 
net portfolio value model is a stock or mark-to-market? approach that 
relies on estimates of the present value of expected future cash flows 
from existing assets and liabilities under its own set of interest rate 
scenarios. These estimates of asset and liability market values for each 
interest rate scenario are compared to illustrate the impact of potential 
3The provision charges the appointed actuary to investigate asset default (C-l), un-
derwriting (C-2), and interest rate risk (C-3). This paper is concerned only in the pre-
scribed method for evaluating a life company's interest rate risk exposure. The stock 
and MSCF approaches, however, may be adapted to analyze the independent and/or 
dynamic impact of asset default risk, underwriting risk, and interest rate risk. A more 
powerful solvency test would include the dynamic impact of C-l, C-2, and C-3 risks. 
4The American Council of Life Insurance's General Bulletin No. 4836 reports that as 
of August 19, 1994 the supplement will be in effect for annual statements of periods 
ending December 31, 1994 and thereafter in 30 states and the District of Columbia. The 
supplement also will be in effect for annual statement periods ending on December 31, 
1995 and thereafter in six additional states and for annual statement periods ending 
December 31, 1996 and thereafter in one other state. 
sSee the "Report of the Special Advisory Committee on the Standard Valuation Law," 
NArC Proceedings, 1989, Vol. 2, p. 785. 
6The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is an agency of the U.S. federal government 
created by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA). Its primary responsibility is to regulate and supervise the U.S. savings and 
loans industry. The portfolio value model is the result of the FIRREA requirement that 
thrifts be subjected to financial stress tests. 
7The mark-to-market approach estimates the market value of all assets, off balance 
sheet items, and liabilities for a firm. Market value net worth is estimated by subtract-
ing the market value of all financial obligations from the market value of all assets. 
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interest rate changes on the market value of net worth or net portfolio 
value (market value of assets less market value of liabilities and off 
balance sheet contingent liabilities). 
The two methods (NAIC and OTS approaches) illustrate one key 
question, identified by Kahane et al. (1989): should solvency surveil-
lance approaches focus on existing assets and liabilities or should these 
approaches be extended to incorporate the impact of expected future 
changes in asset and/or liability structure? 
In perfect capital markets8 both approaches will produce similar 
results, as expectations concerning the future impact of exogenously 
determined variables necessary to forecast changes in expected future 
cash flows will be known and consistent across market participants and, 
therefore, also will be embedded in the market prices of assets and lia-
bilities. But under imperfect conditions, e.g., in situations where these 
expectations can vary, the approaches are likely to produce divergent 
pictures of solvency. 
The objective of this paper is to illustrate both approaches to finan-
cial stress testing and to analyze the feasibility of each as a regulatory 
tool. We argue that in developing and testing operating strategies, in-
corporating the impact of assumed future changes in the asset and/or 
liability structure that mayor may not describe actual future operations 
is advantageous from a firm's managerial perspective, but clouds the 
regulatory intent of the supplement. 
To illustrate, numerical examples representing each approach are 
developed from the assets and liabilities of three hypothetical life in-
surance companies.9 The operational procedures and results of the 
NAIC's MSCFT approach and the OTS stock approach are analyzed and 
compared. An option-based model similar to the one used by the OTS 
and on Wall Street is employed to estimate the present value and cash 
flows of each firm's assets and liabilities. The option-based model is 
essential in pricing the assets and liabilities of life insurance compa-
nies that contain embedded or explicit options and is the technically 
superior method for valuing all fixed or adjustable rate instruments. 
8Perfect capital markets typically are defined by the following characteristics: no 
transactions costs or taxes exist; assets are perfectly divisible and liquid; no constrain-
ing regulations; perfect competition; markets are informationally efficient; and partic-
ipants are rational expected utility maximizers. 
9The three hypothetical insurance companies are developed to demonstrate how the 
two different stress test approaches may be implemented and interpreted. These ex-
amples are not designed to provide a definitive statement about life insurance company 
interest rate risk. 
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2 Why is Solvency Surveillance Important? 
At least three market imperfections necessitate effective solvency 
surveillance in the insurance and thrift industries. First, information 
concerning the quality of assets and liabilities of life insurance com-
panies and thrifts is not known by all parties involved in insurance 
and banking transactions. Second, the existence of deposit insurance, 
state guarantee funds, and the limited liability of owners and managers 
enhances the possibility of moral hazard-induced operating decisions. 
Third, publicly available, negative solvency information may lead to a 
herd or contagion reaction by policyholders or depositors and produce 
runs on life insurance companies and thrifts. In each case, industry 
regulators serve an important function in mitigating information asym-
metry, monitoring company operations, and protecting the interests of 
producers and consumers. An effective solvency surveillance system is 
an important and necessary regulatory tool for mitigating these market 
imperfections. 
2.1 Role of Solvency Surveillance 
One of the most important benefits of insurance regulation is to val-
idate the solvency signals generated by life insurance companies. Cor-
respondingly, current and potential policyholders are concerned that 
after receiving premiums, life insurance companies will not be able to 
satisfy future claims. Alternatively, for depository institutions, current 
and potential depositors are concerned with the availability of their de-
posits. In addition, shareholders (owners), taxing authorities, and de-
posit insurers or state guarantee funds rely on regulators for regulatory 
verification of solvency signals. Because the life insurance industry has 
no guarantee system for policyholders, similar to the taxpayer-backed 
deposit guarantees of the thrift and commercial banking industries, it 
is imperative that regulators identify and resolve problems quickly with 
life companies that are at risk of not being able to meet their obligations 
in a timely manner. 
Strong solvency surveillance also may reduce the moral hazard cost 
associated with the limited liability of life company owners and man-
agers. Because of limited liability and higher potential gains, stock-
holders have an incentive to take more risk because they will not share 
in losses in excess of their stock value. The existence of deposit in-
surance for thrifts and the establishment of state insurance guarantee 
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funds for insurance policyholders lo have provided vehicles that enable 
owners and managers to shift the negative consequences of increased 
risk taking from policyholders and depositors to their respective guar-
antors. Anecdotal evidence of increased risk-taking behavior may be 
indicated by the changing asset/liability structure of the life insurance 
industry during the late 1980s. 
The shift by some companies to more risky asset/liability structures 
is due to modern consumers demanding products with competitive in-
vestment components; however, the existence of state guarantee funds 
has facilitated this shift. On the liability side, a shift has occurred 
from traditional life insurance products with a mortality component to 
pension-related products carrying interest rate guarantees with no mor-
tality component, many of which can redeemed before maturity. The 
life insurance premium to total income ratio!l declined from an aver-
age of 24.5 percent during the 1985-1987 period to 19 percent in 1990. 
In contrast, the annuity consideration to total income ratio increased 
from an 1985-1987 average of 27 percent to 58 percent in 1990. The 
competition among insurers that produced growth in annuity contracts 
also influenced some life insurers to seek higher returns by investing 
larger proportions of their assets in higher yield, lower liquidity assets 
such as junk bonds and commercial mortgages. 
2.2 Role of State Insurance Guarantee Funds 
State insurance guarantee funds are financed by ex post, pro rata 
assessments of the remaining solvent companies in the state when an 
insurance company fails. Thus, there is no 'a priori cost to the owners 
or managers of the failing company. This current method of assessment 
encourages a potential moral hazard cost to guarantee funds.l 2 Also, 
part of the cost of funding a state guarantee fund is borne by taxpayers 
in the form of state premium tax credits and federal income tax de-
ductions. Thus, the financial consequences of insolvency are borne by 
10 Since 1970 guarantee funds have been established in all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia. Since 1988 the NAIC Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association 
Model Act has provided a consistent framework for the structure of state insurance 
guarantee funds. 
II See the 1991 Life Insurance Fact Book for the data involved in the calculations. 
12Brewer et al. (l993a and 1993b) provide empirical evidence that the state premium 
tax pass-through provision of guarantee funds encourages increased risk taking by 
life insurance companies. The existence of moral hazard attributed to a third party 
guarantor commonly is discussed in the thrift crisis literature. The existence of moral 
hazard did not singularly cause the thrift crisiS; however, it was a factor contributing 
to its severity. 
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solvent companies and their policyholders, taxpayers, and, to a lesser 
extent, policyholders of the insolvent company.13 
2.3 The Negative Information Dilemma 
Managers and actuaries employed by life insurance companies can 
be assumed to act in the best interest of the owners. Consequently, they 
may fail to reveal negative information in a timely manner. To delay 
the loss of their jobs, managers and company-employed actuaries may 
report that a company is solvent when the company may be mark-to-
market insolvent if solvency surveillance reporting requirements allow 
considerable latitude in interpretation. It is reasonable to speculate that 
a delay in reporting relevant negative information may allow employees 
the time to seek employment elsewhere or time for the firm's fortunes 
to turn for the better. Belth (1993, p. 198) supports the contention that 
negative information concerning life insurer solvency may be delayed. 
He observes that most of the major life insurance companies that failed 
since 1991 had ratings in "A" or better categories from several rating 
agencies until shortly before they were seized by regulators. 
Reliance by regulators on book-value-based information seems to 
facilitate delaying behavior. Prior to the Actuarial Opinion and Memo-
randum Regulation, the data and information relied upon by regulators 
and policyholders to assess the financial viability of the company were 
in book value terms.14 It is widely recognized, however, that financial 
solvency only can be measured in market value terms.l s The problem 
with relying on book-value-based information is the lag between the 
time when market value measures will raise questions concerning sol-
vency and the time when book value data will indicate the same prob-
lems. The insolvency of First Executive Corporation is an excellent ex-
ample of this time lag. 
In 1991 the assets of First Executive Corporation were seized by 
California and New York regulators. 16 The seizure occurred after First 
13Most states establish limits to the liability of the guarantee fund for death benefits, 
cash value and guarantee investment contract withdrawals, annuity, and health bene-
fits. Som~ states limit guarantee fund liability only to contracts written by domestic 
insurers and/or to contracts held by residents. 
14For example, the NAIC's insurance regulatory information system (IRIS) consists of 
12 book-value-based ratios. Also, insurance rating companies typically rely on book 
value data. 
ISSee, for example, White (1991) for a thorough discussion of the implications of 
book versus market value financial reporting. 
16See Fenn and Cole (1992) for a description of the events leading to the seizure of 
First Executive Corporations assets. 
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Executive had written down $500 million in book value of junk bonds 
in 1990 and another $450 million in 1991 that depleted its book value 
net worth. The market value of the marked down assets, however, was 
significantly below book values in 1990 and 1991. Observers relying on 
mark-to-market net worth could have identified the insolvency much 
earlier. After its seizure in 1991 the amount by which the current value 
of First Executive's liabilities exceeded its assets was estimated to be 
more than $1 billion. This loss will be passed to the guarantee funds 
of California and New York. 
The motivation underlying the NAIC's provision is to lessen the 
impact of interest-rate-risk-induced insolvency. The key is to iden-
tify risky situations, via the stress test approach, in advance. The in-
formation developed under this framework can be used by regulators 
and company management to develop operating strategies that reduce 
or eliminate the possibility of insolvency resulting from interest rate 
changes. 
3 NAIC AND OTS Approaches 
Both the OTS's net portfolio value model and the NAIC's MSCFT at-
tempt to measure the impact of changing interest rates on the solvency 
of their respective institutions using financial stress tests. The MSCFT 
is a run-off approach that forecasts and examines the annual or quar-
terly net cash flows produced by the firm's existing and expected future 
assets and liabilities under different interest rate scenarios. The OTS17 
stock approach involves pricing or marking to market the existing as-
sets, off balance sheet items, and liabilities of the institution under 
different interest rate scenarios. The first fundamental difference be-
tween the two approaches is their asset liability perspective. The NAIC's 
approach starts with the firm's existing assets, liabilities, underwriting 
policy, investment policy, and claims-paying policy and incorporates ex-
pected future changes in the asset and/or liability structure attributable 
to future changes in underwriting, investment, and claims-paying poli-
cies. The NAIC's approach focuses on the question of whether under 
different interest rate scenarios the expected cash flows of the assets 
will be sufficient to cover the expected cash demands of liabilities. The 
NAIC's approach illustrates the impact of interest rate changes on ex-
pected future firm liquidity and solvency. 
17For a complete description of this approach, see The OTS Market Value Model, Cap-
ital Markets produced by Office of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G. Street, NW, Washington, 
D.C. 20552 and Gordon (1993). 
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In contrast, the OTS approach focuses on existing assets and liabili-
ties and under different interest rate scenarios addresses the question 
of whether the current market value of assets is greater than or equal 
to the current market value of liabilities. The OTS approach also il-
lustrates the impact of interest rate changes on a firm's liquidity and 
solvency. For example, when interest rates rise, life insurance compa-
nies are likely to incur increased contract surrenders and policy loan 
utilization at a time when the market value of the assets supporting 
liabilities has declined. In a liquidity shortage the fair market value 
of assets, rather than the amortized cost, is the amount of the firm's 
assets available to cover a firm's obligations. 
The second fundamental difference between the two approaches 
is the procedure required for implementation. To operationalize the 
MSCF approach, firm-specific assumptions must be made by the ap-
pOinted actuary concerning future underwriting, investment, claims-
paying policies, and the reinvestment of cash inflows. These endoge-
nous assumptions can influence the future asset and liability structure 
substantially. The supplement provides that appointed actuaries may 
rely on other company officials for these assumptions. The actuary 
must document the assumptions and note their source in a supporting 
memorandum. The NAIC's supplement also suggests that the actuary 
consider the insurer's policies and practices relative to the sale of assets 
prior to maturity and the disposal of assets with declining values. The 
analysis must contain cash-flow projections for assets and liabilities 
under seven interest rate scenarios: 
1. Level with no deviations; 
2. Uniformly increasing over ten years at 0.5 percent per year and 
then level; 
3. Uniformly increasing at 1 percent per year over five years and then 
uniformly decreasing at 1 percent per year to the original level at 
the end of ten years and then level; 
4. An immediate increase of 3 percent and then level; 
5. An immediate decrease of 3 percent and then level; 
6. Uniformly decreasing over ten years at 0.5 percent per year and 
then level; and 
7. Uniformly decreasing at 1 percent per year over five years and 
then uniformly increasing at 1 percent per year to the original 
level at the end of ten years and then level. 
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The appointed actuary's opinion must indicate whether the insurer has 
established sufficient reserves to assure that its reserves plus cash flow 
from its assets will meet the cash flow requirements of its liabilities. 
Operationalization of the stock approach varies significantly from 
that of the MSCF approach. Because the calculations are performed by 
the OTS staff, the OTS need only specify a valuation methodology and 
a uniform set of assumptions that will be consistent across all thrifts. 
The OTS approach first marks to market all assets, liabilities, and off 
balance sheet items to estimate the institution's mark-to-market port-
folio net worth under the current interest rate environment (the cur-
rent U.S. Treasury yield curve). Next, the model recalculates the in-. 
stitution's mark-to-market net worth under different interest rate sce-
narios. Specifically, the model projects mark-to-market net worth that 
would result from instantaneous, parallel shifts in the U.S. Treasury 
yield curve of -400, -300, -200, -100, + 1 00, +200, +300, and +400 basis 
points. The change in the mark-to-market net worth of the institution 
under the different interest rate scenarios provides a definitive measure 
of the institution's exposure to interest rate risk is 
There is a fundamental difference between the interest rate scenar-
ios that will facilitate the NAIC's run-off approach and the OTS option-
based, mark-to-market approach. The option-based model requires in-
terest rate scenarios that result in an instantaneous shift in the base 
yield curve that produces a monotonically flat, increasing, or decreas-
ing function. NAIC scenarios 3 and 7 do not facilitate use of the option-
based model as they must be interpreted as nonmonotonic yield curves 
from the mark-to-market perspective. 19 A change in the slope from pos-
itive to negative or vice versa in the yield curve will result in negative or 
large positive implied forward rates. The existence of a nonmonotonic 
yield curve and either negative or very large positive implied forward 
rates suggest that arbitrage opportunities would be available. The effi-
ciency of the U.S. Treasury market makes it difficult to believe that an 
interest rate scenario that creates arbitrage opportunities could exist 
for any reasonable length of time. Therefore, NAIC scenarios 3 and 7 
preclude the use of the option-based model and will not be analyzed in 
this paper. 
18 A measure of thrift solvency is the adequacy of the mark-to-market portfolio net 
worth to meet regulatory capital standards with either a plus or minus 300 basis point 
parallel shift in the U.S. Treasury yield curve. 
19The apparent interpretation of the application of the NArC's interest rate scenarios 
is that each scenario causes a series of (rather than instantaneous) parallel shifts in 
the current yield curve. For example, NArC scenario 3 would result in the current yield 
curve shifting upward by 1 percent each year for five years and subsequently shifting 
downward by 1 percent each year for the final five years. 
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A second difference between the NAIC and OTS interest rate sce-
narios concerns how each approach incorporates the risk of changing 
yield curve slopes. NAIC scenarios 2 and 6 explicitly address chang-
ing yield curve slope risk. The OTS approach incorporates changing 
yield curve slope risk in the interest rate process used to estimate the 
current market price of each contract. The interest rate process uses 
each base interest rate scenario to simulate 300 random possible in-
terest rate paths (yield curves) with varying slopes that are consistent 
with U.S. Treasury yield curves observed between 1980 and 1990. Each 
interest rate path is used to discount path specific cash flows that pre-
dict the path-specific current market price for each security or contract. 
The estimated current market value of the security or contract is the 
average of the 300 simulated path specific prices. 
To evaluate each of the two approaches it is necessary to identify 
the separate managerial and regulatory objectives of the supplement. 
Management's perspective is to assess the impact of various operating 
strategies on the market values of asset and liabilities or their relative 
cash flow consequences under varying economic scenarios. Therefore, 
it is important to incorporate firm-specific assumptions concerning 
current and future operating strategies. These assumptions, however, 
mayor may not describe actual future operations. From the regula-
tory perspective of validating firm solvency signals, the analytic method 
of choice should be applied consistently under homogeneous assump-
tions over time and across firms to produce comparative results. Other-
wise, it is possible that solvency opinions concerning similar firms will 
vary significantly due to reliance on different operating assumptions. 
Numerical examples are developed in the next section to facilitate a 
comparison of each approach under consistent operating assumptions. 
4 Numerical Examples 
The assets and liabilities of three hypothetical2o life insurance firms 
are employed to illustrate the stock and MSCF models. The difference 
between each firm is the degree of capitalization. The first firm's bal-
ance sheet is designed to produce a capital plus surplus to total asset ra-
tio (capital ratio) of 0.15 which is over twice the recent industry average 
20To maintain focus on the central main point of this paper, the assumptions lead· 
ing to the hypothetical insurance companies are designed to be abstract from the full 
scope of potential insurance company operations. Including more complex insurance 
contracts, other types of assets, or lengthening the time period over which the meth-
ods are analyzed would add greater complexity to the results without altering their 
fundamental structure or validity. 
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of 0.065. The second firm's balance sheet is designed to approximate 
the industry average with a capital ratio of 0.0627. The third firm's bal-
ance sheet is designed to approximate an undercapitalized firm with a 
capital ratio of 0.029. Each initial balance sheet is illustrated in the base 
case columns of Table I, Panels A, B, and C, respectively. The balance 
sheets are designed to be simple yet representative of typical asset and 
liability maturities. 
The assets consist of cash, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), princi-
pal only strips21 (PO), and ten year u.s. Treasury bonds (T-bonds). The 
dollar investment in MBS is altered for each firm to produce the differ-
ent capital ratios. $1.5 billion is invested in MBS for the first firm, $1.2 
billion for the second firm, and $1.1 billion for the third firm. Both the 
MBS and the PO have 30 year maturities and yield 7.5 percent. The MBS 
currently are priced at par and the PO at 43.1938. Both the MBS and PO 
assume a 0.004 loan servicing rate and carry a 66.6 basis point option-
adjusted spread (OAS) above the current Treasury term structure. The 
ten year T-bonds yield 6.6144 percent and currently are priced at par. 
The liabilities consist of term insurance and deferred annuities. The 
term insurance portfolio consists of $100 billion face value annually re-
newable term policies. Insured are 10,000 males at each age 25 through 
59. The composition of the group of insureds is constant in time. Each 
year new policies are written on 10,000 25-year-olds. All policies are 
terminated at the end of the year in which each insured reaches age 
59. Group mortality expense remain constant at the number of ex-
pected deaths in the group multiplied by the average policy face value. 
Expenses are ignored, as they will not influence the balance sheet; how-
ever, they easily could be included. A 5 percent profit loading is added 
to the pure premium of insurance products and carried to the asset 
side of the balance sheet. 
The single premium deferred life annuities were purchased by 10,000 
60-year-old males five years ago, of which 9,393.83 survive at this time. 
The annual annuity payment is $24,000 per annuitant and produces 
an annuity consideration reserve of $2,131,512,400. A 5 percent profit 
loading is added to this liability and carried to the asset side of the 
balance sheet. 
21 Mortgage·backed secuntIes may be stripped into two cash-flow components: 
interest-only cash flows (10) and principal-only cash f70ws (PO). The owner of a PO will 
receive monthly payments amounting to the principal payments made by the borrower 
into the pool of mortgages securitizing the mortgage-backed securities. The IO owners 
will receive the interest component. 
Table 1 
Mark-to-Market Life Insurance Company Balance Sheets 
Panel A: Above Average Capitalized Firm (Capital + Surplus) I Total Assets = 0.15 
Assets 
Cash 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Principal Only Strip 
Ten Year U.S. T-Bond 
Total Assets 
Liabilities and Net Worth 
Net Term Policy Reserves 
Net Annuity Reserves 
Total Liabilities 
Capital & Surplus 
Total Liabilities and Net Worth 
CS/TA 
(1) (2) 
Base Case 300 BP Parallel 
No Shift Upward Shift 
39,619,622 
1,500,000,000 
750,000,000 
900,000,000 
3,189,619,622 
577 ,000,000 
2, 13 1,512,400 
2,708,512,400 
481,1 07 ,222 
3,189,619,622 
0.15084 
39,619,622 
1,197,178,500 
456,042,881 
730,490,400 
2,423,331,403 
577 ,000,000 
1,716,720,052 
2,293,720,052 
129,611,351 
2,423,331,403 
0.05348 
(3) 
300 BP Parallel Down 
Shift 
39,619,622 
1,784,631,000 
1,296,927,452 
1,125,459,000 
4,246,637,074 
577 ,000,000 
2,752,206,600 
3,329,206,600 
917,430,474 
4,246,637,074 
0.21604 
(4) 
50 BP Per Year 
Upward Shift 
39,619,622 
1,093,129,500 
442,188,462 
623,571,300 
2,198,508,884 
577 ,000,000 
1,532,675,460 
2,109,675,460 
88,833,424 
2,198,508,884 
0.04041 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Mark-to-Market Life Insurance Company Balance Sheets 
Panel B: Average Capitalized Firm (Capital + Surplus) I Total Assets = 0.0627 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Base Case 300 BP Parallel 300 BP Parallel Down 50 BP Per Year 
No Shift Upward Shift Shift Upward Shift 
Assets 
Cash 39,619,622 39,619,622 39,619,622 39,619,622 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 1,200,000,000 957,742,800 1,427,704,800 874,503,600 
Principal Only Strip 750,000,000 456,042,881 1,296,927,453 442,188,462 
Ten Year U.S. T-Bond 900,000,000 730,490,400 1,125,459,000 623,571,300 
Total Assets 2,889,619,622 2,183,895,703 3,889,710,875 1,979,882,984 
Liabilities and Net Worth 
Net Term Policy Reserves 577 ,000,000 577 ,000,000 577,000,000 577 ,000,000 
Net Annuity Reserves 2, 131 ,512,400 1,716,720,052 2,752,206,600 1,532,675,460 
Total Liabilities 2,708,512,400 2,293,720,052 3,329,206,600 2,109,675,460 
Capital & Surplus 181,107,222 -109,824,349 560,504,275 -129,792,476 
Total Liabilities and Net Worth 2,889,619,622 2,183,895,703 3,889,710,875 1,979,882,984 
CS/TA 0.06268 -0.05029 0.14099 -0.06555 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Mark-to-Market Life Insurance Company Balance Sheets 
Panel C: Below Average Capitalized Firm (Capital + Surplus) I Total Assets = 0.029 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Base Case 300 BP Parallel 300 BP Parallel Down 50 BP Per Year 
No Shift Upward Shift Shift Upward Shift 
Assets 
Cash 39,619,622 39,619,622 39,619,622 39,619,622 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 1,100,000,000 877 ,930,900 1,308,729,400 801,628,300 
Principal Only Strip 750,000,000 456,042,881 1,296,927,453 442,188,462 
Ten Year U.S. T-Bond 900,000,000 730,490,400 1,125,459,000 623,571,300 
Total Assets 2,789,619,622 2,104,083,803 3,770,735,475 1,907,007,684 
Liabilities and Net Worth 
Net Term Policy Reserves 577 ,000,000 577 ,000,000 577,000,000 577 ,000,000 
Net Annuity Reserves 2,131,512,400 1,716,720,052 2,752,206,600 1,532,675,460 
Total Liabilities 2,708,512,400 2,293,720,052 3,329,206,600 2,109,675,460 
Capital & Surplus 81,107,222 -189,636,249 441,528,875 -202,667,776 
Total Liabilities and Net Worth 2,789,619,622 2,104,083,803 3,770,735,475 1,907,007,684 
CS/TA 0.02907 -0.09013 0.11709 -0.10627 
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The MSCF example is further simplified by omitting the impacts of 
expected changes in the asset liability structure. Making the assump-
tion that no changes will occur in the future asset liability structure 
is reasonable because too many possibilities exist to develop a reason-
able outlook for each. The forward nature of insurance and annuity 
contracts imply that by omitting expected future changes in the asset-
liability structure, the MSCFT results will be conservative assessments 
that are consistent across firms. It also is assumed that reinvestable 
funds are invested at the one year implied forward U.S. Treasury rate. 
Numerical examples of both the stock and MSCF approaches are 
developed with the three insurance firm balance sheets under the four 
rational interest rate scenarios. The interest rate scenarios are: 
• Level with no deviations; 
• A 300 basis point parallel upward shift in the term structure; 
• A 300 basis point downward shift in the term structure; and 
• A 50 basis point upward shift in the term structure in each of the 
next ten years. 
The appendix contains a brief discussion of the theoretical differences 
in each approach. 
5 Numerical Results 
The results of the stock analysis are shown in Table 1 with Panels A, 
B, and C representing the three levels of capitalization. The above aver-
age capitalized insurance company (Table 1, Panel A) always maintains 
a mark-to-market capital and surplus that is positive; thus, it is antici-
pated that this firm would be able to withstand significant increases in 
interest rates and severe changes in the economy and still remain sol-
vent. Alternatively, the capital ratios for the average (Table 1, Panel B) 
and the below average capitalized (Table 1, Panel C) firms become sig-
nificantly negative under both of the increasing interest rate scenarios. 
Thus, it is anticipated that neither the average nor the below average 
capitalized firms would remain solvent if the interest rate increases 
were realized in the near future and a need to liquidate assets would 
arise. 
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Tables 2 and 3 display the results of the MSCF approach. Table 2 
displays the first two years of the cash flow income statement for the 
current term structure of the average capitalized firm. Table 3 displays 
the first ten year cash flow revenues for each of the three companies 
for the four interest rate scenarios. For ease of comparison, the capital 
and surplus (mark-to-market net worth) and the capital ratios (CS/TA) 
obtained under the stock approach in Table 1 also are listed in Table 3. 
Table 2 
Annual Cash Flow Revenues 
(Base Case - Average Capitalization Firm) 
Cash Revenues: 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Interest on MBS 
Normal Payment of Principal 
Prepayment of Principal 
Principal Only Securities 
Normal Principal Payment 
Prepayment of Principal 
10 Year Treasury Interest 
Return of Reinvested Funds 
Term Insurance Premium 
Total of Revenue 
Cash Expenses 
Actuarial Cost of 
Term Insurance 
Actuarial Cost of Annuity 
Total Cash Expenses 
C.F. Earnings Before Taxes 
Taxes and Dividends 
Net Cash Flow After Taxes 
Year 1 
91,006,273 
10,374,911 
18,857,460 
6,484,319 
11,785,913 
59,529,596 
o 
605,849,980 
803,888,450 
577 ,000,000 
225,451,920 
802,451,900 
1,436,544 
215,481.6 
1,221,062 
Year 2 
88,332,528 
10,989,281 
48,441,096 
6,868,301 
30,275,686 
59,529,596 
1,283,731 
605,849,980 
851,570,240 
577 ,000,000 
222,250,510 
799,250,500 
52,319,744 
7,847,962 
44,471,784 
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Table 3 demonstrates that the cash flow revenues generated are pos-
itive in all years for the above average capitalized company; whereas 
for the below average and the average capitalized firms, negative an-
nual cash flow revenues are found in the early years for the scenarios 
involving increasing interest rates. With the average capitalized firm, 
initial year cash flows are negative for the increasing interest rate sce-
narios; however, net cash flows in all subsequent years are positive. 
With the below average capitalized firm, initial cash flows are negative 
for the base case and increasing interest rate scenarios; however, for 
all interest rate scenarios, net cash flows even for the below average 
capitalized firm subsequently become positive. 
The MSCF results do not seem to indicate future solvency concerns 
for the average and below average capitalized firms. In contrast, the 
stock approach test results indicate that the average and below aver-
age capitalized firms would have problems liquidating assets to sat-
isfy disintermediation or run induced contract redemptions. The MSCF 
method does not explicitly or implicitly address the possibility of dis-
intermediation,22 runs,23 or the asset liquidity problems that recently 
have plagued the life insurance industry. Many of the insolvencies that 
have occurred since the early 1990s are the outcome of operating strate-
gies developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s to deal with high in-
terest rates and increased product market competition. 
The net impact, that mayor may not be incorporated in the MSCF 
approach, is that assets, whose values typically are reported in book 
terms rather than lower market values, must be liquidated at a loss or 
effectively marked to market. Such losses can deplete or eliminate net 
worth or capital and surplus, as was the case in many of the early 1990s 
insolvencies. 
22 Disintermediation is the process where liabilities of the insurance company are 
involuntarily paid off due to policy surrenders or terminations of deferred annuity 
contracts and the funds are transferred to higher yielding investments in the general 
market. Similarly for thrifts, this occurs when depositors withdraw their deposits and 
reinvest them in higher yielding investments. 
23The possibility of disintermediation and/or runs in the life insurance industry also 
has received considerable attention in the media. This attention was initiated by an-
nouncements of significant losses in the value of commercial real estate owned by 
Mutual Benefit Life and The Travelers and in junk bonds owned by First Executive Cor-
poration. The prospect of runs is a difficult issue for regulators, as the potential impact 
of negative solvency information is that the holders of interest-sensitive life insurance 
and annuity contracts will redeem them. First Executive Corporation's two subsidiaries 
reportedly experienced more than $3 billion in redemptions while Mutual Benefit Life 
reportedly experienced more than $500 million in redemptions prior to being taken 
over by regulators. 
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Table 3 
Net Cash Flow After Taxes 
Panel A: Above Average Capitalized Firm 
300 BP 300BP 50 BP 
Year Base Case Shift UQ Shift Down UQ Per Year 
1 26,771,818 12,655,997 135,832,940 10,643,251 
2 98,704,176 55,731,060 477,233,090 47,118,232 
3 175,939,120 111,451,240 720,375,870 93,151,024 
4 205,575,780 146,603,970 694,296,510 126,135,810 
5 223,275,170 175,019,490 629,518,780 156,581,540 
6 237,654,780 202,031,490 557,733,630 189,134,930 
7 252,240,400 229,872,370 489,598,590 227,172,770 
8 267,919,230 259,158,020 428,027,900 274,503,040 
9 285,205,660 290,260,930 374,258,880 334,298,500 
10 304,457,540 323,470,110 328,775,970 407,902,850 
Capital & 
Surplus * 481,107,222 129,611,351 917,430,474 88,833,424 
CS/TA * 0.15084 0.05348 0.21604 0.04041 
Panel B: Average Capitalized Firm 
300 BP 300BP 50BP 
Year Base Case Shift UQ Shift Down UQ Per Year 
1 1,221,062 (11,115,062) 98,882,120 (12,791,344) 
2 44,471,784 6,378,944 385,982,300 (702,140) 
3 94,880,016 36,832,608 595,164,540 21,462,540 
4 105,842,660 50,649,772 564,104,640 32,922,554 
5 107,914,530 60,064,456 498,524,000 42,630,724 
6 109,031,090 69,773,928 427,595,810 54,290,440 
7 111,765,890 81,407,208 360,518,820 69,779,480 
8 116,828,950 95,478,744 299,966,500 91,110,808 
9 124,642,100 112,334,310 247,156,830 120,091,590 
10 135,509,860 132,266,370 202,560,960 157,933,760 
Capital & 
Surplus * 181,107,222 (109,824,349) 560,504,275 (129,792,476) 
CS/TA * 0.06268 -0.05029 0.14099 -0.06555 
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Table 3 (coot.) 
Net Cash Flow After Taxes 
Panel C: Below Average Capitalized Firm 
300 BP 300 BP 50BP 
Year Base Case Shift U{J Shift Down U{J Per Year 
1 (7,295,802) (19,038,748) 85,432,368 (20,602,858) 
2 26,394,336 (10,071,779) 351,036,190 ( 16,642,266) 
3 67,860,352 11,959,786 544,235,710 (2,433,584 ) 
4 72,537,664 18,665,076 510,393,860 1,851,504 
5 69,461,072 21 746,182 444,536,990 4,647,175 
6 66,156,600 25,688,116 374,286,210 9,342,330 
7 64,941,088 31,918,874 308,232,480 17,315,084 
8 66,465,540 40,919,028 248,872,110 29,980,058 
9 71,120,872 53,025,528 197,334,530 48,689,252 
10 79,193,888 68,531,872 154,047,970 74,610,688 
Capital & 
Surplus * 81,107,222 (189,636,249) 441,528,875 (202,667,776) 
CS/TA* 0.02907 -0.09013 0.11708 -0.10627 
* Note: The capital and surplus (mark-to-market net worth) and ratio of common 
stock to total assets (CS/TA) from the relevant balance sheet in Table 1 are 
included for comparison 
The consequence of focusing on expected cash flows and ignoring 
asset liquidity and the possibility of runs and disintermediation, espe-
cially during periods of rapidly changing interest rates, can be a failure 
to identify life companies that are at risk of being unable to withstand 
significant interest-rate-induced asset liquidations. 
The advantages of the stock approach in detecting solvency prob-
lems is obvious when Tables 1, 2, and 3 are compared. The impact of 
the different interest rate scenarios on mark-to-market capital and sur-
plus is unambiguously apparent. The stock approach results provide a 
definite answer to questions concerning the ability of a firm's existing 
assets to retire its existing liabilities when interest rates change.24 The 
current balance sheet is marked to market based on the current, observ-
able u.s. Treasury yield curve. The potential inconsistencies stemming 
241n addition to its use by regulators, the potential impact on the firm's solvency given 
different operating assumptions also may be illustrated using the stock approach. 
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from the assumptions regarding endogenously determined variables 
such as reinvestment rates, business growth rates, or future asset and 
liability structures are not evident. 
The advantage of the MSCF approach lies in its capability to facilitate 
developing and testing operating strategies that will optimize, within 
managerial and regulatory constraints, a life insurance company's in-
terest rate risk exposure. Once a problem has been identified, it is 
essential to analyze the economic consequences that various operat-
ing assumptions (such as product mix, pricing, and/or asset allocation 
strategies) can have on rectifying the problem. 
6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study addresses requirements of the 1990 supplement to the 
standard valuation law. We evaluate the regulatory effectiveness of 
the NAIC's recommended financial stress test for life insurance com-
panies, and we compare the NAIC approach to a similar stress test de-
signed by the OTS for the thrift industry. The NAIC's MSCFT requires 
the appointed actuary to forecast annual or quarterly net cash flows 
over a reasonable period for different interest rate scenarios and give 
an opinion concerning the expected solvency of the firm. From a reg-
ulatory perspective, the procedures necessary to implement the MSCF 
approach may not lead to consistent opinions. Alternatively, the OTS 
stock approach stress test marks to market all assets, off balance sheet 
activities, and liabilities for the current U.S. Treasury term structure and 
for different interest rate scenarios. The stock approach implementa-
tion procedures are clearly defined and are applied evenly across all 
thrifts. 
The MSCF approach indicates that the cash flows for each of this 
study'S hypothetical insurance firms should be adequate to satisfy ex-
pected future liabilities or that the firm can be expected to remain sol-
vent and have no liquidity problems. Alternatively, the stock approach 
indicates (using the same hypothetical life insurance companies, time 
frame, and data) that the current value of assets is less than the current 
value of liabilities for the average and below average capitalized firm 
during upward shifting interest rate scenarios. The stock approach re-
sults imply that the average and below average capitalized firms would 
have problems liquidating assets in the event of a run or disintermedi-
ation. 
In light of viable alternatives, M~CFT may not be the most effec-
tive surveillance tool. The results show that, relative to the OTS ap-
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proach, the MSCF approach may fail to identify potentially risky situ-
ations because of its dependence on assumptions concerning product 
mix, pricing, the future asset-liability structure, and reinvested returns. 
MSCFT is sensitive to these assumptions used to forecast cash flows 
and may not adequately incorporate the liquidity risk associated with 
assets. Also, no definitive criterion for assessing financial solvency is 
apparent with the MSCFT method. 
The MSCF approach is an effective managerial tool, however, in that 
it facilitates the simulation of the cash flows for prospective operating 
strategies under various economic scenarios. We suggest that employ-
ing both stress test methods will produce a superior solvency surveil-
lance mechanism and better managerial strategies for dealing with the 
interest rate, liquidity, mortality, and morbidity risks encountered by 
life insurance companies. 
In implementing the stress test approaches one additional critical 
concern emerges. The responsibility for the stress testing of thrifts lies 
with the OTS, while the responsibility for stress tests of life insurance 
firms falls on an actuary appointed and employed by the firm being 
tested. The conflicting incentive structure under which the appointed 
actuary must operate can be expected to influence at least some opin-
ions. Future amendments to the NAIC's supplement must address this 
issue. 
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Appendix 
The theoretical difference between the NAIC's MSCF approach and 
the OTS mark-to-market approach lies in the focus and methodologies 
of the analysis. 
The OTS mark-to-market approach focuses on the expectation of the 
market value of the firm's current set of assets and liabilities. Equation 
(2) below illustrates the process used in this paper to mark-to-market 
the firm's assets and liabilities of each hypothetical firm under each 
interest rate shift scenario: 
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where: 
E 
MVNW 
CFAijt 
CFLijt 
NA 
NL 
Mj(A) 
Mj(L) 
fijk(A) 
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E[MVNW] 
The (statistical) expectations operator; 
Current market value of net worth; 
Cash flows generated during time period t 
by asset j for interest rate path i; 
Cash flows generated during time period t 
by liability j for interest rate path i; 
Number of assets; 
Number of liabilities; 
Time to maturity for asset j; 
Time to maturity for liability j; 
(1) 
The time k implied monthly forward rate of interest for 
interest path i and asset j. 
The time k implied monthly forward rate of interest for 
interest path i and liability j. 
Equation (2) takes into account the impact of dynamic interest rate 
changes on the current value of assets and liabilities. Both assets and 
liabilities are priced given the cash flows generated under 300 differ-
ent possible interest rate paths. Thus, each of the 300 different interest 
rate paths will generate a different pattern of cash flows and a different 
set of discount rates. For interest rate scenarios of parallel shifts up 
and down of 300 basis points and up of 50 basis points per year for ten 
years in today's Treasury yield curve, the results provide a clear expec-
tation of the firm's capacity to absorb significant shifts in interest rates. 
The stock approach results also illustrate the possible consequences of 
disintermediation and/or runs. 
The MSCF approach focuses on a series of static comparisons of es-
timates or forecasts of the future cash flows that can be expected to be 
generated from both the current and expected future set of assets and 
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liabilities. This process is depicted in equation (3). Forecasting future 
cash flows requires assumptions concerning the future product mix, its 
pricing, the future asset liability structure, and reinvested returns. If 
e(.) denotes the set of assumptions, then 
NA NL 
CFt = L {CAjt I eA,d - L {CLjt I eL,k} 
j=l j=l 
for t = l,2, ... ,M and k = l,2, ... ,K 
where: 
CFt Net cash flows generated during period t; 
CAjt Asset j's cash flows during period t; 
CL jt Liability j's cash flows during period t; 
e A,k Assumptions for assets under scenario k; 
e A,k Assumptions for liabilities under scenario k; and 
K The number of operating scenarios examined. 
(2) 
The two methods will produce similar results when E[CFAijtJ = CAjtJ 
and E[CFLijtJ = CLjtJ for all j and t. This condition occurs when eA 
and eL in the MSCF approach are consistent with the assumptions of 
the stock approach (which are the current operating and capital struc-
ture) and the analysis is concerned only with the run-off of the current 
book of business. Small deviations from this condition can lead to sig-
nificantly different results. 
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HIV, AIDS, Markov Processes, and Health and 
Disability Insurance 
Steven Haberman* 
Abstract t 
This paper presents a Markov model of the transmission and development 
of HIV and AIDS. The Markov model is used to derive functions needed in the 
calculation of disability insurance premiums, reserves, and cash flows. An 
application to health insurance and disability insurance is provided. 
Key words and phrases: permanent health insurance, transition probabilities, 
premiums, cash flows 
1 Introduction 
In the late 1980s the Institute of Actuaries AIDS working party de-
veloped a Markov model of the transmission and spread of AIDS among 
(only) male homosexuals in the United Kingdom; see Daykin et al. (1988a, 
1988b, 1990), This model is, in many respects, similar to other mathe-
matical models proposed for the transmission and spread of AIDS.l 
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School of Mathematics, Statistics and Actuarial Science at City University, London. He 
obtained his masters degree in'mathematics from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. 
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tThis research work was performed under research contract SPES-CT91-0063. 
IThe use of Markov models in actuarial mathematics has been proposed by a num-
ber of authors; for example, see Waters (1984, 1989), Amsler (1988), Haberman (1988, 
1992), Hoem (1988), Wilkie (1988), Norberg (1988), Ramsay (1989), Continuous Mortal-
ity Investigation Report No. 12 (1991), Pitacco (1993), and Jones (1994). For a review 
of the mathematical models proposed for the transmission and spread of AIDS, see 
Haberman (1990). Markov models and their applications to life contingencies are in-
cluded in the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries' syllabus for their professional subject, 
actuarial mathematics (Subject D). See Chadburn et al. (1993). 
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The emphasis of actuarial models of HIV / AIDS has been the impact 
of HIV and AIDS on life insurance underwriting, life insurance premi-
ums, reserving, and, to a lesser extent, health insurance and pension 
provision. The Institute of Actuaries working party's model attempts 
(in their own words): "(t)o show the potential impact of HIV on mortal-
ity and morbidity and the implications for the use of existing actuarial 
bases and standard tables for premium rating and reserving". To ac-
complish this, the Institute of Actuaries working party developed an 
age-specific model that allows them to use the type of data that nor-
mally are available to an insurance company to do the following: (i) to 
consider the progress of individuals of a given age and gender through 
future calendar years, (ii) to consider the longer-term trend in transmis-
sion, and (iii) to produce numerical results (although not necessarily by 
analytical means). For these reasons, equilibrium models are of less 
interest. 
The objective of this paper is to develop a modified version of the In-
stitute of Actuaries AIDS working party model. This model then is used 
to determine the permanent health insurance (PHI) valuation functions 
needed for the calculation of net premiums and policy values. Exam-
ples are given to illustrate formulae and calculations that could be of 
value in supporting actuarial decisions on pricing and reserving for PHI. 
In practice, pricing is based on cash-flow models (as well as on present 
value considerations) using realistic assumptions and allowing for the 
cost of capital tied up in the establishment of reserves on a more strin-
gent basis. A brief discussion of the equations needed for cash-flow 
and profit-testing models is provided in Section 6. 
The approach advocated in this paper permits the development of 
partial derivatives of the key valuation functions so that their sensi-
tivities to changes in the underlying parameters (e.g., force of interest, 
transition intensities) can be measured explicitly. This information is 
intended to supplement the calculation of sensitivities based on inten-
sive computer-based calculations. An advantage of making these sim-
plified assumptions to the Institute of Actuaries AIDS working party's 
model is that the resulting simplified model provides an approxima-
tion to the transmission of HIV and development of AIDS without the 
restrictions to the male homosexual population. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief descrip-
tion of the Institute of Actuaries AIDS working party model. Section 3 
describes the modified model used throughout the rest of the paper. 
Section 4 describes the basics of PHI in the United Kingdom, while Sec-
tion 5 provides expressions for several PHI valuation functions. Section 
6 provides a mathematical description of the expected emerging costs 
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and cash flows. Finally, Section 7 provides various extensions and mod-
ifications to the model described in Section 3. 
2 Institute of Actuaries AIDS Working Party Model 
The Institute of Actuaries AIDS working party model is a Markov 
model of the transmission and the progression of HIV among male 
homosexuals only, with each cohort (of a single age) treated indepen-
dently. The model assumes that infection occurs from contact between 
two individuals homosexuals within a single age group.2 This assump-
tion is artificial, but if infections between those of different ages bal-
ance, it may be a reasonable representation of reality. The transition 
intensities between states are allowed to vary with attained age and 
time. The model allows for immigration of susceptibles and for normal 
mortality as well as extra mortality from AIDS. 
The AIDS working party made several other simplifying assump-
tions, including the follOWing: 
• That all males described as being at risk of infection behave in the 
same manner at anyone time. As a result, the probability of infec-
tion depends on the age of the individual at risk and the particular 
calendar year, but not on any subdivision according to frequency 
of sexual contact or frequency of change of sexual partner. 
• There are six states. The members of one cohort at age x may 
be in anyone of the six discrete states indicated in Figure 1. Five 
of these are live states: clear, at risk, immune, positive, and sick 
from AIDS. The sixth state is the dead state. 
Those in the clear state are those whose sexual activity puts them 
at no risk of becoming infected with HIV. They form the normal 
pre-AIDS population for comparative purposes. Those at risk are 
at risk of acquiring HIV infection through sexual contact with in-
fected persons. Those in the immune state are assumed to have 
acquired HIV infection and to be infectious, but to be immune 
from becoming sick from AIDS or dying from AIDS. Those in the 
positive state are HIV seropositive, but not yet sick from AIDS; 
they are infectious and not immune. 
• It is possible to distinguish those who are HIV seropositive from 
those who are sick from AIDS. In reality, there are several stages 
2This model ignores the possibility of heterosexual transmission of the disease and 
the effects of risk factors such as intravenous drug use and geographic location. 
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Figure 1 
Institute of Actuaries AIDS Working Party Model 
Sick from 
HIV + (1) AIDS (2) 
Dead (5) 
in the transition from HIY infection to death from AIDS. Those 
who are suffering from AIDS are highly infectious, but their sex-
ual activity may be reduced considerably. The model makes it 
possible to choose whether those sick from AIDS are treated as 
contributing to further infections or not . 
• The current age is part of the status and that transition intensi-
ties can vary by current age. In addition, because each age cohort 
(or year of birth cohort) is treated separately, each transition in-
tensity can be varied by calendar year; therefore, each cohort has 
its own set of transition intensities. Durations since entry to the 
states immune, positive, and sick from AIDS are also relevant to 
the transition intensities. 
Possible transitions are as shown in Figure 1. Those in any of the live 
states may die, and those who are sick from AIDS may die from AIDS or 
from causes other than AIDS. Those who are at risk may change their 
behavior and become clear, for example, by giving up sexual activity or 
by restricting themselves to one equally monogamous partner. There is 
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no representation in the model of transfer from clear to at risk. Those 
who are at risk may become infected; at that point, these persons im-
mediately are allocated either to the immune state or to the positive 
state in proportions that may depend on age (and on calendar year, 
although it seems unlikely that calendar year would exercise any influ-
ence). Those in the positive state may become sick from AIDS, if they 
do not die first. Infection is possible from the immunes, positives, and 
sick. 
In order not to increase the basic underlying numerical complexity 
inherent in the model, the Institute of Actuaries working party avoided 
introducing elements that depend on detailed assumptions about sex-
ual behaVior. 
The working party proceeded by establishing a complex series of or-
dinary and partial differential equations for the probabilities of survival 
in a state and of transition between states and then solving these equa-
tions by numerical methods, given assumptions about the form of the 
various transition intensities. In most applications, the working party 
considered the following functional forms for the transition intensities: 
• Transition from state 0 to state 1: Ao is a function of calendar 
time, attained age, and number of persons infected; 
• Transition from state 0 to state 3: Vo is a function of calendar 
time; 
• Transition from state 0 to state 4: A6 is zero; 
• Transition from state 1 to state 2: Ai is a function of duration in 
state 1; 
• Transition from state i to state 5: J1i is a function of attained age 
for i = 0 or 3 or a function of calendar time and attained age for 
i = 1,2. 
3 The Modified AIDS Model 
Given the complexity of the Institute of Actuaries AIDS working 
party model, Haberman (1992) suggested that it be modified along the 
lines described below so that Markov processes techniques can be ap-
plied. Figure 2 depicts the modified version of the model, with the 
identified states and the corresponding transition intensities. The ar-
rows indicate the directions of the transitions that are permitted in this 
model. 
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Figure 2 
Modified AIDS Model (Version 1) 
Clear ~ At Risk ~ HN+ -+- Sick from 
(3) ""0 (0) -\ (1) A, AIDS (2) 
,vf] v /0 ,v)-<, 'v ;<-L 
Dead (4) 
The proposed model is a continuous time Markov process with con-
stant transition intensities. Thus, a person in state 0 is subject to a 
constant force of progression out of state 0 into state 1, out of state 
o into state 3, and to a constant force of mortality out of state 0 into 
state 4. For a person in state 1, the possible transitions are to states 2 
and 4. For a person in state 2 or 3, the transitions are to state 4 only. 
Once a life leaves a state, it cannot return to that state. The constant 
transition intensities are as depicted in Figure 2, i.e., 
Ai Transition intensity from state i to state i + 1, for i = 0,1; 
l1i Force of mortality in state i, for i = 0,1,2,3; and 
Vo Transition intensity from state 0 to state 3. 
Because the transition intensities remain constant while an individual 
is in any state, a memoryless property exists. The length of time spent 
in the current state has no effect on the future length of time that the 
person will remain in this state. 
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We now consider how the model of the Institute of Actuaries AIDS 
working party (as described in Section 2) has been modified to fit with 
these assumptions. 
• First, the immune state is removed. 
• Second, the viewpoint is changed from that of the population as 
a whole to that of an individual male at risk who is considered 
to progress from state to state over time. We are concerned not 
with the spread of HIV in a population, but with the outcome for 
a particular individual. 
• Third, it is assumed that all transition intensities are constants, 
independent of attained age, duration in current state, and sec-
ular time. We acknowledge that this assumption contradicts the 
arguments of Daykin et al. (1988a, 1990) that explain the impor-
tance of these variables, in particular attained age, to an actuarial 
assessment of the effects of HIV and AIDS on survival prospects. 
Two arguments support this seemingly extreme assumption: 
1. The magnitude of the AIDS-related transition intensities out-
weighs the normal age-related mortality risk. Many of the 
AIDS working party simulations assume intensities that do 
not vary with respect to age; 
2. The desire to reach some analytical results does require, at 
least initially, some heroic assumptions. We believe that the 
results are, nevertheless, of value in pricing and reserving. 
• Fourth, it is assumed that the transition intensity from the at risk 
state to the seropositive state is constant and does not depend 
on the numbers of persons infected. This again is a simplify-
ing assumption to keep the resulting mathematical manipulations 
tractable.3 As noted by Daykin et al. (1990), a constant transition 
intensity from at risk to seropositive would be consistent with the 
exponential development of new cases of AIDS in the early stages 
of the epidemic. 
An advantage to making these simplifying assumptions to the origi-
nal model is that the model is now flexible enough to approximate the 
transmission of HIV and the development of AIDS without the restric-
tion to the male homosexual population mentioned in Section 2. 
3To allow for the effect of heterogeneity of risk and behavioral change, it would be 
reasonable to postulate an intensity that decreases with time as the epidemic develops. 
This assumption is not pursued here on the grounds of mathematical tractability. 
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Given these assumptions, the next step is to determine the transi-
tion probabilities. To this end, let Pi} (t) be the transition probability 
that a life now in state i will be in state j at t years from now. There 
are a number of different ways to set up equations for the required 
transition probabilities. A common approach used by actuaries (for ex-
ample, Ramsay (1989), Haberman (1992), and Jones (1994)) is to use 
the Chapman-Kolmogorov backward system of difference-differential 
equations. Because the transition intensities are assumed to be con-
stant, we obtain simple recursive solutions to these equations.4 
Assume that insurance is issued to a life in state i at time of issue, 
i.e., at t = O. It can easily be proved that 
POO(t) 
Pll(t) 
P22 (t) 
P33 (t) 
podt) 
e- lXot 
e- lX1t 
e-JJ2t 
e-JJ3t 
Ao (e-lX1t _ e- lXot ) 
lXo - lXl 
_A--,,1'-(e-JJ2t _ e- lX1t ) 
lXl - JJ2 
AoAl [ t -(lXl - JJ2)e- lXO 
(lXo - lXd(lXo - JJ2)( lX l - JJ2) 
+ (lXo - JJ2)e- lX1t - (lXo - lXl)e-JJ2t] 
Vo (e-JJ3t _ e- lXot ) 
lXo - JJ3 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
where lXo = Vo + JJo + Ao and lXl = Al + JJl. We note from the repre-
sentation of the model in Figure 2 that Pi} (t) = 0 for i < j and that 
P13(t) = P23(t) = O. 
The associated probabilities of dying (being in state 4) are given by 
the following expression: 
3 
P04 1 - L POj(t) 
j=o 
3 
P14 1 - L POj(t) 
j=l 
4For a thorough discussion of the Chapman-Kolmogorov backward system of 
difference-differential equations, see Cox and Miller (Chapter 4, 1965) or Karlin and 
Taylor (Chapter 4, 1975). 
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P24 1 - e-J1zt 
P34 1 - e-J13t • 
Alternatively, the equations for Pi} (t) can be obtained using matrix 
methods; see Cox and Miller (Chapter 4.5, 1965). 
4 Individual Permanent Health Insurance (PHI) 
Individual PHI policies are designed to provide a weekly or monthly 
income to an individual if he/she is prevented by sickness from work-
ing. In this sense, PHI policies provide disability income protection.s 
Policies are typically for a fixed term, usually ceasing at age 65 for males 
or age 60 for females. Once the insurance company has offered formally 
to provide the necessary cover and the first premium has been paid, the 
company cannot cancel the policy as long as the policyholder obeys the 
policy conditions, hence the name permanent health insurance.6 
Under the most common type of PHI policy, a weekly or monthly 
income is paid to the policyholder when he/she has been sick for longer 
than the deferred period'? The benefit continues to be paid until"the 
policyholder recovers or dies or until the age at which the policy term 
ceases. Because the insurer cannot cancel the policy, a policyholder 
who is sick permanently, or indefinitely, will receive the benefit until 
one of the above events occurs. With most poliCies, the premiums are 
waived while the income benefit is being paid. 
Some poliCies pay a benefit of a fixed level amount, while others pro-
vide a benefit that increases to protect the policyholder from inflation. 
There are various methods by which increases in benefit are provided, 
some of which are more effective than others. 
Another common feature in policy design is a benefit level that re-
duces with duration of the sickness claim. This is designed to encour-
age a return to work. The availability of the PHI benefit may lengthen the 
duration of sickness because of its effect on the minimum acceptable 
salary that would entice the sick individual to return to gainful employ-
ment (Le., the so-called reservation wage). We allow for the presence of 
such stepped benefits in our valuation formulae in a later section. 
SIn applying the model to disability insurance poliCies, it is assumed that at the start 
of the policy the individual policyholder is in state 0 and healthy and that the insurance 
company's underwriting or selection process ensures that this is true. 
6In the U.S. the descriptions noncancellable and guaranteed renewable are used. 
7The deferred period is the minimum period of time that the illness must last before 
the benefit begins. The deferred period is usually four, 13, or 26 weeks. 
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As PHI policies usually are affected to supplement the sickness bene-
fit available from an employer or the benefit payable from the national 
or state government (e.g., in the United Kingdom, the national insur-
ance scheme), the deferred period chosen by the policyholder tends to 
reflect the length of time after which these benefits reduce or (in the 
case of benefits from an employer) cease. The longer the deferred pe-
riod, the cheaper the cover and, hence, the lower the premium. Let us 
now consider the effect of introducing a deferred period of d years on 
the value of the policy. 
For the moment let us assume that a sickness claim is admitted only 
when full AIDS develops, i.e., the policyholder is in state 2. To calculate 
present values, we need the probability that an individual starting in 
state 0 is sick throughout the time interval (t - d, t), i.e., that the un-
derlying stochastic process is in state 2 throughout this time interval. 
In the absence of the deferred period, the probability that the policy-
holder is in state 2 at time t given that the policyholder was in state 0 at 
time 0 is P02 (t). It can be verified by appealing to the Markov property 
tha t P02 (t) can be written as 
P02(t) = f~ POdU)P22(t);).qdu. (9) 
We can adapt equation (9) for the presence of a deferred period. Let 
us define qd (t) to be the probability that a person in state 0 at time 
zero is in state 2 throughout the time interval [t - d, t]. Adapting the 
integral definition (9), we can write the following: 
qd(t) = f~-d POdU)P22(t - u)?qdu, for t > d. (10) 
If t :::; d, qd (t) = O. A more formal derivation of qd (t) is provided by Wa-
ters (1984). Such probabilities have been suggested for unemployment 
insurance by Haberman and Bloomfield (1990) and used extensively by 
eMIR (1991) for the calculation of PHI-based functions. 
To deal with sickness claims that are paid while the policyholder 
is in state 1 or state 2, let us define rd(t) to be the probability that a 
person in state 0 at time zero is in state 1 or state 2 throughout the 
time interval [t - d, tJ. Clearly, 
rt - d 
rd(t) = Jo POO(U)(Pll (t - u) + P12(t - u))i\odu, for t > d. (11) 
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Given the earlier results [equations (3) and (5)], it follows that equa-
tion (10) becomes: 
AOAle-J.l2 t [1 - e-(OQ-J.l2)(t-d) 1 - e-( OiO-J.l2)(t-d)] 
q,dt) = 
«Xo - (Xd «Xl - iJ2) «Xo - iJ2) 
(12) 
Similarly, from equations (I), (2), and (6), equation (11) becomes 
AO [A I e-J.l2 t (1 - e-(Oi l-J.l2)(t-d)) 
«Xo - (Xl) «Xl - iJ2) 
(iJl - iJ2)e- 0i1t (1 - e-( OiO-J.l2)(t-d))] 
+ . 
«XO - (Xl) 
(13) 
5 PHI Valuation Functions 
Following Daykin et al. (1988b), we recognize that a major difficulty 
in estimating the impact of HIV infection and AIDS on PHI business 
is knowing at what stage a PHI claim will be presented to the insurer. 
For the purposes of illustration of the methodology and the results, we 
consider here two extreme cases. 
Case 1: We assume that a claim only is admitted when full AIDS devel-
ops. In the case of a PHI policy with a d week deferred period, 
we assume that no benefit is payable until d weeks after AIDS has 
developed (Le., after entry to state 2). 
Case 2: We make the equally extreme assumption that claims are ad-
mitted on the basis of HIV seropositivity alone (Le., on entry to 
state 1) without requiring evidence of AIDS or any of the interme-
diate stages. 
Let A j (n, d) be the actuarial present value (under Case j) of a PHI 
benefit of one unit (per year) in an n year policy (with the n years mea-
sured from the inception of the policy) with deferred period of d, for 
j = 1,2. It follows that: 
Adn,d) f: e-8t qd(t)dt Case 1; 
AOAI [(al + a2 - a3)e-(O+J.l2)d - ale-(o+J.l2)n 
_a2 e-( OiO-J.l2)d e -(o+ Oio)n + a3e(Oil-J.l2)de-(o+0iJ}n] (14) 
fun e-otrd(t)dt Case 2; 
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Ao [AlaI (e-(o+fJ2)d - e-(O+fJ2)n) 
+ a3 {f.1I - /12 )(e-(o+cq)d _ e-(o+oC!)n) 
- (Ala4e«()(O-fJ2)d + as (/11 - /12)e«()(o-()(lld) 
x (e-(o+()(o)d _ e-(o+()(o)n)] (15) 
where the akS are constants such that their reciprocals are given by 
all (0<0 -/12)(0<1 - /12)(8 + /12) 
az1 (0<0 -/12)(0<0 - 0<1)(8 + 0<0) 
ail (0<1 -/12)(0<0 - 0<1)(8 + 0<1) 
a;j1 (0<1 -/12)(0<0 -/12)(8 + 0<0) 
as 1 (0<1 -/12)(0<0 - o<d(8 + 0<0). 
Given these results, it is possible to investigate the explicit forms for 
the partial derivatives of Al (n, d) and A2 (n, d) with respect to d. To 
illustrate, we present some numerical values for Adn, d) and A2 (n, d) 
based on equations (14) and (15) for different combinations of some of 
the key parameters. 
Following Daykin et al. (1990), we set /12 = 0.35 and /10 = /13 = 0.001 
throughout.8 We also set Vo = 0.10 and d = 0.07. Tables 1 to 3 present 
the magnitudes of Al (n, d) and A2 (11, d) for the values of Ao, AI, /11, n, 
and d shown. For convenience, we set Ao = Al in this presentation. The 
results indicate that Al (n, d) and A2 (n, d) both increase with increas-
ing 11, decreasing d, decreasing /11, and increasing Ao = AI. They further 
indicate the relative sensitivities of Al (11, d) and A2 (n, d) to changes 
in these parameters and that the ratio A1(n,d)/A2(n,d) decreases as 
Ao = Al increases. These results are as expected. 
We can compare these results with those given by Daykin et al. 
(1988b) for the discounted present value of additional sickness ben-
efits under a PHI policy allowing for the two extreme cases described 
above. Daykin et al. use different morbidity and mortality assumptions 
(intermediate between the sets underlying Tables 2 and 3). It is im-
possible to rerun their full model on modified assumptions; however, 
we can consider from their appendix tables the values of Al (n, d) and 
A2 (n, d) and the ratio of the present values under Cases 1 and 2 for 
comparison with Tables 1 through 3. The details appear in Table 4 for 
a deferred period of six months and two alternative terminating ages. 
BThe values /-10 = /-13 = 0.001 are approximately equivalent to the value of the force 
of mortality for a male age 30 to 34 according to English Life Table No 14. 
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Table 1 
Present Values of PHI Benefits: Ao = A, = 0.001 
Deferred Period: 3 Months 
Policy Terms {Years) 5 10 15 20 
100 AI 0.00077 0.00341 0.00655 0.00935 
100 A2 .764 2.442 3.673 4.842 
Ratio 992 716 561 518 
III = 0.01 
100 AI 0.00076 0.00332 0.00631 0.00889 
100 A2 0.752 2.172 3.511 4.569 
Ratio 989 654 566 514 
III = 0.05 
100 AI 0.00073 0.00299 0.00538 0.00721 
100A2 0.700 1.900 2.904 3.599 
Ratio 958 635 540 499 
Deferred Period: 6 Months 
Policy Terms {Years) 5 10 15 20 
100 AI 0.00061 0.00293 0.00576 0.00830 
100 A2 0.687 2.127 3.543 4.705 
Ratio 1130 726 615 567 
III = 0.01 
100 AI 0.00061 0.00286 0.00555 0.00790 
100 A2 0.675 2.059 3.381 4.432 
Ratio 1110 720 609 561 
III = 0.05 
100 AI 0.00058 0.00258 0.00474 0.00642 
100 A2 .623 1.788 2.776 3.465 
Ratio 1070 693 586 540 
The magnitude of Al (n, d) and A2(n, d) and the ratios are intermediate 
between those appearing in Tables 2 and 3 and display similar trends. 
In particular, we note the stability of the ratios as we consider different 
age ranges. Similarly, expressions for the present value of premiums 
and expenses can be developed, including the value of expenses related 
to the timing of the payment of the sickness benefit. Also, allowance 
can be made for a waiver of premium benefits and for stepped sickness 
benefits, i.e., a level of sickness income that depends on the current 
duration of sickness. 
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Table 2 
Present Value of PHI Benefits: Ao = Al = 0.01 
Deferred Period: 3 Months 
Policy Terms (Years) 5 10 15 20 
100 Al 0.0755 0.3257 0.6130 0.8586 
100 A2 7.507 21.567 34.655 44.890 
Ratio 99.5 66.2 56.5 52.3 
III = 0.01 
100 Al 0.0746 0.3178 0.5906 0.8168 
100A2 7.385 20.911 33.149 42.418 
Ratio 99.0 65.8 56.1 51.9 
III = 0.05 
100 Al 0.0710 0.2863 0.5049 0.6660 
100 A2 6.784 18.320 27.515 33.621 
Ratio 96.9 64.0 54.4 50.5 
Deferred Period: 6 Months 
Policy Terms (Years) 5 10 15 20 
100 Al 0.0600 .2802 .5396 .7629 
100 A2 6.745 20.458 33.405 43.584 
Ratio 112 73.0 61.9 57.1 
III = 0.01 
100 Al 0.0593 0.2736 0.5201 0.7265 
100 A2 6.625 19.806 31.904 41.117 
Ratio 112 72.3 61.3 56.6 
III = 0.05 
100 Al 0.0566 0.2472 0.4458 0.5937 
100 A2 6.125 17.231 26.288 32.339 
Ratio 108 70.0 59.0 54.5 
For example, let us take Case 1 (as discussed above, allowing for 
a waiver of premium benefit) where a sickness claim is admitted only 
when a transition is made to state 2 (the development of full AIDS). 
Also, let Pt be the annual premium payable at time t = 0, 1, ... , n - l. 
Then the actuarial present value of annual premiums (APVP) is given 
by: 
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Table 3 
Present Value of PHI Benefits: Ao = Al = 0.10 
Defened Period: 
3 Months 
Polici' Terms {Years 2 5 10 15 20 
100 Al 6.092 21.527 33.260 40.081 
100 A, 63.091 150.480 206.611 233.975 
Ratio 10.4 7.18 6.18 5.84 
!ll = 0.01 
100 Al 6.026 20.793 32.223 38.545 
100 A, 62.129 146.437 198.228 224.077 
Ratio 10.3 7.04 6.15 5.81 
!ll = 0.05 
100 Al 5.745 18.916 28.203 32.804 
100 A, 58.097 130.326 170.037 187.542 
Ratio 10.1 6.88 6.03 5.72 
Defened Period: 
6 Months 
Polici' Terms {Years) 5 10 15 20 
!ll = 0.001 
100 Al 4.895 18.475 29.524 35.867 
100 A, 56.689 142.179 196.820 225.057 
Ratio 11.6 7.70 6.67 6.27 
!ll = 0.01 
100 Al 4.845 18.081 28.616 34.503 
100 A, 55.748 138.163 189.466 215.189 
Ratio 11.5 7.64 6.62 6.24 
!ll = 0.05 
100 Al 4.630 16.485 25.088 29.398 
100 A, 51.809 122.173 161.403 178.784 
Ratio 11.2 7.41 6.43 6.08 
If the deferred period were d 1 and the level of sickness benefit were 
B per annum for sickness of durations u where d 1 < u :::; d 1 + d z and 
the level of sickness benefit were C per annum « B) for sickness of 
durations u where u > d 1 + dz, then the actuarial present value of the 
benefits (APVB) under Case i (where i = 1,2) is given by 
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Table 4 
Present Value of PHI Benefits 
According to the Daykin et aI. (1988b) Model 
Deferred Period Six Months 
Terminating Age of Policy: 60 
Policy Terms (Years) 10 15 20 
Assumption A 
100 Al 0.67 1.76 2.18 
100A2 16.77 24.26 26.12 
Ratio 25.00 14.00 12.00 
Assumptions Be 
100 Al 0.48 1.02 1.28 
100 A2 9.49 13.88 15.25 
Ratio 20.00 14.00 12.00 
Assumptions F 
100 Al 0.65 1.36 1.71 
100 A2 6.88 9.33 10.11 
Ratio 11.00 7.00 6.00 
Note on assumptions made by Daykin et al. (1988b) 
A. 110' Ill' 113 England and Wales population mortality 
'Ao 0.7 at ages 25-50, reducing to zero at ages 15 and 70 
Be. 
F. 
'AI Max [exp( -8.4 + l.4d), 2.5] where d = duration in state 1 
112 Normal mortality +0.7 
Yo 0 
110' Ill' 113 
'Ao 
'AI 
'A2 
Yo 
As for projection A 
As for projection A, but reducing linearly from 1987 to 
1992 to half initial intensity at all ages 
As for projection A 
As for projection A 
0.10 
As for projections A and Be 
As for projection Be 
As for projections A and Be 
Normal mortality +0.35 
As for projection Be 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
Present Value of PHI Benefits 
According to the Daykin et al. (1988b) Model 
Deferred Period Six Months 
Terminating Age of Policy: 65 
Policy Terms (Years) 10 15 20 
Assumption A 
100 Al 0.34 1.57 2.13 
100 A2 8.81 22.36 25.70 
Ratio 26.00 14.00 12.00 
Assumptions Be 
100 Al 0.25 0.90 1.25 
100 A2 4.71 12.13 14.83 
Ratio 19.00 13.00 12.00 
Assumptions F 
100 Al 0.38 1.25 1.65 
100 A2 3.96 8.54 9.93 
Ratio 10.00 7.00 6.00 
Note on assumptions made by Daykin et al. (1988b) 
A. flo, fll' fl3 England and Wales population mortality 
A,o 0.7 at ages 25-50, reducing to zero at ages 15 and 70 
A,I Max [exp( -804 + lAd), 2.5] where d = duration in state 1 
fl2 Normal mortality +0.7 
Yo 0 
Be. As for projection A 
As for projection A, but reducing linearly from 1987 to 
1992 to half initial intensity at all ages 
F. flo, fll' fl3 
A,o 
A,I 
A,2 
Yo 
As for projection A 
As for projection A 
0.10 
As for projections A and Be 
As for projection Be 
As for projections A and Be 
Normal mortality +0.35 
As for projection Be 
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6 Emerging Costs 
These ideas also can be applied to emerging costs and cash flow 
considerations. For illustration, we choose a simplified example. We 
consider a nonprofit PHI policy for a term of n years with a zero de-
ferred period (to simplify the algebra). The policy has annual premiums, 
Pt , being paid at times t 0,1, ... , n 1. The premium is not paid if 
the policyholder is sick at time L. We use Case 1 for the definition of 
sickness for purposes of illustration. 
Let us take the benefits provided by the policy to be: 
• A death benefit of D t payable at the end of the policy year if the 
policyholder dies during the t-th policy year (for t = 1,2, ... , n); 
• An income benefit if Bt payable at the end of the t-th year if the 
policyholder is then alive and sick (for t = 1,2, ... , n). 
We assume that the rate of interest in the t-th policy year is it and that 
the expected cash flow for the t-th policy year per policy alive and in 
state j at the start of the t-th policy year is CFi j ). It follows that 
{ 
(1 + idPt -1 - pj2(l)Bt - PjJ,(l)Dt if j = 0 or 1 
cFi
jj = -P22(I)Bt - P24(l)Dt if j = 2 
(1 + idPt -1 - P34(l)Dt if j = 3. 
Then, we define the expected costs (or cash flow) for the t-th policy 
year per policy originally issued to be ECt where 
3 
( 'j 
ECt = I CF/ POj(t - 1). 
j=O 
The above argument can be extended to allow for deferred periods, 
varying benefits, and transition intensities that are functions of attained 
age. If the Pts are net premiums (in the traditional sense of the term), 
then the equation of value for such a policy would, by definition, be 
given by 
00 
I e- iit ECt = O. 
t=l 
This provides an extension to the results given by Hare and McCutcheon 
(1991) in respect to conventional life insurance profit testing. 
Haberman: HIV, AIDS, Markov Processes 69 
7 Further Modifications to the Model 
7.1 Separating Incidence of Disability 
The discussion earlier is based on the model depicted in Figure 2 
and considers the two extreme cases (Case 1 and Case 2) of timing of a 
claim for disability income from a PHI policy. A more satisfactory ap-
proach is to recognize explicitly the existence of an intermediate state 
between HIV positive and AIDS for those who are sick and, hence, eligi-
ble for a claim. Figure 3 depicts the new model needed, with the states 
renumbered and the transition intensities as shown. A PHI claim would 
be accepted once a policyholder has entered state 2 (and the income 
benefit would be payable while he/she occupies either states 2 or 3). 
Figure 3 
Modified AIDS Model (Version 2) 
Clear At Risk ~ HIV + '\. Sick '\. AIDS / -, 
(4) vi (0) A (1) A, (2) A (3) 0 1-0 
,I,. ftt ,I,. to ," ?-' ,Vt'J. 'v (3 
Dead (5) 
This approach leads to no conceptual difficulties. We still must de-
velop the Chapman-Kolmogorov system of differential equations and 
solve for the transition probabilities Pij(t). The solutions are similar 
to that given in equations (1) to (6); see Ramsay (1989). For example, 
(17) 
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(18) 
where (Xo = Vo + 110 + i\o, (Xl = i\l + 111 and (X2 = i\2 + 112. 
To deal with sickness claims that are paid while the policyholder is 
in state 2 or state 3 in the presence of a deferred period d, we define 
Sd (t) to be the probability that a person in state 0 at time 0 is always 
in state 2 or state 3 during the time interval [t - d, tJ. Then as for 
equations (8) and (9), we obtain 
rt - d 
Sd(t) = Jo POdU)(P22(t - u) + PZ3(t - u))i\ldu, for t > d. (19) 
Substitution from equations (5), (17), and (18) leads to the following: 
i\oe-J1zt [1 -e-(CXj-cxz)(t-d) _ (1 - e-(CXo-CXZ)(t-d))] 
((Xo - (Xl) ((Xl - (X2) ((Xo - (X2) 
+ i\oe-J13t [i\l (1 - r(cx j-J13)(t-d)) 
((Xo - (Xd((X2 - 113) ((Xl - 113) 
_ i\2(l - e-(CXO- J13 )(t-d))] 
((Xo - 113) 
_ i\0i\2e-cxzt [(1_r(CX 1-CX2 )(t-d)) 
((Xo - (Xd((X2 - 113) ((Xl - (X2) 
(1 - r(cxo-cxz)(t-d)) ] 
((Xo - (X2) . (20) 
The actuarial present value of a PHI benefit of one unit (per year) in 
an n year policy with deferred period of d would be: 
A3(n,d) f: e-r5tsd(t)dt 
i\0i\dI12 - 113)(e-(8+cx2 )d - e-(8+cx2 )n) 
((X2 - 113)((XI - (Xz)((Xo - (X2)(8 + (X2) 
i\0i\1i\2 (e-(8+J13)d - e-(O+J13)n) 
+ ----~~~--------------~--
((X2 - 113)((XI - 113)((Xo - 113)(8 + 113) 
i\0i\dI12 - 113)e(CX j-cxz)d(e-(O+cxj}d - e-(o+cx1)n) 
((Xo - (Xd((Xl - (XZ)((X2 - 113)(8 + (Xl) 
i\0i\1 (112 - 113)e(CXo-cxz)d(e-(o+cxo)d - e-(o+cxo)n) 
+ ~~~--~~----~--------~----~ 
((Xo - (Xd ((Xo - (X2)((X2 - fJ3)(8 + (Xo) 
i\0i\1 i\2e(CX1-J13)d (e-(O+cxj}d - e-(o+cx1)n) 
((Xo - (Xl)((X2 - 113)((XI - 113)(8 + (Xl) 
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As an illustration of the numerical effect of separating the incidence 
of disability and receipt of the income benefit from the onset of AIDS, 
we present some sample values of A3 (n, d) in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Present Value of PHI Benefits: Modified Model 
Values of 100 A3 
Deferred Period: Three Months 
Policy Terms (Years) 
!:!I !:!? AI 11,2 5 10 15 20 
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.1 8.702 37.190 66.396 86.776 
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 8.454 34.488 58.916 74.394 
0.01 0.05 0.2 0.1 15.577 60.273 99.365 122.436 
0.01 0.05 0.2 0.2 15.121 55.690 87.587 104.136 
0.05 0.10 0.1 0.1 7.784 30.408 50.480 62.490 
0.05 0.10 0.1 0.2 7.600 28.602 45.928 55.514 
0.05 0.10 0.2 0.1 13.962 49.696 76.950 90.890 
0.05 0.10 0.2 0.2 13.622 46.619 69.704 80.376 
Deferred Period: Six Months 
Policy Terms (Years) 
!:!I !:!2 AI 11,2 5 10 15 20 
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.1 7.384 34.163 62.369 82.265 
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 7.139 31.467 54.898 69.892 
0.01 0.05 0.2 0.1 13.289 55.606 93.641 116.331 
0.01 0.05 0.2 0.2 12.837 51.032 81.874 98.043 
0.05 0.10 0.1 0.1 6.563 27.743 47.066 58.757 
0.05 0.10 0.1 0.2 6.380 25.942 42.519 51.788 
0.05 0.10 0.2 0.1 11.833 45.521 71.942 85.607 
0.05 0.10 0.2 0.2 11.496 42.450 64.705 75.102 
72 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
We retain the parameter values used in earlier tables (/10 = /14 = 
0.001, Vo = 0.10, 0 = 0.07, /13 = 0.35); we focus on Ao = 0.10 for direct 
comparison with Tables 3 and 4. Values have been chosen such that 
(Xi '* (X j for i '* j. As expected, the values of A3 (n, d) are intermediate 
between the two extreme estimates of Ai (n, d) al!d Az (n, d) presented 
earlier. We note the extent to which A3 (n, d) increases with increasing 
n and decreases with increasing d, decreases with increasing forces of 
mortality, and its relative sensitivity to the choice of Ai and relative 
insensitivity to the choice of Az. As expected, A3 (n, d) increases with 
increasing Ai (representing the rate of flow into the claiming state) and 
decreases with increasing Az (representing part of the rate of flow out of 
the claiming state). Space constraints prevent pursuing the sensitivities 
of A3 (n, d) further. 
7.2 Dependence on Time of Occupancy 
It would be more realistic to allow some transition intensities to de-
pend on the time spent in the current state since the latest transition 
into that state. This idea of duration dependence leads to the introduc-
tion of semi-Markov processes (Cox and Miller, 1965). 
The semi-Markov process can be described by a pair of continuous 
time stochastic processes {S(x),Z(x)} for x ~ O. Let S(x) represent 
the state of an individual at time (or age) x where S(x) E 1,2, ... , k. Let 
Z(x) denote the duration for an individual at time x of the temporary 
stay so far in the current state, Le., 
Z(x) = max{z : z :s; x and S(x - u) = S(x) for all u E [0, z]}. 
The event {S (x) = j n Z (x) = z} represents an individual being in state 
j at time x with a duration of z since the last transition into state j. 
We can follow the approach of Section 3 and define transition inten-
sities and probabilities and construct equations for the latter (which will 
be mixed integro-differential equations). The resulting expressions are 
complex. A useful approximation to the semi-Markov model is to follow 
the suggestion of Cox and Miller (1965) and introduce a number of sub-
states; this has been applied to actuarial problems by Norberg (1988) in 
considering select survival models and by Jones (1994) in considering 
multiple state models. 
The replacement of a state by a pair of states labeled "stable" and 
"unstable" together with the transition intensities that are independent 
of the time spent within each substate mimics approximately the be-
havior of a semi-Markov model. Figure 4 illustrates part of such a 
I 
Haberman: HIV, AIDS, Markov Processes 73 
model structure where we seek to approximate a duration dependence 
for transition from state 1 to state 2. State 1 becomes "HIV positive: 
unstable", and we add a further state 6, "HIY positive: stable". This 
modification can be implemented for the model discussed earlier and 
depicted in Figures 2 and 3. 
Figure 4 
Part of Modified AIDS Model (Version 3) 
HIV + Unstable Sick 
.... , (1) 
, 
(2) 
, 
\11 II' 
II HIV+ Stable I 
(6) 
,II 
Dead 
I (5) 
Another approximation that can be made is to model nonconstant 
intensity functions as piecewise constant functions. This preserves the 
mathematical tractability of constant forces while giving the flexibil-
ity of using nonconstant functions. For a further discussion, readers 
are referred to Cox and Miller (1965) and to Jones (1994) for actuarial 
applications. 
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Introduction 
A mortality table is an indispensable tool for actuaries. It can pro-
vide the actuaries with information on such items as survival proba-
bilities, average remaining lifetimes, and annuity values. The standard 
mortality table that actuaries use often comes from U.S. Bureau of the 
Census data or internal (large) company data sets. In practice, how-
ever, it is frequently necessary to adjust the mortality table in order to 
reflect certain mortality characteristics of a subpopulation that is not 
intrinsic to the summary aggregate population from which the various 
available standard mortality tables are developed. This is the case, for 
example, in situations involving medically impaired underwriting and 
in obtaining structured payment schemes for wrongful injury lawsuits 
and potential settlements. In these situations it is deSirable to adjust 
the mortality table to remain as close as possible to the chosen standard 
table while still obtaining a table reflecting the known characteristics 
of the individual. 
We provide an information theoretic method for actuaries and other 
financial analysts to incorporate new medical research results with the 
standard mortality table to generate the specific adjusted mortality ta-
ble needed to reflect the special aspects of the individual under study. 
2 rnformation Theory 
The information theoretic approach to statistics has been applied 
successfully to actuarial science in such important applications as uni-
variate and multivariate graduation, construction of loss distributions, 
etc. (cf., Brockett, 1991). Brockett and Zhang (1986) use this approach, 
for example, to create a model for graduating mortality rates. They later 
extended their results to encompass the quadratically constrained case 
(Zhang and Brockett, 1987). Brockett et al. (1991) also provide a new 
multivariate graduation method based upon a constrained information 
theoretic methodology. An application of the information theoretic ap-
proach to obtain a unifying approach to actuarial analysis can be found 
in Brockett (1991). 
Information theory originated in engineering communications the-
ory as a method to quantify the amount of uncertainty in an information 
transmittal (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). In the statistical literature, 
Kullback and Leibler (1951) first developed a measure of informational 
distance between two measures. Akaike (1973, 1977, 1978) points out 
how to use information theory to solve a number of important problems 
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in statistics, such as how to estimate the order in an autoregressive time 
series model, how to estimate the number of factors in a factor analysis 
model, and how to analyze contingency tables. There are many applica-
tions in the social sciences and in business-related subjects. Examples 
are shown in Charnes and Cooper (1974), Guiasu (1977), and Brockett 
and Cox (1984). 
In information theoretic notation, the expected information for dis-
tinguishing two measures p and q is denoted by I(plq). This expected 
information is mathematically quantified by the expected log-odds ra-
tio, i.e., 
where p and q are discrete with positive masses Pi and qi for i = a, a + 
1, ... , b for some pair of integers a and b. 
Applying Jensen's inequality to the function h(x) = x In(x) implies 
that I(plq) ~ 0 with I(plq) = 0 if and only if p = q. As a consequence, 
I(plq) can be thought of as the (pseudo-) distance or closeness between 
p and q within the space of all measures having equal total mass. 
In our application q will correspond to a standard mortality table, 
and p will correspond to the adjusted mortality. The adjustment will 
be done in such a way that I(plq) is minimized, i.e., we adjust as little 
as possible while still remaining true to the known constraints. 
3 The Data 
Small clinical studies often report information about certain disease 
and other factors that can affect mortality. One such study that will be 
used in this paper to demonstrate our methodology is the DeVivo et al. 
(1987) study of the mortality and morbidity of 5,131 individuals who 
sustained a spinal cord injury. They reported the overall seven year sur-
vival rate and the effect of several prognostic factors on survival. Their 
report shows that spinal cord injury mortality rates are significantly 
higher than the mortality rates in the standard table. 
More speCifically, four classes of injuries were investigated: incom-
plete paraplegia (abbreviated as "ip" in this paper), complete paraplegia 
(cp), incomplete quadriplegia (iq), and complete quadriplegia (cq). Pa-
tients at the beginning of the study are classified into different groups 
identified by severity of injury (ip, cp, iq and cq, respectively) and also 
cross classified by age at injury (1-24, 25-49, and 50+). Data consist-
ing of a seven year history of survival data are collected and analyzed. 
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Their results show that each level of injury severity has a different ef-
fect on the expectation of life. The authors conclude that age at injury 
and neurologic level and extent of lesion are all factors that have a sta-
tistically significant impact on survival. The overall cumulative seven 
year relative mortality ratios l from DeVivo et al. (1987) for this series 
of 5,131 patients are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Cumulative Seven Year Relative Mortality Ratios 
for Spinal Cord Injury Patients 
Neurologic Level 
Incomplete Paraplegia 
Complete Paraplegia 
Incomplete Quadriplegia 
Complete Quadriplegia 
Age at Time of Injury 
1-24 25-49 50+ 
4.82 6.59 3.26 
4.93 6.93 
4.22 6.71 
12.40 20.78 
3.26 
3.95 
14.11 
Source: DeVivo, M.l. et al. "Seven-Year Survival Following 
Spinal Cord Injury." Arch Neurol, 44 (1987): 872-875. 
4 Adjusting a Standard Table 
In implementing our mortality table adjustment process, we will use 
the force of mortality as our basic unit of analysis. A mortality rate 
is the number of deaths during a given time period divided by some 
measure of the number of lives exposed to the risk of death during 
this time period (cf., Brown, 1991). The simplest mortality rate is the 
so-called crude mortality rate, which is the ratio of observed number 
of deaths during age x to the number of persons who were alive at 
(age) x. For our purposes, however, we shall assume a constant force 
of mortality within each age interval, Le., /-lx+t = /-lx for x = 0,1, ... and 
o =::; t < 1, where /-lx+t is the force of mortality at age x + t. We find 
these two mortality rates (crude mortality rate and /-lx) are extremely 
close in absolute values_ 
As noted in the DeVivo et al. (1987) report, the modified mortality 
table obtained for spinal cord injury is affected most by age at injury, 
I The relative mortality ratio is defined as the number of persons dying during the 
study divided by the expected number of deaths during the study. 
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neurologic level, and extent of lesion. We first investigate how different 
medical injury severity affects the mortality profile. We assume that the 
level of injury (ip, cp, iq and cq, respectively) will influence the mortality 
force relative to the standard mortality rate J.lx by increasing the stan-
dard force by a constant amount J.lip, J.lcp, J.liq, and J.lcq, respectively. 
Thus, the force of mortality is J.lx + J.lip for incomplete paraplegics, etc.2 
The problem now becomes how to estimate J.lip in such a manner that 
the adjusted mortality table obtained exhibits the seven year relative 
mortality ratio given in Table 1. 
In order to obtain numerical results and model the relative mortali-
ties given in Table 1, we need to determine the exposure level, Ex, within 
the study population. DeVivo et al. (1987) only give a partial breakdown 
by the three age categories, as in Table 1 (with some additional infor-
mation such as mean age at injury, percentage of male). To be most 
accurate, one should take Ex as defined by the study population. When 
using secondary data, however, this information is often unavailable. 
Accordingly, one solution is to build a model to derive the values Ex for 
the study population distribution. The next section shows how one can 
use information theoretic techniques to develop this set of exposure 
values Ex that are consistent with the information about the patient 
profile given in DeVivo et al. (1987). These values are used to develop 
equations for mortality rates used later on in this paper. 
As commonly used in the mortality table, we take the upper age 
limit as 110. Accordingly, we set qllO equal to 1. It is common to 
have J.lo higher than J.lx for the early years, which indicates a relatively 
high infant mortality rate. Let Lx denote the number of lives age x last 
birthday, and qx be the probability of a life now age x dying before 
reaching age x + 1. Table 2 shows some of these values for the 1980 
U.S. Life Table. Note that J.lx = -In( 1 - qx) in Table 2. 
2 A more general way of defining the adjusted mortality rates would be p~ = apx +Pk, 
where k indicates the spinal cord injury level k. This definition, however, requires 
more information (a second equation in addition to equation (1)) in order to solve for 
parameters a and Pk. Because in this case we don't have enough information, we do not 
give numerical illustrations. In London(1985) this additional information is provided 
by the assumption that the average ages at death in the graduated and ungraduated 
series are equal. For spin,,] cord injured patients there is no information relating the 
expected average age at death of the injured patient to that of an uninjured person 
following the standard mortality curve. Hence, only the single equation (1) is imposed, 
and a single parameter Pk is introduced. If we did have enough information, the more 
general adjustment process should yield better results. 
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Table 2 
The Standard Mortality Table 
(1980 U.S. Life Table)* 
Lx qx 
100,000 0.01260 
98,740 0.00093 
98,648 0.00065 
98,584 0.00050 
33 0.36364 
21 1.000000 
J1x 
0.01268 
0.00093 
0.00065 
0.00050 
0.45199 
00 
* Source: Bowers, N.L., Jr., et al. Actuarial Math-
ematics. Itasca, Ill.: Society of Actuaries, 1986. 
The modified force of mortality are given as: 
, J1x + J1cp for complete paraplegia, 
{ 
J1x + J1ip for incomplete paraplegia, 
J1x = J1x + J1iq for incomplete quadriplegia, and 
J1x + J1cq for complete quadriplegia, 
where x = 1, ... , 1l0. 
The relative mortality ratios for each category shown in Table 1 are 
calculated in the standard actuarial manner as the ratios of observed 
to expected deaths. We can use these relative mortality ratios to com-
pute the expected deaths of spinal cord injury patients in terms of the 
standard mortality table. We constrain the expected number of deaths 
in the modified (derived) table to equal the number of deaths observed 
in the study. In other words, the following relationship should hold: 
Expected number of deaths = Actual number of deaths 
where the expected number of deaths is taken from the modified table. 
Because the DeVivo et al. medical study only gives seven year mortality 
rates, the above relationship becomes 
110 110 
L Ex(l - 7P:) = fk L Ex (1 - 7Px) (1) 
x=l x=l 
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where: 
tP: Pr[a life injured at age x survives t years, 
using the modified or adjusted table;] 
tPx Pr[a life injured at age x survives t years, 
using the standard table;] 
Ex The exposure (number of persons) age x in the study; 
fk The relative mortality ratio for neurologic injury 
severity level k, where k = ip, cp, iq, cq. 
In this context, fk is different for three age categories (cf., Table 1). 
83 
We take the starting age as 1 to be consistent with the age categories 
in Table 1. Rewriting equation (1), we have 
110 6 110 6 
L Ex(l- exp(- L (J.1x+j + J.1k))) = fk L Ex(l- exp(- L J.1x+j)) (2) 
x~l j~O x~l j~O 
Because Ex and J.1x+ j are assumed to be known, we may solve equation 
(2) to obtain: 
_ 1 [I~~OlEx(l-fk(l-eXp(-IJ~OJ.1x+j)))] 
J.1k - --In 110 6 . 
7 IX~lExexp(-Ij~oJ.1x+j) 
(3) 
Upon applying the actual data, the results obtained are presented in 
Table 3. 
Table 3 
Values Found Using Equation (3) 
Value 
J.1ip 0.013826 
J.1cp 
J.1iq 
J.1cq 
0.014248 
0.015494 
0.074946 
Intuitively, the inequalities J.1cp > J.1ip and J.1cq > J.1iq should hold 
(because within each pair a complete lesion is more extreme than an 
incomplete lesion). Accordingly, we expect a larger mortality rate for 
cp and cq than for ip and iq, respectively. The computed results support 
this intuition. 
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The standard mortality table is adjusted by a level amount for each 
neurologic level without consideration of different age categories. This 
is done to ascertain in general how much a spinal cord injury can af-
fect a person's expectation of life. The results show that this level is 
increasingly ordered as incomplete paraplegia, complete paraplegia, in-
complete quadriplegia, and complete quadriplegia. The effects of the 
first three neurologic levels are close, whereas complete quadriplegia 
has a much larger influence on mortality. 
5 The Study Population Distribution 
As mentioned in the previous section, an interesting subproblem of 
this study is how to derive Ex, the number of patients at age x in the 
study. DeVivo et al. (1987) only give a partial breakdown of Ex by three 
age categories, as in Table 1. One solution is to apply an information 
theoretic approach to minimize the information distance between the 
desired population distribution and a standard population distribution. 
For example, if we assume the standard population is a stationary 
population where Lx is the number of persons alive between age x and 
x + 1 in the entire population, we can develop an information theoretic 
model as follows: 
/1 
minI(EIL) = I Exln(Ex/Lx) 
x=a 
subject to 
Number of patients between ages a and b 
in the study (given); 
/1 
I xEx Average age of exposure of patients 
x=a 
times number of patients; and 
Ex ;:: Oforx=a,a+l, ... ,b. 
(4) 
Essentially, the solution of this information theoretic problem pro-
vides exposure values for imputation into equation (1) and subsequent 
equations. If the injured population were a random sample from the 
general population, the correct choice of Ex would be Lx from the stan-
dard table. Because the average age within each interval is given and is 
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not equal to the average age within each interval for the standard ta-
ble, however, an adjustment must be made. The process described can 
be thought of as determining an exposure distribution that is as close 
as possible to that which would be obtained were injuries randomly 
occurring in the population subject to the constraint expressed in the 
medical study concerning average exposure age in the interval. This is 
akin to applying the generalization of Laplace's principle of insufficient 
information, as described in Brockett (1991). 
DeVivo et al. (1987) present the following information concerning 
the study population. 
Table 4 
The Study Population in DeVivo et al. (1987) 
IP CP IQ CQ 
Age Interval 1-24 Years 
Number of Patients 417 688 688 741 
Average Age of Patients 19.0 19.3 18.9 19.0 
Age Interval 25-49 Years 
Number of Patients 424 656 506 426 
Average Age of Patients 33.7 33.8 34.6 32.7 
Age Interval 50+ Years 
Number of Patients 113 118 247 107 
Average Age of Patients 59.3 57.5 61.3 62.2 
Notes: IP = Incomplete Paraplegic; CP = Complete Paraplegic; IQ = 
Incomplete Quadriplegic; CQ = Complete Quadriplegic. 
Using the incomplete paraplegic exposure determination, for exam-
ple, we estimate Ex to be the solution of: 
subject to 
24 
24 
min L Ex In(Ex / Lx) 
x=l 
LEx 417 
x=l 
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24 
I xEx 19.0 x 417 = 7923 
x=l 
Ex :2: 0 for x = 1,2, ... ,24. 
These are the exposures used in our computations. If other information 
about the study population were given, it could be incorporated as a 
constraint. 
6 The Information Theoretic Approach 
We would like to incorporate the relationships obtained thus far to 
build an information theoretic model for mortality table adjustment. In 
the previous calculations we examine each level of the neurologic injury 
separately. Now we will relax this assumption. We want simultaneously 
to find four series of mortality rates Ox,k corresponding to each neu-
rologic level and extent of lesion k. We do this using an information 
theoretic approach-namely, we choose Ox,k to minimize the informa-
tion theoretic distance of the Ox,k'S from fJx'S, which also satisfies the 
previously known constraints on the Ox,k'S.3 These constraints imply 
the Ox,k series should: 
• Increase with age; 
• Be convex; 
• Be smooth; 
• Have the number of deaths in the adjusted table using Ox match 
the number of deaths found empirically by the DeVivo et al. (1987) 
study; 
• Have an ordered relationship between different neurologic sever-
ity levels; and 
• Be nonnegative. 
Accordingly, the modified mortality table is obtained as the solution 
to: 
110 
minI(lllfJ) = I I Ox,k In(ox,k/fJx) 
k x=l 
(5) 
3 Any distance measure on the space of probability distributions could have been 
used in the objective function with similar results. There are strong conceptual and 
interpretation reasons for selecting the information theoretic distance, as discussed in 
detail in Brockett (1991) and Kullback (1959). 
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subject to 
::::: 0, (6) 
::::: 0, (7) 
~ M, (8) 
x=l 
110 6 110 6 
L Ex(l - exp(- L Dx+),k)) fk L Ex(l- exp(- L 11x+))) (9) 
x=l )=0 x=l )=0 
Dx,cp ::::: Dx,iP Dx,cq ::::: Dx,iq (10) 
Dx,k ::::: 0, (11) 
where x = 1, ... , 11 0; k = ip, cp, iq, cq. As in Brockett and Zhang (1986), 
the constraints (6), (7), and (8) may be rewritten in matrix notation for 
easy input into commercial nonlinear programming codes. 
This nonlinear mathematical programming model is solved using 
GAMS4 (general algebraic modeling system). The optimal solutions are 
found qUickly using this computer program (cf., Brooke et al., 1992). 
Any commercial nonlinear programming code could be used to solve 
this problem, however. According to Brockett (1991), the resulting se-
ries Dx,k can be interpreted as the adjusted mortality rates for different 
neurologic injury levels that are empirically least distinguishable from 
the standard mortality table and that satisfy the given set of constraints. 
The numerical series depicted in Figure 1 are obtained using the 
value of the parameter M in equation (8) set to the value I (6. 3 I1x) 2 cor-
responding to the smoothness in the standard table used. The choice of 
M determines the smoothness of the adjusted table and has the same 
effect on the final mortality table appearance as the smoothness trade-
off parameter does in ordinary Whittaker-Henderson graduation. We 
choose M to be the value I(6. 3 I1x)2 calculated using the standard mor-
tality rates I1x to force no more smoothness on the resultant table than 
that intrinsic in the standard table. If there were biological (or other) 
reasons to assume the adjusted table should be more (or less) smooth 
than the standard table, a smaller (or larger) value of M could be used. 
For the standard 1980 U.S. life table used in our illustrative example, 
we calculate M which was used in constraint (8) 
"" 3 2 M = L (6. I1x) = 0.008. 
4GAMS is designed to construct and solve large or complex mathematical program-
ming models. It can solve various types of mathematical programming problem, such 
as linear programming, nonlinear programming, and mixed integer programming. 
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Figure 1 shows the logarithms of the adjusted mortality rate for 
each neurologic level that are derived by the information theoretic ap-
proach. We also plot logarithms of the standard mortality rate in each 
chart. We note that In(ox,ip), In(ox,cp), and In(ox,iq) all have a smooth 
pattern and are consistently higher than In(Jix) (shown as In(std) in 
Figure 1). In(ox,cp) is larger in absolute value than In(ox,ip)' The dif-
ferences between the adjusted mortality rates In(ox,ip), In(ox,cp), and 
In(ox,iq) and the standard mortality rate Jix appear to be the largest 
between age 40 and 50, while the disparity becomes smaller after age 
55. At the latest years of life these differences almost disappear, per-
haps because at this stage the natural driving force of mortality is so 
large that other reasons are not as important. Complete quadriplegia 
seems to have such a big influence on the mortality rate that age is a 
much less important factor. The adjusted mortality rate for complete 
quadriplegia shows only a moderate increase as age increases. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper provides actuaries with a method of modifying a standard 
mortality table by incorporating results from a medical study. Although 
we often don't have a complete information set, we still may pursue the 
construction of a mortality table for the compared or substandard life 
using grouped medical study results and reasonable statistical assump-
tions. 
The information theoretic approach utilized in this paper provides 
an effective method for incorporating such information into the mor-
tality table. Poor information about the age distribution of participants 
in the medical study hurts the precision of our model. Additional infor-
mation, if available, could be incorporated into the analysis by adding 
to the constraint set of equations (6) through (11). 
Other methods for incorporating information can be developed, for 
example, by using Cox's proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972). This 
method of incorporating covariate information into a mortality table 
adjustment is presented in Brockett and Cox (1983). The Cox propor-
tional hazard model uses different information than that used in the ad-
justment methodology presented here; however, it is a well-developed 
methodology for use when covariate (as opposed to relative mortality) 
information is available at an individual level of data (as opposed to 
published summary grouped data). See Brockett and Cox (1983) for 
details of the mathematics within an actuarial context. A recent pa-
per by England and Haberman (1993) also proposes an approach based 
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on multiplicative models for the force of mortality function with vari-
ous observed covariates affecting the force of mortality. Models are fit 
and parameters estimated using the theory of generalized linear mod-
els. Their results provide a statistically rigorous method for deriving 
mortality tables for impaired lives when there is covariate information 
available about the individuals. 
Of potential importance in constructing a mortality table for im-
paired lives is the advent of medical advances to decrease relative mor-
tality differentials in the future. Such adjustments also can be incor-
porated into this analysis provided there are adequate data to allow 
analysis. Competing risk models (cf., Arnold and Brockett 1983) can be 
used to obtain a mortality table appropriate for analysis when a par-
ticular cause of death has been eliminated. Cause-specific mortality 
tables must be used, and such tables are not available for spinal cord 
injury persons at this time. Research also is being done on how to use 
other secondary grouped data and how to make the results from several 
studies with different formats compatible. 
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Simulation of Investment Returns for a Money 
Purchase Fund 
M. Zaki Khorasanee* 
Abstract t 
This paper examines the problem of investment risk in money purchase 
pension plans. The disadvantages of modeling equity returns as indepen-
dent, identically distributed random variables are conSidered, and a modified 
stochastic model of equity returns is proposed. This modified stochastic model 
is used to estimate the variability in a plan member's retirement fund and to 
compare various alternatives to investing 100 percent of the assets in ordi-
nary shares. Varying conclusions are drawn about the likely success of these 
alternative investment strategies in reducing investment risk. 
Key words and phrases: pension plan, defined contributions, dividend yield, 
investment risk 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Defined Benefit and Money Purchase Pension Plans 
In defined benefit pension plans the pension benefit is calculated 
from a set mathematical formula. The most common approach is for 
the pension to equal a fixed fraction of the member's salary close to 
retirement multiplied by the number of years of service with the em-
ployer. Such arrangements usually are described as final salary plans. 
*M. Zaki Khorasanee, B.A., F.I.A., is a lecturer in the Department of Actuarial Science 
and Statistics at City University, England. He obtained his B.A. degree in 1985 from 
Cambridge University, and has worked for six years as a pension actuary with various 
consulting firms in the London area. He is a Fellow of the Institute of Actuaries. 
Mr. Khorasanee's address is: Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics, 
City University, Northampton Square, London ECl V OHB, England. Internet address: 
m.z.khorasanee@city.ac.uk 
tThis research was performed under EC Contract SPEC-CT91-0063. 
93 
94 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
From the employees' perspective, final salary plans have the advan-
tage of providing pensions linked to their retirement income needs. 
New entrants to the plan can predict what fraction of their earnings 
will be replaced by the plan should they stay in service until retire-
ment. Moreover, provided that an employee's salary increases at a rate 
not lower than the rate of price inflation, the real value of the pension 
(in terms of its future purchasing power) has a lower bound. 
A money purchase pension plan is fundamentally different; it is a 
defined contribution plan where the objective is to set aside a fraction of 
the member's salary for contributions to the pension plan. The fraction 
is determined by an agreed upon mathematical formula. The pension 
at retirement is an annuity purchased by the member's accumulated 
fund, the value of which depends on investment returns over the same 
member's period of service. 
A comparison by Bodie (1989) based on historic United Kingdom 
investment and earnings data for a money purchase plan in which con-
tributions of 10 percent of earnings are invested in ordinary shares 
shows that the pension of a United Kingdom employee with 20 years 
of service retiring in one of the years from 1970 to 1987 would have 
varied between 13 percent and 41 percent of final salary. 
Nevertheless, money purchase plans have become increasingly preva-
lent in both the United States and the United Kingdom for a variety of 
reasons. This paper examines the problem of investment risk in such 
plans and assesses the validity of various strategies that may be em-
ployed to limit this risk. 
1.2 Outline of Paper 
Our approach is first to develop a stochastic investment model for 
equity returns net of wage inflation. The reasons for focusing on re-
turns net of wage inflation are twofold. First, contributions to money 
purchase plans are usually a fixed percentage of the employee's salary. 
Second, it is desirable for an employee's retirement fund to be mea-
sured relative to the projected salary at retirement. Thus, it is natural 
to use currency units adjusted for future wage inflation, in which case 
returns also must be measured relative to wage inflation. 
In particular, in Section 2 we derive formulae for the mean and vari-
ance of a money purchase fund, assuming net annual returns are inde-
pendent and identically distributed lognormal random variables. It is 
shown that this model, however, overstates the variability in the retire-
ment fund. In Section 3 we develop a modified stochastic investment 
model that employs certain aspects of Wilkie's (1986) model. This mod-
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ified model is used throughout the rest of the paper. Sections 4, 5, and 
6 examine the impact of switching the fund to low risk assets near to re-
tirement, the impact of balanced investment strategies, and the use of 
derivative-based investment products, respectively. Section 7 contains 
a summary and implications for pension plan design. 
1.3 Notation 
We assume that a contribution of one unit is paid annually at the 
start of each year into a pension plan member's fund. All amounts and 
returns are expressed in terms of constant earnings. 
Let 
Xo Youngest entry age to a money purchase plan; 
y Normal retirement age, e.g., 62 or 65; 
n y - Xo = Maximum number of years to normal retirement; 
x Xo + to = Current age of a plan member in mid-career; 
t Time since member was age xo, with t = 0,1, ... ; 
F(t) Actual fund at time t; 
F(O) 0; and 
8 t Average force of interest between t and t + 1. 
It follows that: 
F(t + 1) = (F(t) + l)e Dt • (1) 
2 The Independent Lognormal Returns Model 
We now derive expressions for the expected value and variance of 
the fund at retirement for a member at any age. The following assump-
tions are needed: 
Assumption 1: The annual investment returns (net of wage inflation) 
form a sequence of independent, identically distributed, lognor-
mal random variables; and 
Assumption 2: A member age x, where Xo :s: x < y, already has accu-
mulated a fund equal to its expected value on entering the plan at 
age Xo. 
Assumption 1 implies that 
(2) 
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and that the annual investment return (net of wage inflation) in any year 
is independent of the fund value at the start of that year. This indepen-
dence makes it easy to derive expressions for the mean and variance of 
F (t). The second assumption is intended to cover the case of members 
who enter the plan in mid-career, bringing with them transfer values. 
2.1 Mean and Variance of the Fund 
Because eO t is lognormally distributed, then from Assumption 1 and 
equation (1) we can deduce that: 
E[F(t + 1)] = (E[F(t)] + 1)e!1+~u2. 
As F(O) = 0, equation (3) yields 
where 
E[F(t)] = (1 + r) ((1 + r)t - 1) 
r 
I ? 
r = e!1+zlT" - 1 
is the expected annual return net of wage inflation. 
(3) 
(4) 
We now derive the variance of the projected retirement fund of a 
member age x who has accumulated a fund equal to its expected value. 
It is well known [see, for example, Bowers et al. 1986, Chapter 2, equa-
tion (2.2.11), p. 29] that for any two random variables Wand V, 
Yar[W] = Yar[E[W!Vll + E[Yar[W!Vll. 
So, from equation (1), let 
W = F(t + 1) = (F(t) + l)V and V = eOt . 
Note that V is a lognormal random variable with 
1 2 2 2 2 
E[V] = e!i+ zu and Yar[V] = e !1+U (eU - 1). 
It follows from Assumption 1 above that 
Yar[F(t + 1)] Yar[(E[F(t)] + l)eOt ] + E[e20tYar[F(t)]] 
(E[F(t)] + 1)2Yar[eOt ] + e2!1+ 2U2 Yar[F(t)] 
e2!1W2 ((E[F(t)] + 1)2(eU2 -1) 
(5) 
+ e2!1+ 2U2Yar[F (t)]). (6) 
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Now equation (6) is the first order linear difference equation in 
Var[F(t)]. From Mickens (1987, Chapter 2.2), the solution to a first 
order linear difference equation of the form 
Yt+l = PtYt + qt, t = 0,1,2, ... 
for t = 1,2, ... , is given as 
(7) 
To solve equation (6), let 
e 211+2cr2 
e2JJ +cr
2
(ecr
2 
-1)(E[F(t)] + 1)2. 
Hence, as Var[F(O)] = 0, we have 
t-l 
Var[F(t)] = e2tJJ+(2t-l)cr2(ecr2 -1) L e- 2i (JJ+cr 2 ) (1 +E[F(i)])2. (8) 
i=O 
This equation can be simplified further because of the simple form that 
E [F (t)] takes in equation (4). 
2.2 Parameters Estimated From Past Equity Returns 
Estimators for the mean and standard deviation of the force of inter-
est are obtained from United Kingdom equity index returns and average 
earnings data from 1950 to 1993. The equity returns are taken from the 
BZW1 equity index and the earnings data from government statistics. 
The following estimators are obtained for J1 and u: 
p = 0.052 and a- = 0.2556 
The estimate a- is larger than expected, particularly if one believes 
that equity returns are correlated, to some extent, with wage and price 
inflation. The data suggest, however, that there is little correlation 
IThe BZW equity index is a representative stock price index for ordinary shares 
traded in the United Kingdom. This index is compiled by the investment bank Barclays 
de Zoete Wedd (hence BZW). We have used annual returns on the index as calculated 
by BZW, which allow for the reinvestment of gross dividends. 
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when returns are measured over annual intervals.2 In addition, the 
period covered includes the crash/recovery scenario of 1974 and 1975, 
which has a significant effect on the measured standard deviation. 
Using equations (4) and (8) and the above estimates P and fr gives, 
for example: 
E[ho] = 54.5 and U(F20) = 55.8. 
Although it is possible (given the skewed nature of the distribution) 
for the standard deviation of the fund to exceed its expected value, 
the figure obtained is nevertheless implausibly high and not consistent 
with the empirical studies to which Bodie refers. 
It may be incorrect to assume that annual equity returns net of wage 
inflation are independent when estimating the variability in funds ac-
cumulated over long periods. In making such an assumption, we ig-
nore the fact that the average dividend yield on ordinary shares tends 
to fluctuate around a central value that may be comparatively stable. 
This effect will tend to reduce the variability in returns over long pe-
riods, without necessarily affecting the measured variability in annual 
returns. 
A central feature of Wilkie's stochastic model3 for the simulation of 
equity returns is the explicit treatment of dividend yield. This aspect 
of Wilkie's approach is adapted next to simulate equity returns net of 
wage inflation. 
3 Modification of the Simple Lognormal Model 
The end-of-year dividend yield on the BZW equity index ranges from 
4 percent to 6 percent in 35 of the 44 years from 1950 to 1993. This has 
had a profound effect on long-term stability in equity returns, as there 
has been a tendency for the market to correct itself when overvalued 
or undervalued by historical standards. 
2 Economic theory implies that equity returns and wage inflation should be correlated 
over long periods, as both arc driven by growth in the national income. Over relatively 
short intervals, however, there is little evidence of this correlation. 
31n the mid-1980s, A.D. Wilkie developed a stochastic investment model that sim-
ulates United Kingdom investment returns that since has become a standard tool for 
many United Kingdom actuaries. Wilkie devised four connected models: (1) for United 
Kingdom price inflation; (2) for ordinary share dividend yields; (3) for growth in or-
dinary share dividends; and (4) for yields on fixed interest government bonds. The 
price inflation time series from model (1) is used as an input variable for each of the 
subsequent models. Model (2) assumes that the natural logarithms of share dividend 
yields are correlated over adjacent periods. This is probably the most robust feature 
of Wilkie's models as far as adherence to the data is concerned. 
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United Kingdom actuaries implicitly have recognized this phenom-
enon by using a discounted cash flow (or actuarial) value for equities in 
valuations of defined benefit plans. Actuarial values differ from market 
values in that price changes arising from fluctuations in dividend yields 
(as opposed to a rise or fall in dividend income) are not recognized. 
Following Thornton and Wilson (1992), the actuarial force of net 
interest, Yt, is defined by the relationship 
Yt = Dt + d t - dt-l (9) 
where d t = In(D t ) and D t is the average equity index dividend yield at 
the end of year t. Equation (1) now can be rewritten as: 
F(t + 1) = (F(t) + l)eYt+dt-l-dt. (10) 
We now model the Yt'S (the actuarial force of net interest) as a se-
quence of independent, identically distributed, normal random vari-
ables. The historical data over 1950-1993 give the following estimates 
of the mean and standard deviation of Yt: 
j1(yd = 0.0428 and u(yr) = 0.0646. 
The variability is reduced compared with returns on market values, Dt. 
What matters for a plan member, however, is the market value of the 
fund at retirement. Given F(to), let F(t, to) denote the value of the fund 
at time t (to ~ t ~ n). Then, 
F(t, to) 
t 
F(to) exp[d to - d t + 2.: Yk] 
k=to+ 1 
t-l t 
+ 2.: exp[dj - d t + 2.: Yk]. (11) 
j=~ k=j+l 
We therefore require a model for the way that dividend yields change 
over time. 
3.1 Dividend Yield Model 
Dividend yields (Dr) must lie in the range zero to infinity, so it may 
appear reasonable to assume that d t can be modeled as a normally 
distributed random variable with mean Ild and standard deviation O"d. 
Wilkie (1986) observes that the average dividend yield on United 
Kingdom equities tends to vary about a long-term average and that 
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yields in adjacent periods exhibit significant positive correlation. We 
estimate the autocorrelation4 of d t from the year-end dividend yield on 
the BZW equity index from 1919 to 1993. 
k p(d t , dt+k) 
1 0.512 
2 0.204 
3 0.030 
4 -0.008 
where p(d t , dt+k) is the correlation coefficient between d t and dt+k. 
It seems that dividend yields in adjacent years exhibit significant 
positive correlation, which is consistent with the idea that changes in 
market valuations occur in response to a continuous stream of price 
sensitive information. The data confirm that an autoregressive5 model, 
as used by Wilkie, is appropriate. Wilkie uses an autocorrelation pa-
rameter of 0.6 for d t and d t - 1 and also assumes that the rate of price 
inflation has a direct effect on d t . Because we require a model that op-
erates in real values, we ignore the latter feature of Wilkie's model and 
use an autocorrelation parameter of 0.5 for d t and d t - 1 in accordance 
with our own data. 
This leads to the following first order autoregressive formula for d t : 
J3 
d t = 0.5dt- 1 + 0.5fJd + TO'dNt (12) 
where the Nt's form a sequence of independent normal random vari-
ables with mean zero and unit variance. The coefficients in equation 
(12) have been selected so that E[dtJ = fJd and Var[dtJ = O'J. The 
historic data give the following estimates of the mean and standard 
deviation: 
Pd = -3.008 and a-d = 0.240. 
3.2 Expected Value of Fund 
Assuming that the change in the equity dividend yield over any pe-
riod is independent of the actuarial return over the same period, we can 
deduce expected value of the fund at age Xo + t for a new entrant age Xo 
as follows: let to = 0 and F(O) = 0 in equations (9) and (11). Assuming 
4The term autocorrelation refers to the correlation of a sequence of random variables 
with itself. 
sFor a more detailed description and analysis of autoregressive processes, see Box 
and Jenkins (1976, Chapter 3). 
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that the change in dividends dj - d t and the Yk'S are independent, then 
we see that 
E[F(t)] E [~ exp[dj - d t + kt Yki] 
t-1 t 
L E[e(drdr)]E[exp[ L Yk] 
j=O k=j+1 
t-1 L E[e(dj-dtl ]e(t- j)(!1J'+~a-~). (13) 
j=O 
But from equation (12), we have 
(14) 
where f3 = 2-(t-j). Although the value of this expression does not 
depend on t and j, we find that for our estimate of <rd, it is fairly close 
to unity for all t and j. Thus for the purpose of estimating the fund in 
mid-career, we shall use the approximation: 
t-1 
F ~ '" e(t-j)(!1)'+!a-~) to ~ L . (15) 
j=O 
3.3 Use of Simulation to Obtain Percentiles 
As Bodie notes, the standard deviation is not a particularly useful 
parameter for the skewed distribution of the fund at retirement. What 
is required are values of the fund at various percentiles so that we can 
estimate the probability of a plan member's benefits lying within a par-
ticular range. The relevant probability density function is difficult to 
obtain, so these values have to be estimated through simulation. 
For n = 40 and to = 0,20,30, and 35, there are 1000 simulations 
performed for each combination of 11 and to using the modified stochas-
tic model described in Section 3.1 above. The values of the retirement 
fund at various percentiles, as a multiple of its mean value over each 
run of 1000, are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Percentile Points of F40 
to 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
0 0.49 0.71 0.93 1.18 1.82 
20 0.54 0.74 0.94 1.21 1.63 
30 0.58 0.77 0.95 1.18 1.56 
35 0.60 0.80 0.97 1.16 1.52 
There are two main conclusions to be drawn from Table 1 . 
• Even though the stochastic model allows for long-term stability 
in dividend yields, the variability in the projected fund of a new 
entrant 40 years from retirement is still high; the ratio of the 75th 
percentile to the 25th percentile is 1.66. In other words, an em-
ployee whose working career coincides with a period of moder-
ately favorable equity returns would end with a fund 66 percent 
greater than that of an similar employee whose working career 
coincides with a period of moderately unfavorable equity returns. 
• The variability in the projected retirement fund reduces slowly as 
the employee gets closer to retirement. At only five years from 
retirement, the ratio of the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile 
is as high as 1.45. There is still a 1 in 4 chance that the fund will 
be less than 80 percent of its expected value and a 1 in 20 chance 
that it will be less than 60 percent of its expected value. 
The results obtained over a 40 year period of service are broadly 
consistent with those of Knox (1993), based on the experience of an 
Australian managed fund. This appears to be a coincidence, however, 
as the stochastic model used by Knox assumes independent, identically 
distributed returns combined with a low standard deviation. Hence 
for periods of service less than 40 years, Knox's model would imply 
significantly less variability in the fund. 
3.4 Practical Problems Created by Investment Risk 
Some practical implications of the results shown in Table 1 are dis-
cussed below. 
• Uncertainty in future benefit levels: An employee in a money 
purchase plan may have little idea of what the real value of his or 
her future pension will be, which makes planning for retirement 
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difficult. The projected future pension arising from a given rate 
of contribution can be estimated, but these estimates need to be 
updated frequently and may be wide of the mark. Even if the 
contribution rate is varied, following regular benefit projections 
the plan member may find that either: 
1. The retirement fund is too small to purchase the required 
pension; or 
2. The retirement fund is larger than required, and the surplus 
savings it contains must be used to purchase an annuity. 
The second problem is a consequence of United Kingdom legisla-
tion that limits the amount of a member's fund that can be taken 
as a lump sum. 
o Inequity between employees: It can be argued that a money pur-
chase plan is the most equitable form of pension provision, as the 
same contribution rate can be paid for each employee, who always 
would receive his or her asset share by definition. 
We believe this definition of equity is valid only for individual 
pension contracts, where the member effectively hires an insur-
ance company to manage his or her personal savings and retains 
control over the choice of insurer and type of fund. 
In an employer-sponsored plan, the member usually has less con-
trol over the money invested on his or her behalf. Furthermore, 
the option to receive salary in lieu of pension contributions is 
not normally available. It follows that the benefit being provided 
by the employer is not the contribution, but the pension derived 
from the contribution. In a money purchase plan, this pension will 
depend on whether the employee's period of service happens to 
coincide with a period of favorable or unfavorable investment ex-
perience. Thus, different generations of employees with identical 
salary and service histories may end with different pensions. 
If a government requires its citizens to invest social security con-
tributions in money purchase arrangements, the economic conse-
quences of inequity between the generations could be severe, as 
an entire generation of newly retired pensioners could end with 
inadequate pensions and could require additional financial sup-
port from the working population. 
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4 Switching to Low Risk Assets 
The results obtained in Section 3 are for a money purchase fund in-
vested fully in ordinary shares. The first variant from this investment 
strategy to be examined is one frequently employed: switching the ex-
isting fund and future contributions to low risk assets at some time 
close to retirement. 
Before investigating the optimal time to switch, we should consider 
what low risk assets are appropriate for such a switch. Most insurance 
companies in the United Kingdom writing unit-linked6 business have 
funds invested in cash and/or government bonds, specifically to meet 
the needs of risk-averse policyholders. Individuals with unit-linked 
pension policies can switch their assets into these funds at any time, 
sometimes subject to a small administration fee. Cash and fixed inter-
est bonds give no guaranteed protection against inflation, however, so 
switching into a fund investing in index-linked government bonds may 
be more appropriate. 
The real yield (net of price inflation) on United Kingdom index-linked 
bonds usually has been around 3 percent to 4 percent, which is approx-
imately 1 percent above the annual growth in United Kingdom average 
earnings over the post-war period. We assume for modeling purposes 
that a pension plan member always can switch into assets that guar-
antee a fixed return of 1 percent above the increase in United King-
dom average earnings. Let F(sw) (n, to) be the fund at retirement after 
switching at time to. Then: 
F(SW) (n, to) = F(to)(l.Ol)(n-to) + Sn-tol (16) 
evaluated at 1 percent. 
Switching to index-linked assets partly solves the problem of having 
an unpredictable pension at retirement-at least the real value of the 
fund is now fairly predictable, although one still must contend with 
uncertain future annuity rates. The earlier the switch is made, the easier 
it is to plan for retirement and to afford any extra contributions that 
may be required to obtain the desired pension. If the switch is made 
too early, however, the projected fund at retirement will be far below 
the fund expected from continued investment in equities. 
Under the stochastic model used in this paper, the equity dividend 
yield at the time of switching has an important bearing on the decision. 
6 A unit-linked product offers its policyholders a number of investment funds in 
which their assets can be invested. As with mutual funds, no investment guarantees 
are provided, and the policyholder's maturity value is linked directly to the market 
value of the underlying assets. 
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The argument for switching would be strengthened if the dividend yield 
were below its long-term average, because of the greater risk of a fall in 
the equity market. The reverse would apply if the dividend yield were 
above its long-term average. 
Simulations are performed to compare the fund obtained after switch-
ing into index-linked bonds at time to with that obtained by remaining 
in equities, assuming that the equity dividend yield at to were either 
equal to, 1 percent below, or 1 percent above its long-term average. 
Table 2 shows the value of the fund obtained after switching into 
index-linked bonds, as a fraction of the mean fund from continued in-
vestment in equities, for switches made at different durations from 
retirement and at different equity dividend yields. For comparison, the 
25th and 50th percentiles of the fund obtained from continued equity 
investment (from Table 1) also are shown. 
Table 2 
Fund Obtained by Switching to Low Risk Assets 
Switch to Low Risk Assets Stay in Equities 
Value of Dto Percentiles 
to 4.08% 5.08% 6.08% 25th 75th 
0 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.71 0.93 
20 0.61 0.52 0.47 0.74 0.94 
30 0.82 0.67 0.58 0.77 0.95 
35 0.98 0.79 0.67 0.80 0.97 
As one might expect, the ratio of the switched retirement fund to the 
mean fund from continued investment in equities is always less than 
one. The amount by which this ratio falls below unity is the insurance 
premium paid in order to obtain a guaranteed fund at retirement. 
By comparing these ratios with the percentiles from continued in-
vestment in equities, we can assess the degree of risk protection ob-
tained by switching. If the fund remains in equities, the probability of 
ending with a retirement fund below the 25th percentile is 0.25, a sig-
nificant risk. If by switching to low risk assets we can guarantee a fund 
equal to or higher than this, the case for switching is reasonably strong. 
According to Young (1994), the most commonly recommended time 
for a switch to low risk assets is approximately five years before retire-
ment, which corresponds to the case to = 35. Table 2 confirms that 
at this duration, the risk of a lower retirement fund by remaining in 
equities is significant but the magnitude of this risk depends greatly 
on the prevailing equity dividend yield. (At to = 0, however, the initial 
dividend yield is irrelevant, as there is no fund to switch.) 
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Ideally, the following conditions would hold before switching into 
low risk assets: 
• The projected fund after switching will meet the member's re-
quirements; 
• The equity market is overvalued by historic standards; 
• There are fewer than ten years before retirement. 
If the first condition is true, one would expect the member to be risk-
averse, as he or she virtually can guarantee the required fund without 
having to pay extra contributions. Thus, even a small probability of not 
achieving the necessary fund might be unacceptable. 
If the second condition is true, the first condition is more likely to 
be true (as the market value of the accumulated fund will be greater), 
and the risk of ending with a lower retirement fund by remaining in 
equities would be greater. 
If the third condition is true, the risk of ending with a lower retire-
ment fund by remaining in equities would be significant under most 
conditions. But if the third condition is true and the first condition 
is not true, there is less time to obtain the required fund by paying 
extra contributions. A member therefore might prefer to risk contin-
ued equity investment in the hope of obtaining the target fund through 
superior investment performance, Le., by taking a calculated gamble. 
In summary, we can conclude that switching to low risk assets at 
some point within ten years of retirement is likely to be a suitable strat-
egy for most members of money purchase plans. The precise timing of 
this switch should flexible, however, depending on the member's pro-
jected fund after switching and the level of the equity market at the 
time of the switch. 
5 Balanced Investment Strategies 
This section examines the results of following a balanced invest-
ment strategy? throughout an employee's period of service and com-
pares them with the results obtained for 100 percent investment in 
equities. 
The following balanced investment strategies are considered: 
7 A balanced investment strategy is one involving a combination of different asset 
types, with a view to achieving a suitable compromise between risk and return. 
Khorasanee: Simulation of a Money Purchase Fund 107 
• 75 percent equities, 25 percent index-linked bonds, realigned an-
nually by market values; and 
• 50 percent equities, 50 percent index-linked bonds, realigned an-
nually by market values. 
Again, 1000 simulations are performed simultaneously for each in-
vestment strategy, so that each set of simulations is based on the same 
sequence of equity returns. This enables the number of times that a 
particular investment strategy leads to a higher retirement fund than 
does an alternative strategy to be calculated. 
The simulations are carried out for the case n = 40, to = 0, i.e., for 
a new entrant at the youngest permitted age of entry, with no accumu-
lated fund. The values of the retirement fund at various percentiles, as 
a multiple of the mean fund from investing fully in equities, are shown 
in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Comparisons of Different Investment Strategies 
Investment Strategy (% in Equities) 
Percentile A = 100% B = 75% C = 50% 
5th 0.49 0.53 0.53 
25th 0.72 0.71 0.64 
50th 0.93 0.86 0.73 
75th 1.20 1.05 0.84 
95th 1.75 1.37 1.00 
Mean 1.00 0.90 0.75 
As one would expect, a lower allocation to equities reduces the mean 
value of the retirement fund, but also reduces its variability. In order to 
determine whether a balanced investment strategy has anything to offer 
the individual plan member, the following probabilities are estimated 
from the simulations: 
Strategy A (100 percent in equities): Probability of obtaining a fund 
of less than one-half the mean is equal to 0.056; 
Strategy B (75 percent in equities): Probability of obtaining a fund of 
less than one-half A's mean is equal to 0.031; and 
Strategy C (50 percent in equities): Probability of obtaining a fund of 
less than one-half A's mean is equal to 0.024. 
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We can summarize the results by saying that a more balanced invest-
ment strategy would result in a lower retirement fund for the majority 
of members, but also would reduce the already small proportion of 
members who obtain a severely substandard fund. 
So, we could sell investment strategy B to a member by explaining 
that although his or her expected fund would be 10 percent lower, the 
risk of ending with only half the expected fund is reduced from 5.6 
percent to 3.1 percent. Most members might not feel this is a good 
deal, and the case for strategy C would be even weaker. 
The main advantage of investing in low risk assets is that inequity 
between different members is reduced significantly. The ratio of the 
retirement fund at the 75th percentile to that at the 25th percentile is 
1.67 for strategy A, 1.48 for strategy B, and 1.31 for strategy C. These 
ratios have been achieved by leveling down;8 the actual fund value at 
the 25th percentile is highest for strategy A. 
The results obtained therefore suggest that the case for investing 
a significant proportion of the fund in low risk assets as a long-term 
strategy is weak. This does not necessarily argue against short-term 
tactical switches from the equity market based on the judgment of the 
fund manager. 
6 Guaranteed Equity Products 
The final investment strategy to be considered as an alternative to 
100 percent investment in equities is one involving the use of guaran-
teed equity products (GEPs). 
GEPs have been marketed by United Kingdom insurance companies 
as a means of allowing policyholders to participate in the underlying 
growth of an equity portfolio while also benefiting from a guaranteed 
minimum fund, either at termination of the contract or at intermediate 
durations. These guarantees are designed to protect against adverse 
movements in the equity market. 
A typical contract may provide a return on the investor's capital 
equal to the increase in an ordinary share price index, while guarantee-
ing that the investor will be repaid the initial capital should the index 
fall over the term of the contract. In such a contract, the absence of 
reinvested dividends would pay for the guarantee. Dodhia and Sheldon 
(1994) describe how the creative use of financial options has enabled 
8 Leveling down means a reduction in the inequality between two groups, achieved 
by making the better off group poorer, rather than making the worse off group richer. 
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the design of a wide variety of contracts, each offering a different type 
of guarantee. 
Consider a contract that provides a rolling guarantee at one year 
intervals coinciding with the annual investment of contributions to the 
pension fund. We assume that the contract guarantees a fraction of the 
capital invested at the start of the year plus the actual equity return 
(if positive) applied to the minimum guaranteed capital. For modeling 
purposes we further assume that: 
• The guaranteed capital increases in line with United Kingdom av-
erage earnings over the year; 
• The equity return is based on the equity price index with dividends 
reinvested, as opposed to the more usual practice of using the 
price index alone. 
Dodhia and Sheldon, on commenting on the feasibility and propriety of 
the first assumption for pension fund contracts, state that such a guar-
antee would be possible to provide and would be suitable for pension 
contracts. 
The GEP investment return net of wage inflation in year between 
times t and t + 1 is given by: 
R t = fmax{e.5 t , 1} - 1 (17) 
where f is a constant with 0 < f < 1. The expected value of the re-
tirement fund will be sensitive to the value of f chosen, as this factor 
will compound over the years to retirement. We choose values for f 
that produce approximately the same expected fund as from investing 
in the equity portfolio alone, which trial simulations show to be in the 
range 0.92 :$ f :$ 0.93. 
Using the modified stochastic model, we perform simultaneously 
1000 simulations for contracts with f equal to 0.92, 0.925, and 0.93, 
respectively, and for investment in the underlying equities alone. As 
before, these are done for a new entrant at the youngest age with 40 
years until retirement. The values of the retirement fund at various 
percentiles, expressed as a multiple of the mean fund from investing 
in equities alone, are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Investing in Guaranteed Equity Products (GEPs) 
GEPs for Various f Values 
Percentile f = 0.92 f = 0.925 f = 0.93 Equities 
5th 0.44 0.50 0.57 0.50 
25th 0.62 0.71 0.82 0.70 
50th 0.80 0.91 1.05 0.93 
75th 1.05 1.21 1.40 1.20 
95th 1.58 1.82 2.11 1.78 
Mean 0.89 1.02 1.18 1.00 
Table 4 indicates that the expected fund from investing in a rolling 
one year GEP contract is sensitive to the level of guarantee offered. 
More important, there appears to be no reduction in the variability of 
the fund at retirement compared with a strategy of investing in the 
underlying shares alone. 
Guaranteed equity products reduce variability in investment returns 
over short periods, so it is perhaps surprising that a rolling one year 
contract fails to reduce the same variability over longer periods. An 
intuitive explanation follows from the fact that the return from a rolling 
GEP contract depends on how variable the underlying equity returns 
are. The greater the variability in equity returns, the greater the return 
from the GEP, as the investor benefits from large positive equity returns 
while being protected against large negative ones. 
Over long periods, however, the variability in equity returns also may 
be variable-perhaps there will be several crash/recovery scenarios as 
in 1974 and 1975; perhaps there won't be any. It follows that the long-
term return from a GEP may be as variable as the long-term return from 
the underlying shares. 
7 Summary and Implications 
7.1 Summary 
The main findings of this paper are summarized below. 
• Modeling equity returns as an independent, identically distributed, 
lognormal random variable appears to overestimate the variabil-
ity in funds accumulated from the investment of annual contribu-
tions over relatively long periods. 
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• In the United Kingdom stochastic models that allow for tendency 
of the equity dividend yield to move toward a central value pro-
duce results that are more consistent with empirical studies. Even 
when such models are used, however, the variability in the retire-
ment fund of a new entrant to a money purchase plan is large, and 
this variability reduces only slowly as the member approaches re-
tirement. 
• A strong case exists for the individual plan member to switch his 
or her fund to low risk assets in the period close to retirement. 
Although the case for switching becomes stronger as the member 
approaches retirement, the optimal time to do so depends also 
on the member's target fund and the prevailing equity dividend 
yield. 
• A balanced investment strategy in which a significant proportion 
of the member's fund is invested in low risk assets throughout 
his or her period of service reduces both the expected value of 
the fund at retirement and its variability. Most of the reduction in 
variability occurs from leveling down-the reduction in the mem-
ber's downside risk is not significant. 
• Over a 40 year period a rolling one year guaranteed equity con-
tract of simple design results in no significant reduction in the 
variability of the retirement fund, compared with investing purely 
in equities. 
7.2 Implications for Pension Scheme Design 
The arguments for investing long-term savings in ordinary shares 
are strong, both from the viewpoint of maximizing returns and hedging 
against wage and price inflation. Equities are a highly appropriate asset 
class for pension plans other than those that consist mainly of retired 
employees. 
In money purchase pension plans, however, investment in equities 
results in pension benefits that depend excessively on whether the em-
ployee's period of service happens to coincide with a period of favorable 
or unfavorable investment experience. This makes it difficult for indi-
vidual members to plan for retirement and results in inequity between 
different generations of employees. 
Three strategies for reducing the investment risk associated with 
equities are examined in this paper: 
• Switching to low risk assets close to retirement; 
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• Balanced investment strategies; and 
• The use of derivative-based investment products. 
Of these three, only the first is found to offer significant advantages to 
the individual member. Moreover, a switching strategy does not deal 
with the fundamental problem-by the time a member gets close to 
retirement, the damage already may have been done. 
A great advantage of defined benefit plans is the implicit smoothing 
of variable investment returns for different generations of employees, 
brought by the use of a fixed benefit formula. A good example of such a 
formula is found in the United Kingdom State Scheme, where a pension 
equal to a fixed fraction of career-average revalued earnings is granted. 
The rate of revaluation applied to each year's earnings figure is the 
increase in an index of average earnings between the year concerned 
and the year prior to retirement. This example is similar to a money 
purchase plan in which a fixed percentage of salary is invested for each 
employee. The only difference is that a guaranteed rate of interest, 
equal to the increase in the average earnings index, is applied to each 
member's contributions. 
Defined benefit plans have become less popular in both the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Aside from the costs of complying 
with increasingly complex legislation, employers have been less willing 
to accept the open-ended liability of such plans, which may require 
them to increase their contribution rate to cover a shortfall created by 
unfavorable experience. 
A way must be found to apply the defined benefit principle to de-
fined contribution plans. In some ways, this would be similar to a with-
profits insurance fund, and a few United Kingdom pension plans are 
run on this basis. Unlike a with-profits fund, however, there should 
be explicit formulae for calculating the benefits paid, ideally based on 
career-average revalued earnings as used in the United Kingdom State 
Scheme. In addition, there would have to be rules for varying the rate of 
benefit accrual, should the experience of the plan deviate too far from 
the assumptions made by the actuary. 
A defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale that could 
be adjusted from time to time would represent a more equitable and 
secure form of pension provision than arrangements based purely on 
the money purchase principle. 
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Appendix: United Kingdom Equity Dividend Yields 
and Index Returns 
Table Al 
U.K. Equity Dividend Yields and Index Returns 
Year EQIDY REQIN Year EQIDY REQIN 
1919 4.8% 1938 5.5% 
1920 9.5% 1939 5.4% 
1921 8.9% 1940 6.3% 
1922 6.0% 1941 5.2% 
1923 6.4% 1942 4.4% 
1924 5.4% 1943 4.1% 
1925 4.8% 1944 3.8% 
1926 5.4% 1945 3.8% 
1927 4.9% 1946 3.5% 
1928 4.6% 1947 4.3% 
1929 6.1% 1948 4.3% 
1930 6.7% 1949 5.0% 
1931 6.8% 1950 5.0% 5.1% 
1932 4.7% 1951 5.4% -1.6% 
1933 3.9% 1952 6.1% -7.1% 
1934 3.8% 1953 5.4% 17.2% 
1935 3.7% 1954 4.4% 37.5% 
1936 3.4% 1955 4.8% 1.6% 
1937 4.6% 1956 5.7% -14.8% 
EQIDY = Equity index dividend yield at year-end. 
REQIN = Return on equity index net of increase in average earnings. 
Sources: BZW Equity/Gilt Study. The abstract of statistics for social 
security benefits and contributions and the indices of retail prices 
and average earnings-Government Statistical Service. 
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Table Al (continued) 
U.K. Equity Dividend Yields and Index Returns 
Year EQIDY REQIN Year EQIDY REQIN 
1957 6.3% -6.5% 1976 7.4% -11.4% 
1958 4.8% 44.9% 1977 5.4% 43.7% 
1959 3.6% 46.6% 1978 5.6% -1.1% 
1960 4.5% -5.2% 1979 6.8% -8.4% 
1961 4.8% -3.6% 1980 5.8% 12.5% 
1962 5.0% -2.9% 1981 5.9% 1.8% 
1963 4.1% 13.2% 1982 5.2% 19.4% 
1964 5.2% -9.1% 1983 4.7% 18.9% 
1965 5.2% 3.6% 1984 4.5% 22.0% 
1966 5.9% -9.3% 1985 4.2% 11.6% 
1967 4.2% 30.5% 1986 4.1% 17.8% 
1968 3.4% 29.8% 1987 4.4% -0.4% 
1969 4.0% -18.7% 1988 4.7% 2.1% 
1970 4.6% -13.7% 1989 4.2% 24.5% 
1971 3.4% 32.9% 1990 5.4% -15.3% 
1972 3.1% 5.3% 1991 5.0% 13.4% 
1973 4.4% -39.9% 1992 4.4% 14.8% 
1974 11.8% -60.8% 1993 3.4% 24.7% 
1975 5.7% 109.1% 
EQIDY = Equity index dividend yield at year-end. 
REQIN = Return on equity index net of increase in average earnings. 
Sources: BZW Equity/Gilt Study. The abstract of statistics for social 
security benefits and contributions and the indices of retail prices 
and average earnings-Government Statistical Service. 
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Many of the criteria used by actuaries when selecting assumptions for pen-
sion plan valuations often conflict. As a result, actuaries must weigh the vari-
ous costs and benefits associated with a particular set of assumptions. We use 
expected utility theory to model the process of chOOSing actuarial assumptions 
when faced with potentially conflicting criteria. The three criteria considered 
are prudence, best estimate, and conservatism. 
The actual contribution chosen by the actuary is found to depend on the 
contribution level that triggers a red flag with respect to tax deductibility. If 
this level is relatively low, the actuary chooses a high contribution that gives 
weight to each criterion, incorporating the risk of a penalty by tax authorities. 
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1 Introduction 
In the United States defined benefit pension plan valuations must be 
performed periodically by the plan actuary. As noted by Shapiro (1990), 
however, many of the criteria underlying the choice of assumptions for 
these valuations often conflict. This observation is not surprising-
while the ultimate choice of actuarial assumptions rests with the ac-
tuary, the actuary must balance his or her preferences and judgments 
against those of a number of self-interest groups, including employees, 
the employer, and tax and labor authorities. 
The main purpose of this paper is to describe a methodology that 
can be used by actuaries to resolve problems associated with conflicting 
assumptions. The methodology uses expected utility theoryl to model 
the process of choosing actuarial assumptions when faced with poten-
tially conflicting criteria. To keep the model simple, only three criteria 
are considered: prudence, best estimate, and conservatism. This is a 
first attempt at modeling actuarial decision making. 
2 The Criteria 
The first criterion, prudence, is satisfied if the contribution that re-
sults is in the range of prudent contributions (that is, contributions that 
would be developed by prudent actuaries in similar circumstances). The 
context considered is the one where tax authorities are concerned with 
the possibility of overfunding to escape current taxation and conse-
quently define a deductible contribution as one that is below a certain 
upper limit.2 Because excise taxes and other penalties may result if 
deductions are taken for nondeductible contributions, one limit on the 
range of prudent assumptions is that such assumptions produce a safe 
IThis is the expected utility theory developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947). See Schoemaker (1982) for a discussion of the pros and cons of expected utility 
theory. 
2In the case where, for example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is 
concerned with the adequacy of plan funding, the range defined by a lower limit on the 
contribution may be equally important. In this model concerns about plan solvency 
are captured by the conservatism criterion. It is assumed that plan solvency is in the 
interest of the actuary and the plan sponsor and is imbedded in the utility function. 
Further pressure by the PBGC is not considered at this stage. 
Editor's note: The PBGC is a self-financed public corporation that administered the 
pension benefits insurance program for qualified plans in the United States. See, for 
example, McGill (1984, Chapter 24) for more on the PBGC. 
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harbor contribution.3 It is assumed that whether the plan contribution 
satisfies a safe harbor is not of concern, however, if the plan can meet 
a facts and circumstance test. 4 Moreover, this test is characterized in 
terms of the relationship between the actual contribution and the con-
tribution that would have funded the plan accurately. 
The actual contribution to the plan is denoted as C; the contribution 
that would have funded the plan accurately is denoted C;5 and the con-
tribution that triggers a red flag with respect to deductibility is denoted 
C*. It is assumed the authorities do not investigate the assumptions 
to determine if they are appropriate unless C > C*. If C > C*, then 
authorities determine whether C - C > D, where D is an acceptable 
deviation. 
If C > C* and C - C > D, the actuary is penalized.6 The penalty 
is modeled here as a monetary penalty of P dollars. This can repre-
sent anything ranging from a fine to damage to one's reputation that 
would reduce earning power. An excise tax may be levied upon the plan 
sponsor that may have repercussions for the actuary in terms of com-
pensation, job security, or future job prospects. The actuary may face a 
lawsuit and possible loss of accreditation. 7 Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the damage to the actuary's reputation also leaves the actuary with 
a lower level of utility for any given wealth level in the event that the 
actuary is penalized. The prudent actuary's rule is characterized by a 
variable, p (the penalty), which takes the following values: 
= S 0 if ~ ::0; ~* or if ~ > C* and C - C ::0; D; 
P l P if C > C* and C - C > D. 
Deductibility raises a perplexing problem. Solvency is one of the 
primary considerations underlying the funding of a pension plan, but 
the taxing authority may not explicitly allow a contingency reserve to 
protect this solvency. Additionally, as modeled above, there may be 
an arbitrary limit to the maximum deductible contribution to a plan. 
3This would be the case, for example, if the contribution were no larger than if all 
the assumptions used were the most generous allowed under IRS standards. 
4This test is satisfied if the facts and circumstances surrounding the plan justify the 
assumptions. 
5The quantity C is known after the actual plan experience has unfolded. 
6In this modeJ, we assume that the authorities always will discover the fact that 
C > C* and C - C > D. The authors currently are investigating a model where the 
occurrence of this event is a random variable. 
7The simplifying assumption is made that the size of the monetary penalty is not 
a function of the size of the contribution or the experience of the plan. It is possible 
that these and other factors may have an impact on the size of the penalty, in which 
case the penalty would not be a constant. 
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Because of adverse experience, however, the deductible contribution 
may not be sufficient to keep the plan solvent. 
The second criterion, conservatism, follows from the concern about 
plan solvency. The actuary (as well as the plan sponsor) prefers to keep 
the probability that the plan has actuarial losses to a minimum. There-
fore, the contribution is conservative if Pr[e < C] < E or, equivalently, 
Pr[C> e 1 < E, where E is the tolerance level for conservatism (that is, 
if the probability of actuarial losses is below E). The actuary uses only 
his or her beliefs about the distribution of C to determine Pr[ C > e]. 
It is assumed that the actuary believes that C has a cumulative distri-
bution function F(C). This is the actuary's subjective belief about the 
distribution of C and is necessary if expected utility theory is to be 
used. Therefore, the actuary concerned about conservatism prefers a 
contribution, e, for which 1 - F(e) < E. 
The final criterion incorporated in the model is the best estimate. 
For this analysis, best estimate is interpreted to mean the estimate for 
which the expected value of the absolute deviation of the actual value 
from the estimate is minimized, as suggested by Anderson (1985, p. 
110). Again, the plan experience is characterized in terms of C, the 
contribution that would have funded the plan accurately. The actuary's 
best estimate of C is p, i.e., the actuary believes that if CE is defined 
as any estimate of C, then E[ICE - CI] is minimized when the estimate 
CE = p. 
3 The Expected Utility Model 
At this point the actuary's decision process is modeled explicitly us-
ing the theory of expected utility. We assume that the actuary obtains 
utility from three sources: (i) wealth, (ii) the appropriateness of his or 
her assumptions, and (iii) plan solvency. The appropriateness of the as-
sumptions may affect wealth through a potential penalty. Apart from 
that, the actuary simply feels good about making an appropriate esti-
mate and enjoys positive recognition from his or her employer.s The 
two aspects of the appropriateness of the assumptions that are mod-
eled here are accuracy and conservatism. The accuracy (or inaccuracy) 
of the assumptions is measured by Ie - CI, with smaller values rep-
resenting greater accuracy. The larger the value of Ie - CI, the lower 
the actuary's utility, and this inaccuracy is weighted by a constant .\ in 
8We assume that neither the actuary nor the employer is motivated to overfund the 
plan for the specific purpose of deferring taxation. 
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the utility function. But due to concerns about solvency and conser-
vatism, the actuary's utility is reduced further when there are actuarial 
losses. Therefore, whenever C < C, the actuary has additional disutility 
equal to a constant y. The actuary's disutility due to actuarial losses is 
characterized by a variable r that takes the following values: 
r = A { 
0 if C ~ C; 
Y ifC<C. 
The actuary's utility function U is given by U(W -p, IC -CI, n, where 
W represents his or her wealth before the penalty is determined.9 As-
suming additivity,10 this utility function can be written more explicitly 
as: 
U(W - p, IC - cl,n = us(W - p) - AIC - CI- r (1) 
where us(W - p) is the utility of wealth in state of nature 5. We assume 
there are two states of nature: 5 = 0 represent the state where the 
actuary is not penalized, and 5 = 1 represent the state where the actuary 
is penalized. For each state 5, utility increases with wealth (so u~ > 0), 
and risk aversion with respect to wealth implies that u; < O. We assume 
that uo(w) > U1 (w) for any given wealth level w. This implies that the 
actuary suffers more than just a monetary fine when penalized by the 
authorities. Once sanctioned by the authorities, the actuary is worse 
off, in utility terms, at any given wealth level. 
In choosing the contribution, C, the actuary maximizes his or her 
expected utility where the expectation is taken over the distribution 
F (C). So, the actuary solves for the C that maximizes the right hand 
side of the equation: 
maxE[us(W - p) - A(IC - CI) - r] 
t 
maxE[us(W - p)] - AE[IC - CI] - y(1 - F(C)) (2) 
t 
where 0 ~ p ~ P. 
Each of the three terms on the right hand side of equation (2) rep-
resents one of the criteria that the actuary uses in making the funding 
decision. The second term represents the best estimate criterion. The 
9 A more general representation of the actuary's utilit)' function is U(Y(W. p).IC -
el, n. where Y and W represent wealth after and before the penalty, respectively, and 
p represents an arbitrary penalty function. 
laThe authors are currently investigating a more general formulation of this utility 
function. The Simplified version in the text, however, is sufficient to convey the essence 
of the model. 
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contribution that minimizes this term (and hence maximizes its contri-
bution to expected utility) is the best estimate, /-'. But the best estimate 
may not be the optimal contribution for the plan due to the offsetting 
effects of the two other criteria. The third term, representing conser-
vatism, is the probability of an actuarial loss weighted by the disutility 
such a loss brings. This term is subtracted from expected utility. To 
maximize this term's contribution to expected utility, the probability 
of an actuarial loss 1 - F(C) must be minimized. This provides an in-
centive for the actuary to choose a contribution that is above the best 
estimate, i.e., to play it safe. On the other hand, the first term is the 
expected utility of wealth which is dependent upon whether a penalty 
is received from the authorities for choosing a contribution that may 
not be deductible. 
The actuary has an incentive to choose a contribution that is higher 
than the best estimate because of concerns about solvency. But govern-
ment officials may choose to interpret this behavior as an attempt to 
avoid current taxation. This exerts pressure on the actuary to choose 
a lower contribution. This first term is maximized when the chance of 
receiving a penalty and the subsequent damage to the actuary's repu-
tation is eliminated (that is, when the contribution is below the author-
ities' upper bound). The relative weight with which each of the three 
criteria enters expected utility determines the trade-off that must be 
made. Other factors that determine this trade-off are initial wealth, W, 
the size of the acceptable deviation, D, and the size of the penalty, P. A 
final factor is the actuary's perception of the distribution of C, in par-
ticular, how probable it is that the deviation will be greater than zero 
and/or greater than D. We now analyze this more formally. 
Let us assume F is such that Pr[CL s C s Cu) = 1. There are 
two possible ranges within which the chosen contribution, C, can fall, 
the prudent range where C E [CL, C*] or the other range where C E 
[C*, cu].11 A penalty is imposed when C E (C*, Cu] and C - C > 
D. On the other hand, when C E [CL, C*] there is no possibility of 
receiving a penalty. Therefore, analysis of the decision requires that 
the maximization problem given by equation (2) be separated into two 
steps because the expected utility function is discontinuous at the point 
C = C*. 
There are two expected utility functions that must be considered, 
one that applies for values of C s C* and one that applies for values 
of C > C*. We will graph both of these expected utility functions over 
the entire range of potential contributions, C, and illustrate how the 
llWe assume that [eL, C*] is not empty. 
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actuary's choice is affected by the tax authorities' choice of an upper 
limit on the prudent range, C*. 
The expected utility function that pertains to the range of contribu-
tions C ::::; C* is: 
Uo(W) - AE[IC - CI] - y(1- F(C)) 
uo(W) - A [J~ (C - C)dF(C) + J:u (C - C)dF(C) ] 
- y(I - F(C)), (3) 
while for the range of contributions C > C*: 
Ul (W - P)F(C - D) + uo(W) (1 - F(C - D)) 
- AE[IC - CI] - y(1 - F(C)) 
udW - P)F(C - D) + uo(W)(I - F(C - D)) 
- A [J~ (C - C)dF(C) + J:u (C - C)dF(C) ] 
- y(I - F(C)). (4) 
Comparison of equations (3) and (4) indicates that for any given 
value of C greater than CL + D, the expression on the left hand side 
of equation (3) is greater than that of equation (4) because uo(W) > 
Ul (W - p).12 Furthermore, the gap between these two functions in-
creases as C increases because more weight is given to Ul (W - P) as 
F (C - D) increases. 
Next, the contribution that provides the maximum level of expected 
utility must be determined. Differentiating13 equations (3) and (4) with 
respect to C yields equations (5) and (6), respectively. Setting equations 
(5) and (6) each equal to zero gives the conditions for the maximum 
values of E[ Uc,;c*] and E[ Ubc*], respectively: 
~ d ~ 
-A(2F(C) - 1) + y-~ F(C) 
dC 
o 
(5) 
120nly contributions that are greater than CL + D are potential choices as the maxi-
mization problem is established. Intuitively, as long as the best estimate, /1, is greater 
than CL + D (as will be assumed), contributions that are less than CL + D will not be 
chosen because C - C cannot be greater than D, implying that there are no potential 
penalties in this range and, therefore, no benefits to be gained from reducing the con-
tribution below CL + D. This further implies that C - D > CL for any possible sollltion, 
soF(C-D»O. 
13We now assume that F(C) is differentiable in the relevant regions. 
124 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
d ~ 
(udW - P) - uo(W)) dCF(C - D) 
A d ~ 
- A(2F(C) - 1) + y-~F(C) 
dC 
O. 
(6) 
A useful point of comparison is the best estimate j.1, which is ob-
tained by minimizing E[ I C - C I]; that is, by solving: 
M2 = mdn [J~ (C - C)dF(C) + f:u (C - C)dF(C)] . (7) 
The first order condition for the problem of equation (7) is: 
2F(C) - 1 = O. (8) 
The value of C that solves equation (8) is the best estimate and is de-
noted j.1, where j.1 is the median because F(j.1) = 1/2. 
4 An Example 
For the purpose of example, assume that C is uniformly distributed 
on the interval [CL, Cu].14 The best estimate is: 
CL + Cu 
j.1= 
2 
(9) 
Furthermore, the contributions that maximize E[UC:5C*] and E[U6c*], 
respectively, and the shapes of these expected utility functions can be 
obtained by substituting for F(C) into equations (5) and (6).1 5 Using 
equation (9), we have: 
d 
-~ E[UCA'<CA*] 
dC -
y-2-A(C-j.1) 
(Cu - Cd 
o 
o. 
(10) 
14This assumption is not meant to imply that this is the appropriate distribution for 
C, but is used to allow a clear characterization of the solution that may be obtained 
using this model. 
15We assume that the contribution that maximizes E[Uc"c* J and the contribution 
that maximizes E[Ut>c* J are elements of the interval [CL, Cu J. 
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Both E[Uc:sc*] and E[Uc>c*] are strictly concave, as the second deriva-
tive with respect to C of each is negative. 
Next, let the solution to (10) be denoted C3 and the solution to (11) 
be denoted C4. 16 Then E[Uc:sc*] is maximized at: 
~ Y 
C3 = J.l +-
2i\ 
and E[Uc>c*] is maximized at: 
C~ - L _ uo(W) - udW - P) 4 - J.l + 2i\ 2i\ . 
(12) 
(13) 
When there is no concern about a penalty by the authorities, as is the 
case when C :::; C*, the optimal contribution, C3, is the best estimate, J.l, 
plus a contingency reserve equal to one half of the relative disutility of 
insolvency (that is, disutility, y, relative to the weight given to accuracy, 
i\). When there is the possibility of a penalty (because the contribution 
is not in the prudent range), then the optimal contribution, C4, is C3 
reduced by one half of the relative disutility of being penalized (that is, 
the change in utility caused by a penalty, uo(W) - Ul (W - P), relative 
to the weight given to accuracy, i\). 
The two expected utility functions, E[Uc:sc*] and E[Ut>c*] now can 
be graphed over the range of potential contributions to illustrate how 
the value of C* impacts the actuary's funding choice. The following 
characteristics of the expected utility functions have been determined 
from the above analysis. E[Ucd*] is greater than E[Ut>c*] for any 
given value of C, and the difference between these two functions in-
creases as C increases. Both E[ U c:sc*] and E[ U t>c*] are strictly con-
cave, and E[Uc:sc*] reaches its maximum value at a higher contribution 
level than E[Ut>c*] does (because C3 > (4). 
Figure 1 is based on the foregoing observations. An important point 
on this graph is the lowest contribution level at which E[Uc:sc*] is ex-
actly equal to the maximum value of E[Ut>(':'*]' This contribution level 
is denoted Cs (thatis, E[Uc:sc* (Cs)] = E[Ut>c* (C4) ]),17 It is necessary 
16Both of these points exist and are unique because the functions that are being 
maximized have been shown to be concave. 
17Solving for C5 explicitly gives: 
C - C uo(W) -Ul(W -P) (C DC) 
5 - 4 - 2Ap + Y 4 - - L· 
It is possible that the value C5 is less than CL, in which case it does not appear on 
the graph. The following analysis will make clear that if this is the case, the optimal 
contribution must be in the prudent range. 
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to know the value of C* to determine which expected utility function is 
relevant over which range of contributions. E[ U c"c*] is the applicable 
expected utility function for all contributions below C*, and E[Ut>c*] 
is applicable for contributions above C*. If C* is greater than C3, then 
C3 is the contribution that is chosen by the actuary because expected 
utility is maximized at that point. If C5 < C* :s; C3, then the optimal 
contribution is C*. If C* = C5, then the actuary is indifferent between 
C* and C4. Finally, if C* < C5, then the optimal contribution is C4. 
EU 
A 
C4 
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Further, Figure 1 indicates that when the upper bound on the pru-
dent range is relatively high (that is, higher than the contribution that 
maximizes the expected utility in the absence of a penalty), then the 
constraint provided by the authorities is not binding and the actuary's 
choice (C3) is a trade-off between the criteria of best estimate and con-
servatism. When the upper bound on the prudent range is in some 
middle range (that is, C5 < C* :s; (3), then the actuary chooses the up-
per bound as the optimal contribution because it is preferable to avoid 
the possibility of a penalty. When the upper bound on the prudent 
range is relatively low (that is, below (5), then it is in the actuary's best 
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interest to choose a contribution above the prudent range that makes a 
trade-off between the criteria of conservatism, prudence, and best es-
timate. In this case, the chosen contribution is C4. If C5 is less than CL, 
then it is necessarily less than C*, implying that for any C* E [CL, Cu] 
the optimal contribution, C, is in the prudent range. 
5 Summary 
The purpose of this paper has been to explore the use of expected 
utility theory to model the process by which an actuary chooses the 
appropriate contribution for a pension plan. Because this is just a first 
attempt, however, only a simple expected utility model is used and 
only three criteria are considered: prudence, best estimate, and con-
servatism. Nonetheless, we are able to conceptualize the essence of 
some of the relationships. 
Based on our model, the actual contribution chosen by the actuary 
depends on the contribution level that triggers a red flag with respect 
to tax deductibility. If this level is relatively low, the actuary chooses a 
high contribution that gives weight to each criterion, incorporating the 
risk of a penalty by tax authorities. If the tax deductible trigger is of an 
intermediate level, the actuary chooses this level exactly and insulates 
the plan from tax scrutiny; if the level is high, the utility maximizing 
contribution is below that level. 
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Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans 
Ho Kuen Ng* 
Abstract 
Cross-tested plans are defined contribution plans that test allocations for 
nondiscrimination. The test is based on a plan's actuarial equivalent annuity 
benefits. Cross-tested plans have become popular among small plan sponsors 
after the release of the nondiscrimination regulations. This paper investigates 
the pros and cons of cross-testing. 
Key words and phrases: pension plan, nondiscrimination, cross-testing, highly 
compensated employees 
1 Introduction 
For a retirement plan in the United States to be qualified and enjoy 
all accompanying tax advantages, it must satisfy the requirements in 
Internal Revenue Code section 401(a). Paragraph (4) of section 401(a) 
requires that a plan not discriminate in favor of highly compensated 
employees, as defined in Code section 414(q), based on compensation, 
ownership, and employment status. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has published voluminous reg-
ulations on the application of this paragraph. These regulations have 
brought renewed interest in a plan design based on the technique known 
as cross-testing. Although this technique has existed for many years, 
it recently has drawn much attention in the employee benefits commu-
nity. Its status had been uncertain because of legislative proposals to 
ban its use in defined contribution plans. The banning language was 
deleted from the Retirement Protection Act, however, before it became 
*Ho Kuen Ng, Ph.D., F.S.A., is a professor of mathematics and computer science at 
San Jose State University. 
Dr. Ng's address is: Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, San Jose 
State University, San Jose, CA 95192, USA. Internet address: ng@sjsumcs.sjsu.edu 
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law in December 1994. Now that the fate of cross-testing seems certain, 
at least in the foreseeable future we will take a look into what it is and 
why it has created such controversy. 
To the Internal Revenue Service, the nondiscrimination requirement 
is not simply section 401(a)(4). Instead, the IRS requirement is a pack-
age of rules consisting of sections 401(a)(4), 401(a)(26), and 410(b). 
Some other sections of the Code are also part of this nondiscrimina-
tion package, but this article will not dwell on these other sections. 
The purpose of sections 401(a)(26) and 410(b) is to ensure that a 
qualified plan generally covers a reasonably large number of employ-
ees of the plan sponsor who are not predominantly highly compensated. 
Code section 401(a)(26) requires that a minimum number of employees 
benefit under a qualified plan. Specifically, it requires that a plan must 
give benefits to at least 50 employees or 40 percent of the employees of 
the plan sponsor. Section 410(b) requires that there be a fair number of 
nonhighly compensated employees who benefit under a plan. The pro-
portion of nonhighly compensated employees receiving benefits under 
a plan generally must not be less than 70 percent of the proportion of 
highly compensated employees benefiting under the same plan. If this 
70 percent test is not satisfied, however, a plan can resort to an alter-
native test, known as the average benefit test, to satisfy section 41 O(b).l 
Finally, section 401(a)(4) tests the actual amount of benefits and other 
features of a plan to ensure that the nonhighly compensated employees 
covered under the plan receive benefits comparable to those received 
by the highly compensated employees. 
2 Cross-Testing 
The concept of cross-testing is actuarially simple. In a defined con-
tribution plan the allocations to employees' accounts are determined 
based on a formula contained in the plan document. The allocation 
formula must be definitely determinable in the sense that once the to-
tal contribution amount is known, each employee's allocation is deter-
mined without any further discretion of the plan sponsor or the plan 
administrator. Instead of testing these allocations for discrimination, 
their actuarially equivalent annuity benefits are tested. In other words, 
such allocations, when accumulated with interest to the employees' re-
tirement, must be capable of buying annuity benefits that are not dis-
criminatory. The regulations require that this actuarial equivalent con-
[The average benefit test will not be discussed here because of its complex technical 
details. 
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version, known as normalization, be done based on standard assump-
tions: namely, an interest rate between 7.5 percent and 8.5 percent and 
one of nine given mortality tables. Instead of these actuarially equiva-
lent accruals, their corresponding accrual rates, defined as the ratio of 
such accruals to employees' compensations, may be used in the nondis-
crimination testing. 
How are these normalized accruals or accrual rates tested for nondis-
crimination? Roughly speaking, a plan is divided into smaller plans 
known as rate groups, each defined by a highly compensated employee 
and each tested for coverage under section 410(b). A rate group con-
sists of a highly compensated employee and all employees (both highly 
and nonhighly compensated) with at least as high an accrual or accrual 
rate as this highly compensated employee. The underlying idea is that 
if the plan sponsor were to choose to establish a plan benefiting pre-
cisely the employees in this rate group, then this rate group would sat-
isfy section 410(b) and, therefore, there are a fair number of nonhighly 
compensated employees with at least as good a benefit as the highly 
compensated employee who defines this hypothetical plan. The main 
policy objective of these regulations is to ensure broad coverage and 
nondiscrimination in qualified plans. Because each rate group satisfies 
this main objective of the regulations, there is no reason that the plan 
as a whole should not be allowed. 
3 An Example 
To illustrate the methodology, consider a sponsor with 16 employ-
ees, all of whom are covered under a defined contribution plan. Among 
these employees HI and H2 are highly compensated, whereas the other 
employees (Nl through N14) are nonhighly compensated. Every em-
ployee receives an allocation equal to 4.5 percent of compensation, ex-
cept that HI receives 20 percent and N5 receives no allocation. How can 
such an allocation be achieved and be deemed definitely determinable? 
The plan sponsor could state in the plan document the precise alloca-
tion that each employee is to receive. The plan sponsor could use an 
integrated excess formula with appropriate integration level and dis-
parity and exclude N5 from receiving an allocation. The plan sponsor 
also could divide the employee group into three classes, receiving al-
locations of 20 percent, 4.5 percent, and 0 percent of compensation, 
respectively. 
Because 15 of the 16 employees benefit under the plan, section 
40l(a)(26) is satisfied. Because more than 70 percent of the nonhighly 
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Table 1 
Employee Data 
Ee Age Comp Alloe AeVal Equiv Rate 
Hl 46 $150,000 $30,000 $129,471 $12,973.05 8.65% 
H2 37 80,000 3,600 31,058 3,111.98 3.89% 
Nl 29 60,000 2,700 43,114 4,320.05 7.20% 
N2 25 60,000 2,700 58,656 5,877.38 9.80% 
N3 48 58,000 2,610 9,657 967.64 1.67% 
N4 45 42,000 1,890 8,809 882.69 2.10% 
N5 40 40,000 0 0 0.00 0.00% 
N6 35 40,000 1,800 18,113 1,814.91 4.54% 
N7 24 38,000 1,710 40,121 4,020.12 10.58% 
N8 30 36,000 1,620 23,952 2,400.03 6.67% 
N9 24 35,000 1,575 36,953 3,702.75 10.58% 
NI0 25 34,000 1,530 33,239 3,330.51 9.80% 
NIl 30 30,000 1,350 19,960 2,000.02 6.67% 
N12 29 23,000 1,035 16,527 1,656.02 7.20% 
N13 35 20,000 900 9,056 907,45 4.54% 
N14 22 16,000 720 19,704 1,974.35 12.34% 
Notes: Ee = Employee; Comp = Compensation; Alloc = Allocation; AcVal = 
Accumulated Value at age 65; Equiv = Equivalent Accrual; Rate = Accural 
Rate 
compensated employees benefit, section 410(b) is satisfied. Section 
40l(a)(4) cross-testing based on a testing age of 65 uses an interest rate 
of 8 percent and mortality in accordance with the 1983 Individual An-
nuity Female Mortality Table. The annuity purchase rate based on these 
assumptions is 9.98. The data and results are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 2 shows the accrual rates arranged in descending order. 
Table 3 shows that both rate groups satisfy the 70 percent test in 
section 41 O(b). 
There are other ways to perform the testing procedure, e.g., imput-
ing Social Security benefits because part of these benefits is paid by 
the employer, using a testing period other than the current plan year, 
using the average benefit test instead of the 70 percent test for the rate 
groups, restructuring, etc. There are also difficulties that practitioners 
may face in practical situations, e.g., the required minimum allocation 
to a young, non-key, highly compensated employee in a top heavy plan 
may result in an unusually high actuarially equivalent annuity b-enefit. 
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Table 2 
Ordered Accural Rates 
Employee Accrual 
Rate(%) 
N14 12.34 
N7 10.58 
N9 10.58 
N2 9.80 
N10 9.80 
HI 8.65 
N1 7.20 
N12 7.20 
N8 6.67 
Nll 6.67 
N6 4.54 
N13 4.54 
H2 3.89 
N4 2.10 
N3 1.67 
N5 0.00 
Or the allocation to an old nonhighly compensated employee that is ac-
tuarially equivalent to an annuity benefit needed to pass the test may 
run into maximum limitation problem under section 415(c). Instead of 
dwelling on these technical details, we instead will focus on other is-
sues faced by practitioners. Practitioners must familiarize themselves 
with the technical difficulties and variations of cross-testing, however, 
before they apply it to their clients' plans. 
4 Benefits of Cross-Testing 
Why do some plan sponsors, especially those sponsoring small plans, 
favor plans based on the cross-testing technique? First, such employers 
are usually small business owners who have spent a lot of time culti-
vating a successful business and now are ready to plan for retirement. 
Owners obviously want to allocate as much as possible to their own 
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Rate 
H2 
Table 3 
Ratios for Various Rate Groups 
Highly Nonhighly 
Compensated 
Number Ratio 
1 1/2 
2 2/2 
Compensated 
Number Ratio 
5 5/14 
11 11/14 
Notes: NR:HR = Nonhigh Ratio to High Ratio. 
NR:HR 
71.43% 
78.57% 
accounts and, at the same time, likely will try to minimize what they 
must give to their rank-and-file employees. 
In a traditional nonintegrated defined contribution plan allocations 
are determined as a uniform percentage of plan participants' compen-
sations. In the case of small businesses, the owners are usually older 
than their employees. Thus, based on the same accrual rates, they will 
receive larger allocations, as a percentage of their compensations, than 
their employees simply because they are older and have larger deferred 
annuity factors. In our numerical example HI receives an allocation 
that is the highest as a percentage of compensation among all employ-
ees. His/her actuarially equivalent annuity benefit as a percentage of 
compensation, however, is not the highest. 
Another reason is that such plans, being defined contribution plans, 
are free of the long-term commitments inherent in defined benefit plans. 
Furthermore, the annual administration required in a defined contribu-
tion plan is usually much less burdensome than that in a defined ben-
efit plan. If a defined contribution plan is of the profit sharing type, 
it does not have a funding requirement. As long as the plan sponsor 
can demonstrate that there are substantial and recurring contributions, 
there is no need to contribute any required amount in any particular 
year. 
Does the above example seem nondiscriminatory? It seems that 
such allocations would not pass the so-called smell test, i.e., people 
would intuitively think that such allocations are discriminatory. Al-
though guidance on section 401(a)(4) existed before the publication of 
these regulations, the tests described in earlier guidance were not as 
clearly defined as those in these regulations. Due to this uncertainty 
and the possible challenge by the Internal Revenue Service, such a plan 
probably would not have been recommended by practitioners before 
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the nondiscrimination regulation package. The author believes that 
there are two main reasons for the change of practitioner attitudes. 
First, the regulation package opts for objective criteria. The conser-
vative practitioners who in the past would not have recommended such 
plans because they did not smell right have no doubt that such plans 
now are allowed simply because the tests are passed. In other words, 
even if a plan is designed to discriminate, it is not discriminatory in the 
eyes of the regulatory government agency. 
Second, Revenue Ruling 81-202, the guide made obsolete by this 
regulation package, had a safe harbor interest rate of 5 percent to 6 
percent. While Internal Revenue Service officials indicated that a higher 
interest rate would be allowed if the plan sponsor could demonstrate 
that its plan consistently had earned a higher rate of return, most prac-
titioners stayed in the safe harbor range. It is easy to demonstrate 
mathematically that the higher the interest rate, the higher the dispar-
ity in allocations between employees of different ages. The regulations 
now require that an interest rate between 7.5 percent and 8.5 percent 
be used, increasing the disparity due to age differences. As pointed 
out earlier, it is usually the case that highly compensated employees 
are older than nonhighly compensated employees. Thus, the disparity 
in favor of the highly compensated employees is now greater due to the 
use of a higher interest rate in the normalization. 
The objection would not be as much if these defined contribution 
plans are strictly age-weighted in the sense that the allocations are ac-
tuarially equivalent to the same annuity benefit (in dollar amount or as 
a percentage of compensation) for all employees. After all, this is how 
the normal cost is calculated under the unit credit actuarial funding 
method in defined benefit plans. A plan that applies this methodology 
and that gives HI the same allocation as in our previous example is 
shown in Table 4 below. When the allocations are converted to annu-
ity benefits commencing at the testing age of 65, all employees receive 
the same benefit as a percentage of compensation. For comparison 
purposes the allocations in our earlier example are shown next to this 
age-weighted plan. 
5 Criticisms of Cross-Testing 
The objection of most critics of cross-tested plans is that such plans 
are not strictly age-weighted. The structure of rate group testing allows 
a plan sponsor to use the demography of the plan population so that 
a relatively small increase in the allocations to young nonhighly com-
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Table 4 
Plan Allocations 
Age-Weighted Allocation in 
Employee Allocation Previous Example 
HI $30,000 $30,000 
H2 8,004 3,600 
N1 3,243 2,700 
N2 2,384 2,700 
N3 13,530 2,610 
N4 7,778 1,890 
N5 5,041 0 
N6 3,431 1,800 
N7 1,398 1,710 
N8 2,102 1,620 
N9 1,288 1,575 
N10 1,351 1,530 
NIl 1,751 1,350 
N12 1,243 1,035 
N13 1,716 900 
N14 505 720 
Total 84,765 55,740 
pensated employees can be used to avoid larger allocations to older 
nonhighly compensated employees that would be required on a strictly 
age-weighted basis. Further, in a strictly age-weighted plan, every young 
employee has the opportunity, as he or she ages, to grow to receive a 
larger allocation. The analogous situation in defined benefit plan fund-
ing is the increasing normal cost in the unit credit method as a person 
ages. But in the example above, an employee may never be able to grow 
into that situation as long as there are new young nonhighly compen-
sated employees that can help the plan pass rate group testing. 
Another objection is that although the policy reason of allowing a 
plan sponsor to do what it could do by utilizing separate plans is sound, 
the rate groups are not plans. They are not required to satisfy the par-
ticipation requirement in section 401(a)(26). If it were required, the 
example above would fail. Furthermore, our example is constructed 
so that each rate group passes the 70 percent coverage test of section 
Ng: Cross-Tested Plans 137 
41O(b). Should a rate group fail such a test, it still can demonstrate its 
coverage by passing the alternative average benefit test. In this test the 
70 percent threshold is lowered to somewhere between 20.375 percent 
and 45 percent if another requirement on the relative benefits that em-
ployees receive is satisfied. The average benefit test for a rate group, 
however, is more liberal than the corresponding test for a plan. For 
example, one of the requirements for a plan to satisfy the average ben-
efit test is that the classification of employees covered under the plan 
be a reasonable one. A rate group does not need to satisfy such a re-
quirement. Thus, a rate group may not be a plan that could pass the 
nondiscrimination requirements if it were to exist alone. 
What should practitioners do? They have an obligation to their 
clients to design retirement plans that are legal and that are best for 
their clients. Because discrimination and nondiscrimination are defined 
by the government, practitioners will be remiss if they do not discuss 
this plan design with their clients whose objectives may be served best 
by cross-testing. 
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Model Year Rating for Automobile Liability and 
Injury Coverages 
Leonard T. Guarini* and Edward P. Lotkowski t 
Abstract* 
This paper is intended to stimulate further research and discussion on the 
validity and utility of model year rating for personal automobile coverages 
other than physical damage. Using data from a single insurer and some ele-
mentary statistical techniques, we provide evidence supporting model year as 
a classification variable for automobile liability and injury coverages. 
Key words and phrases: age rating, risk classification, loss ratio, claim fre-
quency, claim severity 
1 Age Rating Versus Model Year Rating 
Before the mid 1970s the standard automobile phYSical damage rat-
ing system employed age rating. Under the age rating system the pre-
mium structure for a given model yearl was such that renewal premi-
ums decreased automatically as an automobile aged. The age rating ap-
proach recognizes that as a vehicle ages, the maximum amount payable 
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and casualty insurance with emphasis on pricing and research in personal lines. Mr. 
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1 We adopt the convention that the model year of a car is the fiscal year ending 
September 30. For example, model year 1990 runs from October 1, 1990 to September 
30, 1991. 
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(total loss) decreases as the car depreciates. It fails to recognize, how-
ever, that the overwhelming percentage of losses are partial losses that 
are subject to the full impact of inflation. As a result, companies have 
had to seek rate relief constantly to keep pace with the impact of in-
flation. The age rating system builds physical damage premium reduc-
tions into a carrier's inforce book of business. These built-in reductions 
are offset by the attrition of old vehicles and the influx of new vehicles. 
The net result is little or no overall change in premium level. 
Model year rating was introduced in the mid-1970s by rating bureaus 
and individual companies on a state by state basis. Model year rating is 
the end result of an effort to find an inflation-sensitive exposure base 
orrating variable for automobile physical damage coverages. Under the 
model year rating system premiums for a model year remain fixed until 
a general rate level change is implemented. Premium levels between 
successive model years typically increase about 5 percent. In contrast to 
the age rating situation, the influx of new vehicles coupled with attrition 
of older vehicles typically results in an increase in revenue. 
The essential difference between age rating and model year rating 
is captured in the following example. Assume, for simplicity, there 
is a $ 5 differential between age groups and that the premium for age 
zero2 is $100. Table 1 shows the premiums charged on 10/1 / z - 1 and 
on 10/1/z under age rating, while Table 2 shows the premiums under 
model year rating. A model year z automobile classified as age zero on 
10/1/z - 1 carrying a premium of $100 would renew on 10/1/z as an 
age one automobile with a (lower) premium of $95 under the age rating 
system. On 10/1/z newly built cars would be rated at age zero with 
the highest premiums. In contrast, under model year rating premiums 
remain constant and the new car is charged a new (higher) premium. 
The impact of the change from age rating to model year rating on 
the United States automobile rating system was significant. Rate level 
indications for physical damage coverages were reduced to recognize 
that model year rating acts as an automatic premium escalator on these 
coverages. This eliminated the roller coaster effect on rates paid by the 
customers under the age rating system. That is, it was common for 
a policyholder to receive a lower physical damage renewal premium 
when renewing subsequent to 10/1/z, only to have the physical dam-
age premium later revised due to a general rate increase. Arguably, 
an ancillary effect was to reduce pressure on regulators, as the size of 
announced rate increases diminished in recognition of the additional 
revenue generated by model year rating. 
2The convention used here is that the vehicle's birthday is on October 1 each year. 
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Table 1 
Age Rating System 
Data on 10/1/2 - 1 Data on 10/1/2 
MY Weight Age Premium Weight Age Premium 
2 + 1 wriz+ 1) 0 $100 
2 wriZ) 0 $100 wiz+ l ) 1 $95 
2 - 1 wiZ) 1 $95 W~Z+l) 2 $90 
2 - 2 W?) 2 $90 WJZ+l) 3 $85 
2 - 3 WJZ) 3 $85 WF+l) 4 $80 
MY = Model Year; and W?) = Percent of in force cars at age i in model year z 
Table 2 
Model Rating System 
Data on 10/1/2 - 1 Data on 10/1/2 
MY Weight Age Premium Weight Age Premium 
2 + 1 wriZ+1) 0 $105 
2 wriZ) 0 $100 wiz+1) 1 $100 
2 - 1 W?) 1 $95 W~z+l) 2 $95 
2 - 2 W?) 2 $80 wiz+l) 3 $90 
2 - 3 wf) 3 $85 WF+l) 4 $85 
I'vrY = Model Year; and wiz ) = Percent of in force cars at age i in model year z 
Model year rating has many desirable features and is more appro-
priate than age rating for many reasons: 
• Age rating ignores the fact that overall loss costs tend to increase 
over time because age rating automatically lowers a risk's pre-
mium each year. Model year rating does not; 
• Model year rating avoids the roller coaster effect on a risk's pre-
mium induced under age rating; 
• Due to its effect as an automatic premium escalator on an entire 
book of business, a model year rating system makes it possible to 
file for smaller rate increases than would be necessary under an 
142 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
age rating system while achieving the same overall premium level; 
and 
• If manual rates are not reviewed or filings delayed for some rea-
son, average premiums nevertheless are increasing automatically. 
These advantages do not reference a particular coverage. 
2 Is Model Year Rating Valid for Other Coverages? 
One would expect a connection between the model year and the cost 
level for physical damage coverages, even if only due to the effects of 
depreciation and the higher cost of parts for newer vehicles. A review 
of auto collision data3 indicates that severities are correlated positively 
with model year, but that severity alone does not explain the entire 
cost difference from model year to model year. Frequency increases by 
model year are also significant; see Table 3. This suggests that one may 
find frequency increases by model year for other coverages. 
Before examining frequency and severity data for liability (plus in-
jury) coverages, loss ratio data for these coverages by model year will 
be reviewed.4 Table 4 shows the basic limits loss ratio data for liabil-
ity (Le., other than physical damage) coverages. The loss ratios tend 
to increase with model year, suggesting that model year rating may be 
a valid rating criterion.s Because liability coverages currently are not 
3 All data in this paper are drawn from several states for an individual company. 
The data are for the four year accident period 1/1/88 through 12/31/91, evaluated 
as of 12/31/91. Model years subsequent to 1988 are not examined for two reasons. 
First, only the more recent of the four accident years would apply to model years 1989 
and subsequent, whereas all four accident years' experience would apply to the earlier 
model years. Second, the experience for more recent accident and model years is biased 
downward for liability coverages because these coverages develop upward over time 
and because new model years are introduced in the latter half of the year. 
4The use of loss ratio data controls for distributional effects. For example, if more 
recent model years had a disproportionate share of youthful operators who generate 
high loss costs, the frequency and severity data should reflect this effect, thus giving 
the more recent model years the appearance of higher loss costs. Youthful operators 
also generate a higher premium, however. In a loss ratio analysis this offsets their 
higher loss costs, to the extent that they are rated properly. Loss ratios at basic limits 
also have been utilized to mitigate the potential impact of large losses on anyone 
model year's data. 
5 Another rating criterion that may be important is the automobile's symbol. Symbols 
are physical damage rating variables that are assigned to each automobile and reflect 
its relative loss potential. With the exce,ption of an automobile's symbol, we know of 
no other variable not reflected in the liability rating system that would be correlated 
strongly enough with model year to explain this observed loss ratio behavior. We 
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Table 3 
Private Passenger Automobile Collision 
Insurance Frequency and Severity Data 
Frequency Severity 
MY Observed Relativity Observed Relativity 
1974 0.0303 0.497 $1,151 0.697 
1975 0.0308 0.505 $1,005 0.608 
1976 0.0327 0.535 $1,005 0.609 
1977 0.0333 0.545 $ 948 0.574 
1978 0.0379 0.621 $ 962 0.582 
1979 0.0375 0.615 $1,072 0.649 
1980 0.0445 0.729 $1,083 0.656 
1981 0.0481 0.788 $1,148 0.695 
1982 0.0484 0.793 $1,264 0.765 
1983 0.0536 0.878 $1,404 0.850 
1984 0.0579 0.949 $1,501 0.909 
1985 0.0632 1.036 $1,647 0.997 
1986 0.0673 1.103 $1,741 1.054 
1987 0.0706 1.158 $1,846 1.118 
1988 0.0724 1.187 $1,942 1.176 
Total 0.0610 1.000 $1,651 1.000 
Notes: MY = Model Year; Relativity = Ratio of Observed to Total. 
rated by model year, an increasing trend in loss ratios (by model year) 
suggests that a differential between successive model years should ex-
ist in the rating system. By fitting an exponential regression to the data 
in Table 4, we see an average increase between successive model years 
of 3.3 percent. Figure 1 depicts these liability loss ratio relativities. 
To better understand the behavior of the loss ratios in Table 4, let 
us split the pure premium into its frequency and severity components. 
As the data in Table 5 show, claim frequency by model year increases at 
a faster rate than does severity. The estimated annual rate of increase 
produced by fitting an exponential to the data in Table 5 is 3.3 percent 
for frequency and 1.0 percent for severity.6 Figures 2 and 3 respectively 
reviewed liability loss ratios split to model year and symbol and found no evidence of 
a relationship between loss ratio and symbol. 
6The larger year-to-year frequency change obtained for collision possibly is due to 
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Table 4 
Private Passenger Automobile 
Liability Insurance Loss Ratios 
Model Year Amount Relativity 
1974 40.5% 0.644 
1975 50.9% 0.810 
1976 47.6% 0.758 
1977 49.2% 0.783 
1978 53.5% 0.852 
1979 55.3% 0.881 
1980 56.3% 0.896 
1981 58.3% 0.929 
1982 60.0% 0.955 
1983 62.0% 0.986 
1984 63.8% 1.016 
1985 66.7% 1.062 
1986 64.7% 1.030 
1987 69.8% 1.1l0 
1988 69.0% 1.099 
Total 62.8% 1.000 
Notes: Relativity = Ratio of Observed to Total. 
display the actual and fitted frequency and the actual and fitted severity 
rela tivities. 
3 What Drives the Results? 
Although causality applied in the context of insurance pricing can be 
difficult to establish, regulators and insurance company management 
nevertheless often ask why a rating variable works. The relatively mild 
annual rate of increase in severity over the model years is not surpris-
ing. One would not expect the distribution of automobiles (and their 
operators) to which any vehicle is exposed to depend strongly upon the 
an interaction with deductibles. Because the focus of this paper is liability and injury 
coverages, this is not investigated. We speculate that higher first dollar severities for 
newer models mean that proportionately more claims pierce the deductible. 
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model year of that vehicle. So what explains the frequency result? It 
seems unlikely that frequency variation by model year can be explained 
by territory or operator characteristics. Moreover, these variables are 
controlled for in the loss ratio analysis above. 
In the case at hand, it is plausible that model year acts as a partial 
surrogate for annual miles driven. In the United States some insurers 
incorporate miles driven into their rating plans. Due to the cost and dif-
ficulty of obtaining accurate odometer readings, however, miles driven 
is incorporated on an incomplete basis. Companies often will use just 
a single breakpoint (such as 7,500 miles annually) to segregate vehicles 
by miles driven. 
Why is there a link between model year and miles driven? It is rea-
sonable to surmise that a newer car is likely to be used more than an 
older one. It also is likely that older vehicles are more prone to be under 
repair and thus are removed from exposure more days of the year than 
are newer vehicles. Moreover, we surmise that both factors are likely 
to operate more strongly in multiple car households than in single car 
households. For example, in the specific case of a two car household 
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Table 5 
Private Passenger Automobile Liability 
Insurance Frequency and Severity Data 
Frequency Severity 
MY Observed Relativity Observed Relativity 
1974 0.0465 0.690 $2,848 0.862 
1975 0.0521 0.775 $3,244 0.982 
1976 0.0519 0.771 $3,017 0.914 
1977 0.0531 0.789 $3,062 0.928 
1978 0.0572 0.849 $3,086 0.935 
1979 0.0576 0.855 $3,230 0.978 
1980 0.0621 0.922 $3,130 0.948 
1981 0.0641 0.952 $3,125 0.946 
1982 0.0635 0.943 $3,278 0.993 
1983 0.0661 0.982 $3,279 0.993 
1984 0.0686 1.020 $3,269 0.990 
1985 0.0704 1.046 $3,364 1.019 
1986 0.0714 1.061 $3,260 0.987 
1987 0.0742 1.102 $3,468 1.050 
1988 0.0750 1.115 $3,455 1.046 
Total 0.0673 1.000 $3,300 1.000 
Notes: MY = Model Year; Relativity = Ratio of Observed to Total. 
with two operators, the newer car is apt to be used when both opera-
tors are traveling together or when either operator has a choice between 
vehicles. Table 6 contains the data on single car households and mul-
tiple car households. The data show a modest but definitely greater 
indicated model year factor in the multiple car case. There is a lower 
annual rate of increase between successive model years for single cars 
than for multiple cars (2.3 percent for single cars and 3.8 percent for 
cars on multiple car policies). This result is consistent with our hy-
pothesis and hence does provide evidence that frequency differences 
by model year reflect annual miles driven. 
The issue of more accurately reflecting a vehicle's annual mileage 
in the automobile insurance pricing structure has been raised before. 
Butler (1993) argues for car-mile as an exposure basis to be preferred 
over the currently employed car-year exposure basis. One may view 
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the extension of model year rating to all major automobile coverages 
as an idea that lies between these two extremes. It retains car-year as 
the exposure base but recognizes miles driven through a classification 
rating variable. Although it does not capture the mileage of individ-
ual vehicles, it does reflect mileage on an average basis. It also has 
the advantage of injecting no additional administrative costs into the 
insurance system. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that model year rat-
ing is a valid rating criterion for personal automobile liability and injury 
coverages. The data and analysis are far from complete, however. The 
authors hope that this discussion will encourage further research utiliz-
ing more extensive data sets that lend themselves to more sophisticated 
analysis. We expect the results of this paper will be corroborated. The 
'xtension of model year rating to automobile liability and injury cov-
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erages also may be viewed as a means of reflecting miles driven in the 
automobile rating system at no additional administrative cost. 
In clOSing, we note that the insurance industry's annual personal 
automobile liability plus injury premium stands in excess of $50 billion. 
Should a model year rating differential of just 1 percent prove to be 
valid and be adopted, the annual industry wide premium impact would 
exceed $0.5 billion due to model year rating's action as an automatic 
premium escalator. 
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Table 6 
Private Passenger Automobile Liability Insurance 
Loss Ratios: Single Car Versus Multiple Cars 
Single Car Multiple Cars 
MY Observed Relativity Observed Relativity 
1974 57.5% 0.935 35.6% 0.562 
1975 49.3% 0.803 51.4% 0.811 
1976 46.5% 0.756 48.0% 0.758 
1977 45.8% 0.744 50.3% 0.794 
1978 53.8% 0.875 53.4% 0.843 
1979 51.9% 0.844 56.4% 0.891 
1980 59.7% 0.971 55.2% 0.871 
1981 55.4% 0.901 59.3% 0.936 
1982 61.6% 1.002 59.5% 0.939 
1983 60.1% 0.979 62.6% 0.988 
1984 62.6% 1.019 64.3% 1.015 
1985 63.2% 1.028 68.1% 1.076 
1986 64.1% 1.043 64.9% 1.025 
1987 68.0% 1.106 70.6% 1.114 
1988 63.1% 1.027 71.7% 1.132 
Total 61.4% 1.000 63.3% 1.000 
Notes: MY = Model Year; Relativity = Ratio of Observed to Total. 
References 
Butler, P. "Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk Transfer: 
Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis." Journal of Actuarial Practice 1, no. 
1 (1993): 51-67. 

Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
Discussion of Leonard T. Guarini and Edward P. 
Lotkowski's "Model Year Rating for Automobile 
Liability and Injury Coverages" 
Cheng-Sheng Peter Wu* 
1 Introduction 
The paper by Messrs. Leonard T. Guarini and Edward P. Lotkowski 
presents data supporting their view that private automobile loss costs 
correlate with the model years of vehicles: the newer the vehicles, the 
higher the loss costs. Not only physical damage coverages, but also 
liability and injury coverages exhibit such model year cost differences. 
The paper explores the idea of applying model year rating to liability 
and injury coverages. 
The loss cost inflation associated with private automobile insurance 
is volatile because the underlying frequency and severity trends are 
affected uniquely by external economic conditions. During recession 
the vehicle repair cost is low. Also, a higher unemployment rate reduces 
the frequency of accidents because fewer persons drive to work. When 
the economy is recovering, both frequency and severity tend to rise. 
Although the data reviewed in the paper indicate that "severity alone 
does not explain entire cost difference indicated from model year to 
model year," the model year rating currently used for physical dam-
age coverages is designed to hedge against the severity trend. Due to 
the higher cost in repairing newer vehicles, the insurance industry con-
vinced regulators that using model year ratings for physical damage 
coverages would "reduce the roller coaster effect on the rates ... and 
* Cheng-Sheng Peter Wu, A.C.A.S., A.SA, MAAA, is a senior consultant with Deloitte 
& Touche LLP. He received his masters degrees in chemical engineering and in statistics 
from Pennsylvania State University. Mr. Wu has published several papers in the areas 
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pressure on regulators as the size of announced rate increases dimin-
ished in recognition of the additional revenue by model year rating," as 
pointed out in the paper. The commonly used model year factor has 
been indexed to a long-term inflation trend, 5 percent per model year, 
for example. 
2 Examples 
Before continuing my comments, I would like to introduce two ex-
amples. These two examples illustrate how a model year rating system 
hedges against automobile loss cost inflation. The key assumptions for 
the examples are: 
• No vehicles with age more than three years; 
• Model year factor and model year cost difference is 5 percent per 
year; 
• An annual trend of 5 percent for severity; and 
• No expense is included. 
2.1 Example 1: No Model Year Cost Difference for Frequency 
The commonly used model year rating has been indexed to the long-
term severity trend. Therefore, in this first example it is assumed that 
there is no model year cost difference for frequency. That is, the overall 
model year loss cost difference is due entirely to severity: 
Table 1 
Data on 10/1/z 
MY SEV FREQ PURE BRATE MYF 
z $441 10% $44.0 $40.0 1.10 
z-1 $420 10% $42.0 $40.0 1.05 
z-2 $400 10% $40.0 $40.0 1.00 
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity; FREQ = Claim 
Frequency; PURE = Pure Premium; BRA TE = Base Rate; and MYF 
= Model Year Factor. 
In Table 1, model year z - 2 is used as the base year for the model 
year factor. One year later at z + 1, the z - 2 vehicles drop out and the 
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2 + 1 vehicles are introduced. If we assume that the frequency remains 
unchanged, then the following loss costs are expected at year 2 + 1: 
Table 2 shows that the severity for the 2 and 2 - 1 vehicles at year 2 + 1 
Table 2 
Expected Loss Costs on 10/1/2 + 1 
MY SEV FREQ PURE 
2 + 1 $463 10% $46.3 
2 
2-1 
$441 
$420 
10% 
10% 
$44.1 
$42.0 
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Sever-
ity; FREQ = Claim Frequency; and PURE = Pure 
Premium. 
remains the same as the severity at year 2. This is because the annual 
depreciation as assumed in the model year cost difference offsets the 
external severity upward trend, both being 5 percent. 
On the other hand, the premium at year 2 + 1 automatically will 
escalate by the model year rating: 
Table 3 
Premium Escalation on 10/1/2 + 1 
MY BRATE MYF PREM 
2 + 1 $40.0 1.16 $46.3 
z $40.0 1.10 $44.0 
2 - 1 $40.0 1.05 $42.0 
Notes: MY = Model Year; BRATE = Base Rate; 
MYF = Model Year Factor; and PREM = Charged 
Premium. 
Because the model year rating increases the premium at a rate that 
is the same as the rate of inflation, there is no need to adjust the base 
rate. This is an ideal example because the external severity trend and 
the model year cost difference exactly offset each other. 
If the frequency has changed from year 2 to year 2 + 1, however, 
then the model year rating will not be in balance. Table 4 lists the new 
loss costs when the frequency has dropped from 10 percent at year 2 
to 8 percent at year 2 + 1: 
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Table 4 
Frequency Change on 10/1/2 + 1 
MY SEV FREQ PURE 
2 + 1 $463 8% $37.0 
2 $441 8% $35.3 
2 - 1 $420 8% $33.6 
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Sever-
ity; FREQ = Claim Frequency; and PURE = Pure 
Premium. 
With this new frequency assumption, the premium charged by the 
model year rating will overstate the loss costs. The opposite is true 
when the frequency has increased instead of decreased. 
2.2 Example 2: Model Year Cost Difference for Frequency 
As the data presented by Guarini and Lotkowski suggest, the fre-
quency cost difference by model year is significant as well. Therefore, 
in this second example we assume in addition to all the assumptions 
made in the first example that the frequency cost difference is also 
5 percent per model year. The overall model year factor becomes 10 
percent per model year-5 percent from frequency and 5 percent from 
severity. Because of the increased model year cost difference, both the 
model year factor and the base rate need to be modified as follows: 
Table 5 
Data on 10/1/2 
MY SEV FREQ PURE BRATE MYF 
2 $441 10% $44.1 $36.2 1.22 
2 - 1 $420 9.5% $40.0 $36.2 1.10 
2-2 $400 9.1% $36.2 $36.2 1.00 
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity; FREQ = Claim 
Frequency; PURE = Pure Premium; BRA TE = Base Rate; and MYF 
= Model Year Factor. 
Next, if we assume that the frequency trend is also 5 percent per 
year, then the loss costs at year 2 + 1 are: 
Wu: Discussion 
Table 6 
Expected Loss Costs on 10/1/2 + 1 
MY SEV FREQ PURE 
2 + 1 $463 10.5% $48.5 
Z $441 10% $44.1 
z-1 $420 9.5% $40.0 
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Sever-
ity; FREQ = Claim Frequency; and PURE = Pure 
Premium. 
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With all the assumptions the model year rating will increase the 
charged premium at the same rate as the overall inflation, as illustrated 
below: 
Table 7 
Premium Escalation on 10/1/2 + 1 
MY BRA TE MYF PREM 
2 + 1 $36.2 1.34 $48.5 
2 $36.2 1.22 
2 - 1 $36.2 1.10 
$44.1 
$40.0 
Notes: MY = Model Year; BRATE = Base Rate; 
MYF = Model Year Factor; and PREM = Charged 
Premium. 
But if the external frequency trend exhibits a different rate from 
the frequency model year cost difference, the model year rating will 
overestimate or underestimate the loss cost inflation. Table 8 shows 
the loss costs if there is no change in frequency from year 2 to year 
2+1. 
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Table 8 
Frequency Change on 10/1/ z + 1 
MY SEV FREQ PURE 
z + 1 $463 10% $46.3 
z $441 9.5% 
z - 1 $420 9.1% 
$42.0 
$38.1 
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Sever-
ity; FREQ = Claim Frequency; and PURE = Pure 
Premium. 
3 Some Comments 
From these two examples, we can arrive at the following conclusions: 
• Model year factors ideally should include the model year cost dif-
ferences for both frequency and severity; 
• The performance of a model year rating system depends largely 
on the degree that the overall model year cost difference offsets 
the external loss cost inflation. . 
Because the model year factors currently used by insurance compa-
nies for physical damage coverages have been indexed to the long-term 
severity trend, they reflect neither the frequency trend nor the model 
year cost difference for frequency. 
4 The Real World 
Now, let us evaluate real world data. Table 9 replicates the collision 
data by model year. The data further are plotted in Figure 1. Using 
an exponential regression technique and the data we can estimate the 
model year factor. Listed at the bottom of Table 9 are the fitted results 
using different numbers of data points. The fitted results given in Table 
9 suggest that the model year factor for collision is about 12 percent. 
This seems to be higher than the model year factor used in the industry. 
Table 10 and Figure 2 show industry collision loss cost data from 
the first quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 1994. The data are 
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Insurance Services Office (ISO) fast track data from ISO Circular AS-
PA-94-20.1 The data cover the period of the 1991-1993 recession. The 
frequency trend during the recession dropped so low that the overall 
loss cost trend experienced a certain degree of deflation. As illustrated 
earlier, we expect the model year rating for physical damage coverages 
to significantly overstate the loss costs for that period of time. In the 
past two years some insurers did lower their physical damage rates. 
Table 11 and Figure 3 replicate the liability data. The exponential fits 
given in Table 11 suggest a liability model year factor of approximately 4 
percent. We find a major difference when comparing the liability model 
year data and the physical damage model year data: the liability model 
year cost difference is driven mainly by frequency, while the physical 
damage cost difference is driven by both frequency and severity. 
Table 12 and Figure 4 show the liability inflation data from the ISO 
Circular AS-PA-94-20. The liability data in these two tables and figure 
indicate that the liability frequency trend has been flat and that the li-
ability severity trend has been leveling from 1991 to 1994. This differs 
greatly from the liability model year cost difference. Table 11 and Fig-
ure 3 show that the frequency cost difference is significant for liability, 
while the severity loss cost difference is not. 
After presenting all the examples and data, I tend to disagree that 
model year rating should be applied to liability and injury coverages. 
First, the model year rating for liability and injury coverages will not 
be understood easily by public or regulators because frequency, not 
severity, is the main driving force for the liability cost difference. Sec-
ond, the real world data suggest that liability model year rating may not 
perform well. It may be more appropriate to let market forces, under-
writing measures, or age rating correct the model year cost differences 
for liability and injury coverages. 
Finally, I want to applaud the authors for their effort in proposing an 
interesting idea. I agree with them that there needs to be more in-depth 
research and more comprehensive data on this topic in the future. 
ITo obtain copies of this data set write to: Insurance Services Office, 7 World Trade 
Center, New York NY 10048 
Table 9 
Model Year Loss Cost Difference-Collision 
Model Pure Normalized Normalized 
Year Frequency Severity Premium Frequency*** Severity*** 
1974 3.03% 1,151 34.9 1.00 1.00 
1975 3.08% 1,005 31.0 1.02 0.87 
1976 3.27% 1,005 32.9 1.08 0.87 
1977 3.33% 948 31.6 1.10 0.82 
1978 3.79% 962 36.5 1.25 0.84 
1979 3.75% 1,072 40.2 1.24 0.93 
1980 4.45% 1,083 48.2 1.47 0.94 
1981 4.81% 1,148 55.2 1.59 1.00 
1982 4.84% 1,264 61.2 1.60 1.10 
1983 5.36% 1,404 75.3 1.77 1.22 
1984 5.79% 1,501 86.9 1.91 1.30 
1985 6.32% 1,647 104.1 2.09 1.43 
1986 6.73% 1,741 117.2 2.22 1.51 
1987 7.06% 1,846 130.3 2.33 1.60 
1988 7.24% 1,942 140.6 2.39 1.69 
Loss Cost Difference Per Year 
3 Year Fit** 
5 Year Fit** 
10 Year Fit** 
All Year Fit** 
Frequency Severity 
3.72% 5.61% 
5.74% 
7.35% 
7.14% 
6.49% 
7.56% 
5.24% 
* The data in this table are based on Table 3; 
** An exponential fitting technique is used; 
Pure Premium 
9.54% 
12.60% 
15.47% 
12.75% 
Normalized Pure 
Premium*** 
1.00 
0.89 
0.94 
0.91 
1.05 
'--
1.15 0 c 
1.38 ..... :::s 
1.58 ~ 
1.75 0 -., 
2.16 » n .... 
2.49 c s:u 
2.98 ~. s:u 
3.36 -0 
3.74 ..... s:u 
n 
4.03 .... n 
_(1) 
< 
0 
w 
Z 
0 
\.0 
\.0 
U"1 
Table 10 
Industry Loss Cost Trend-Collision* ...... 
c 
Pure Normalized Normalized Normalized Pure 0 
Year Frequency Severity Premium Frequency*** Severity*** Premium*** Vi 
t"'I 
1990, 1Q 8.05% 1,487 119.7 1.00 1.00 1.00 c III 
1990,2Q 8.05% 1,497 120.5 1.00 1.01 1.01 III 0 
1990,3Q 8.00% 1,505 120.4 0.99 1.01 1.01 :::l 
1990,4Q 7.88% 1,504 118.5 0.98 1.01 0.99 
1991, 1Q 7.61% 1,498 114.0 0.95 l.01 0.95 
1991,2Q 7.40% 1,496 110.7 0.92 1.01 0.92 
1991,3Q 7.28% 1,499 109.1 0.90 l.01 0.91 
1991,4Q 7.22% 1,506 108.7 0.90 l.01 0.91 
1992, 1Q 7.04% 1,514 106.6 0.87 1.02 0.89 
1992,2Q 6.94% 1,527 106.0 0.86 l.03 0.89 
1992,3Q 6.83% 1,537 105.0 0.85 l.03 0.88 
1992,4Q 6.77% 1,560 105.6 0.84 1.05 0.88 
1993, 1Q 6.81% 1,586 108.0 0.85 l.07 0.90 
1993,2Q 6.84% 1,604 109.7 0.85 1.08 0.92 
1993,3Q 6.86% 1,630 111.8 0.85 1.10 0.93 
1993,4Q 6.84% 1,661 113.6 0.85 1.12 0.95 
1994, lQ 7.00% 1,687 118.1 0.87 1.13 0.99 
Annual Trend 
Frequency Severity Pure Premium 
6 Quarter Fit** 2.12% 6.44% 8.69% 
12 Quarter Fit** -2.40% 4.60% 2.09% 
All Quarter Fit** -4.57% 2.94% -1.76% ..... 
U"l 
(0 
* The data in this table are from ISO Circular AS-PA-94-20; 
** A,.... O'..,.Y'O ............. .o. ..... ; .... l -4=':+ .. :_ ..... + ............ t.._.: ..... ~~ ...... .: .... ~~ .... _..J_ 
Table 11 ,..... 
Model Year Loss Cost Difference-Liability* O"l 0 
Model Pure Nonnalized Nonnalized Nonnalized Pure 
Year Freguency Severity Premium Freguency*** Severity*** Premium*** 
1974 4.65% 2,848 132.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1975 5.21% 3,244 169.0 1.12 1.14 1.28 
1976 5.19% 3,017 156.6 1.12 1.06 1.18 
1977 5.31% 3,062 162.6 1.14 1.08 1.23 
1978 5.72% 3,086 176.5 1.23 1.08 1.33 '--
1979 5.76% 3,230 186.0 1.24 1.13 1.40 0 s::: 
1980 6.21% 3,130 194.4 1.34 1.10 1.47 
.... 
~ 
PJ 
1981 6.41% 3,125 200.3 1.38 1.10 1.51 -0 
1982 6.35% 3,278 208.2 1.37 1.15 1.57 -. » 
1983 6.61% 3,279 216.7 1.42 1.15 1.64 ("l ,.... 
1984 6.86% 3,269 224.3 1.48 1.15 1.69 
s::: 
PJ 
1985 7.04% 3,364 236.8 1.51 1.18 1.79 
:::!. 
PJ 
1986 7.14% 3,260 232.8 1.54 1.14 1.76 '"0 .... 
1987 7.42% 3,468 257.3 1.60 1.22 1.94 PJ ("l ,.... 
1988 7.50% 3,455 259.1 1.61 1.21 1.96 ("l 
SO 
Loss Cost Difference Per Year 
< 
0 
Frequency Severity Pure Premium w 
3 Year Fit** 2.49% 2.95% 5.51% z 
5 Year Fit** 2.34% 1.42% 3.79% ~ 
10 Year Fit** 2.77% 0.98% 3.78% 
All Year Fit** 3.28% 0.99% 4.30% <..0 
<..0 
U1 
* The data in this table are based on Table 5; 
Table 12 
Industry Loss Cost Trend-Liability* ~ 
Pure Normalized Normalized Normalized Pure 
s::: 
Year Frequency Severity Premium Frequency*** Severity*** Premium*** 0 
Vl 
1990, lQ 1.33% 7,538 100.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 n s::: 
1990,2Q 1.35% 7,645 103.2 1.02 1.01 1.03 
Vl 
Vl 
1990,3Q 1.37% 7,777 106.5 1.03 1.03 1.06 
o· 
:::l 
1990,4Q 1.39% 7,881 109.5 1.05 1.05 1.09 
1991, lQ 1.40% 8,017 112.2 1.05 1.06 1.12 
1991,2Q 1.40% 8,152 114.1 1.05 1.08 l.l4 
1991,3Q 1.40% 8,268 115.8 1.05 1.10 1.15 
1991,4Q 1.39% 8,373 116.4 1.05 l.l1 1.16 
1992,IQ 1.39% 8,485 117.9 1.05 1.13 1.18 
1992,2Q 1.38% 8,537 117.8 1.04 1.13 l.l8 
1992,3Q 1.37% 8,601 117.8 1.03 1.14 l.l8 
1992,4Q 1.37% 8,702 119.2 1.03 1.15 1.19 
1993,IQ 1.37% 8,711 119.3 1.03 1.16 1.19 
1993,2Q 1.38% 8,740 120.6 1.04 1.16 1.20 
1993,3Q 1.38% 8,758 120.9 1.04 1.16 1.21 
1993,4Q 1.39% 8,730 121.3 1.05 1.16 1.21 
1994, lQ 1.39% 8,739 121.5 1.05 1.16 1.21 
Annual Trend 
Frequency Severity Pure Premium 
6 Quarter Fit** 1.33% 0.34% 1.68% 
12 Quarter Fit** -0.35% 2.53% 2.17% 
All Quarter Fit** 0.36% 3.97% 4.34% ..... 
OJ ..... 
* The data in this table are from ISO Circular AS-PA-94-20; 
** An pvnl"'\npntl'.:ll flttlncr t,::llr-hnlr1l1~ lC llC'Orl· 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 3 
Model Year Cost Differences: Liability 
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Discussion of Leonard T. Guarini and Edward P. 
Lotkowski's "Model Year Rating for Automobile 
Liability and Injury Coverages" 
Mohammed Q. Ashab* 
Introduction 
I congratulate Messrs. Leonard T. Guarini and Edward P. Lotkowski 
on their interesting and innovative paper. I know of no other paper that 
purports to use a rating variable that traditionally is reserved only for 
physical damage coverages (Le., model year) also to price auto liability 
(and injury) coverages. 
My comments will be restricted to a practical observation and a mi-
nor note on the paper. From a practical perspective, I don't believe 
companies would use model year to price auto liability (and injury) cov-
erages. Even if the authors' proposed use of model year were accepted 
and endorsed by regulators, companies would be reluctant to imple-
ment it in the marketplace due to competitive reasons and strategies. 
To see this, assume that the market is competitive. All other things 
equal, a company that tries to use model year to price its auto liability 
(and injury) coverages would be driven out of the market for more re-
cent model years and would undercut the competition on older model 
years. The more recent model year cars would be rated with model 
year factors greater than unity, while the older model year cars would 
be rated with factors less than unity. I don't believe companies would 
choose to be competitive only for older cars and leave newer cars to 
their competitors. This would be a poor competitive strategy even if 
*Mohammed Q. Ashab A.S.A., M.AAA., is a manager of the property and casualty 
reserving unit at Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company. He received 
his B.Sc. degree in pure and applied mathematics and computer science from the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts_ 
Mr. Ashab's address is: Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 700 
Quaker Lane, Warwick RI 02886, USA. 
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older cars produce better loss ratios than newer cars. Therefore, us-
ing the model year for other than physical damage coverages would be 
prohibitive. 
Messrs. Guarini and Lotkowski also give some reasons on the desir-
ability and appropriateness of model year rating when compared with 
age rating. While the reasons are well-known to all practicing actuaries, 
an additional advantage of model year not stated in the paper is that 
model year allows companies to achieve greater differentiation in their 
rating structure than under age rating because ten or more model years 
are substituted for three to five age groups. 
Authors' Reply to Discussion 
Leonard T. Guarini and Edward P. Lotkowski 
As both Messrs. Cheng-Sheng Peter Wu and Mohammed Q. Ashab 
point out in their discussions of our paper, model year rating for liabil-
ity and injury coverages is an idea that must be tested not only from 
an actuarial perspective, but also from a general business (real world) 
point of view. We hope their discussions represent the beginning of a 
healthy debate on this subject. 
Mr. Wu has provided some examples that shed some light on the 
workings of a model year rating system. His examples and conclusions 
are not coverage specific. They work equally well if one is modeling 
physical damage coverages or liability coverages. We have expanded 
Mr. Wu's set of tables to depict a scenario more likely to be found for 
liability than for physical damage coverages. 
Assume that severities do not vary by model year, but that overall 
severity levels are increasing at a 5 percent annual rate. Assume fur-
ther that frequency levels vary 3 percent between model years, but that 
overall frequency levels are not changing over time. Thus, a 3 percent 
model year premium increment is indicated. Using Mr. Wu's notation, 
we have developed Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
On 10/1/z the system is in balance (see Table 1): the average pre-
mium equals the average pure premium. On 10/1/z + 1, however, the 
average premium (Table 3) is 2 percent less than the average pure pre-
mium (Table 2), reflecting the difference between the model year incre-
ment and the annual increase in severities. Thus, a base rate increase 
of 2 percent is necessary to keep the system in balance. 
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Table 1 
Data on 10/1/z 
MY SEV FREQ PURE BRATE MYF PREM 
z $400 10% $40.0 $37.6 1.06 $40.0 
z-l $400 9.7% $38.8 $37.6 1.03 $38.8 
z-2 $400 9.4% $37.6 $37.6 1.00 $37.6 
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity; FREQ = Claim 
Frequency; PURE = Pure Premium; BRATE = Base Rate; MYF = 
Model Year Factor; PREM = Charged Premium. 
Table 2 
Expected Loss Costs on 10/1/ z + 1 
MY SEV FREQ PURE 
z + 1 $420 10% $42.0 
z $420 9.7% $40.7 
z - 1 $420 9.4% $39.5 
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Sever-
ity; FREQ = Claim Frequency. 
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In general the model year increment is not tied directly to the annual 
increase in overall loss costs. The increment reflects the difference in 
relative cost levels among model years. This difference may bear no 
direct relationship to the annual rate at which loss costs are increasing. 
In this example and in our paper one sees a frequency-based cost al-
locator implemented as a premium escalator to partially offset severity-
based aggregate loss cost increases. Mr. Wu is likely correct in suppos-
ing that some regulators may have difficulty making this transition. 
Undeniably, the necessary connections are made more easily for phys-
ical damage coverages. Other regulators may weigh the advantages of 
such an approach and decide in its favor. Our view is that if liability and 
injury pure premiums can reasonably be expected to increase over the 
long term (driven either by frequency or severity) then it is reasonable 
to consider introducing a premium allocator as an escalator. This is 
especially true if the premium allocator's impact on increaSing average 
premiums is as modest as our data suggest. 
Should pure premium trends drop to low levels and be expected to 
remain at low levels, it would be appropriate to question the use of a 
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Table 3 
Premium Escalation on 10/1/ z + 1 
MY BRA TE MYF PREM 
z+1 
z 
z-1 
$37.6 1.09 
$37.6 1.06 
$37.6 1.03 
$41.0 
$40.0 
$38.8 
Notes: MY = Model Year; BRA TE = Base Rate; 
MYF = Model Year Factor; PREM = Charged 
Premium. 
premium escalator. Of course, the ongoing manual rate review process 
corrects rates if they are out of balance, as the example above shows. 
This comment applies to physical damage as well as liability coverages. 
It is hard to imagine insurers discarding model year rating on physical 
damage coverages even if inflation were to stay in check. 
Mr. Ashab wonders if insurance company management would ac-
cept model year/age rating on liability, given its impact on older versus 
newer cars. This is a reasonable question. The answer likely will depend 
on circumstances. For example, a company with a structural expense 
advantage that translates into a lower average premium would be in a 
better position to implement model year rating and still remain com-
petitive for newer cars. Also, an organization that employs multiple 
companies at different rate levels may have less concern with the ef-
fect of model year/age rating on poorly maintained older cars operated 
by drivers with marginal driving records if it can properly assign risks 
to rating tiers. Finally, in a jurisdiction with administrated rates these 
issues may be viewed as minor, as all companies would utilize the same 
rating structure. 
The discussants have identified several potential points of discus-
sion. We would like to add the following points: 
• Companies occasionally do not implement manual rate revisions 
on their planned effective dates. This usually results in reduced 
total premium levels. In a model year rating environment, aver-
age premiums are increasing automatically, thus mitigating the 
effects of delayed revisions; 
• In the same vein, companies would not need to review manual 
rate levels as frequently in a model year rating environment. This 
could be important to a management reluctant to devote resources 
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to states with low premium volume; 
• Model year/age rating reacts to the business cycle. That is, during 
economic downturns fewer new automobiles enter, and fewer old 
automobiles leave, the vehicle population. This retards premium 
growth under model year/age rating at the same time that the 
pure premium's increase is slowing, as happens during economic 
downturns. The opposite effect occurs as the economy recovers. 
These effects partially offset one another, resulting in more even 
operating results over a business cycle; 
• Model year/age rating meets the average consumer's expectation 
that insurance costs more for newer cars; and 
• Model year/age rating achieves the social objective of shifting in-
surance premiums onto those more able to afford higher premi-
ums, as owners of newer automobiles are likely to be more afflu-
ent. 
The authors appreciate the discussants' thoughtful comments and the 
generosity of their remarks. As we have stated, we hope to see our 
results tested on other data sets. If the actuarial analysis is validated, 
we believe that .some interesting discussion may ensue. 
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Recent Canadian Human Rights Decisions Having an 
Impact on Gender-Based Risk Classification Systems 
Robert L. Brown* 
Abstract 
With the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on April 
17, 1982, all previous court precedents using gender in risk classification sys-
tems became obsolete. Three cases involving issues of discrimination in the 
use of age and gender now clarify the position of the Canadian judiciary. Based 
on the decisions in these three cases, this paper presents arguments that can 
be used in any jurisdiction to defend successfully the use of gender in a prop-
erty /casualty risk classification system. 
Key words and phrases: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, human 
rights, gender discrimination, risk selection, automobile insurance, mandatory 
retirement 
1 Introduction 
The existence of the new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(April 17, 1982) brings challenges to many of the present risk classifica-
tion parameters used by the Canadian automobile insurance industry,l 
Individual insurance contracts are generally subject to the sections of 
*Robert L. Brown, F.C.r.A., F.S.A., A.C.A.S., is professor of statistics and actuarial sci-
ence and director of the Institute of Insurance and Pension Research at the University 
of Waterloo. He is a past president of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and is cur-
rently on the SOCiety of Actuaries' Board of Governors and Executive Committee. He 
was an elected Councillor in the City of Waterloo from 1988 to 1994. Professor Brown 
has authored several articles and books. 
Professor Brown's address is: Department of Statistics and Actuarial Sci-
ence, University of Waterloo, Waterloo ON N2l 3G1, Canada. Internet address: 
rlbrown@jeeves.uwaterloo.ca 
I See Brown (1988) for a discussion of some of the actuarial implications of the 
Charter. 
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provincial human rights codes prohibiting certain types of discrimina-
tion. These codes often provide special provisions for insurance. For 
example, the Ontario Human Rights code provides for limited exemp-
tions for insurance "on reasonable and bona fide grounds because of 
age, sex, marital status, family status, or handicap," What is reasonable 
and bona fide has become the issue. 
This paper reviews three recent court cases in Canada that have 
made the application of these human rights provisions much clearer 
for insurance risk classification systems. While the cases are Canadian, 
the reasoning and logic used by the courts are universal. 2 
2 Dickason v. University of Alberta 
At issue in this case is the fact that the University of Alberta has 
an age 65 mandatory retirement clause that had forced Professor Olive 
Dickason to retire. The Individual's Rights Protection Act of Alberta 
(Revised Statute of Alberta (RSA) 1980) prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of age but includes the phrase: "except where reasonable and 
justifiable in the circumstances". 
A board of inquiry appointed to hear the appellant's complaint de-
cided in her favor and ordered that she be reinstated. The Court of 
Queen's Bench (Alberta), upon appeal from the university, upheld the 
decision of the board of inquiry. Upon further appeal, however, the 
Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the lower court decision. Finally, 
the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada (September 24, 1992), on a 4-3 vote, 
supported the Court of Appeal of Alberta and found in favor of the 
University of Alberta. In writing the majority opinion, Justice]. Cory 
stated: 
The University has shown that the impugned practice of man-
datory retirement is reasonable and justifiable within the 
meaning of section 11.1 of the Individual's Rights Protection 
Act. 
In the construction of human rights legislation, the rights 
enunciated must be given their full recognition and effect, 
while defenses to the exercises of those rights should be 
interpreted narrowly. 
2Copies of all of the cases and court opinions discussed in this paper are available 
from the Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC), 181 University Avenue, Toronto ON M5H 
3M?, Canada. 
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The nurturing of academic freedom and the ensuring of fac-
ulty renewal are most delicate matters that do not lend them-
selves to a single clear-cut answer as to the proportionality 
between the burden of the discrimination complained of and 
the objectives sought . 
. . . the terms of the collective agreement relating to compul-
sory retirement will apply to every member of the faculty 
association. Moreover, the union did not negotiate the term 
in a vacuum, but rather in the context of a system of tenure 
which protects all members of faculty from dismissal with-
out just cause, and provides a pension scheme assuring the 
financial security of all retiring members of faculty. 
The objectives of mandatory retirement were stated to be the 
preservation of tenure, the promotion of academic renewal, 
the facilitation of planning and resource management, and 
the protection of "retirement with dignity" for faculty mem-
bers. 
(These objectives) are of sufficient significance to justify the 
limitation of a constitutional right to equality. The impugned 
retirement practice is rationally connected to the objectives 
cited. The retirement of faculty members at the age of 65 
ensures that the university may readily predict the rate at 
which employees will leave the institution and that positions 
are opened for new faculty. Mandatory retirement also al-
lows the university to renew its faculty by means of remedy-
ing the twofold problem of limited funding and a "bulge" in 
the age distribution of professors. As well, the policy sup-
ports the existence of a tenure system which creates barriers 
to the dismissal of faculty members thereby enhancing aca-
demic independence. In the university setting, mandatory 
retirement also withstands the minimal impairment test. No 
obvious alternative policy exists which would achieve the 
same results without restricting the individual rights of fac-
ulty members. Finally, the effects of the prima facie discrim-
ination are proportional to the legitimate objectives served. 
173 
While the Dickason case does not deal with property/casualty in-
surance matters, it is the first of a series of important human rights 
cases. Hence, an understanding of the two other cases, which impact 
auto insurance risk classification systems directly, is enhanced by this 
summary of the Dickason decision. 
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3 Zurich Insurance Company v. Ontario (Human 
Rights Commission) and Bates 
A young male driver, Michael Bates, complained to the Ontario Hu-
man Rights Commission in 1983 that he was paying higher rates for his 
auto insurance because of his gender. The Human Rights Commission 
appointed a board of inquiry that concluded that the driver classifica-
tion for unmarried male drivers contravened the Human Rights Code. 
Zurich Insurance appealed this decision, and the Divisional Court al-
lowed the appeal (Le., found in favor of Zurich). This judgment was 
appealed by the Human Rights Commission and Bates to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. The case finally went 
to the Supreme Court of Canada which found in favor of the Zurich 
Insurance Company (5-2). 
Justice John Sopinka, writing for the majority on the Supreme Court, 
stated that the issue to be determined in the appeal is whether the 
method by which Zurich set its rates, which admittedly discriminates 
on the basis of age, sex, and marital status, nonetheless satisfies the 
reasonable and bona fide grounds exemption provided by section 21 
of the Ontario Code. Noting that the board of inquiry had determined 
that the section 21 exemption has the same meaning as the bona fide 
occupational qualification or requirement when applied in employment 
cases, the court decided that while individual testing is often feasible 
in the case of an employee, individualized assessment is not possible 
in the case of insurance. That is, the court agreed that some form of 
grouping is an essential element of the insuring process. 
The court also noted that single males under the age of 25 have 
the highest claim frequency, the highest loss per car insured, and the 
highest average claim cost of any of the categories for which statistics 
are kept. The insurer's rate classification system (as even the board of 
inquiry had conceded) is based on credible actuarial statistics, is sound 
and accepted business practice, and therefore is reasonable. The court, 
however, stated that the statistical application would not be considered 
reasonable if there were an alternative which in all the circumstances 
was practicable. The board of inquiry had decided that Zurich had not 
proved that the very essence of its business would be undermined if 
it no longer could use its rate classification system using age, sex, and 
marital status. The Supreme Court believed that this decision sets a 
standard higher than that required by section 21 of the Human Rights 
Code and that the board of inquiry had given insufficient weight to the 
difficulties inherent in attempting to adopt new criteria in the absence 
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of an adequate statistical base. 
Although it could be that an alternative statistical base might exist 
in 1992 (the time of the Supreme Court decision), the Supreme Court 
had to judge the situation as it existed in 1983. The Supreme Court 
said that the insurance industry must be allowed time to determine 
whether it could restructure its classification system in a manner that 
would eliminate discrimination based on enumerated group character-
istics and still reflect the disparate risks of different classes of drivers 
and concluded that it would be inappropriate for the court to find a 
particular practice to be unreasonable when no reasonable alternative 
existed. 
4 Watters (Alberta Human Rights Commission) v. 
Co-operators General Insurance Company 
This case again involves a young male driver who claimed discrimi-
nation based on the grounds that auto insurance rates used gender as 
a rating factor for persons under age 25. As this case was in Alberta, 
the act that defines prohibited discrimination is again the Individual's 
Rights Protection Act (RSA 1980) previously seen in the Dickason case. 
Using the wording of section 11.1 of the act, the Co-operators Gen-
eral Insurance Company stated that the practice of using gender as a 
risk classification parameter is reasonable and justifiable in the circum-
stances. 
In a decision dated February 22,1990, the Alberta board of inquiry 
found: 
... that the complaint of the complainant under section 3(b) 
of the Individual's Rights Protection Act is justified and that 
the respondent has failed to establish under section 11.1 of 
the act that the contravention is reasonable and justifiable 
in the circumstances. 
The board ordered Co-operators to cease the contravention com-
plained of and to refrain in the future from committing the same or sim-
ilar contraventions. The board's decision was appealed by Co-operators 
to the Court of Queen's Bench which dismissed the appeal (Le., Co-
operators lost again). 
Co-operators appealed to the Court of Appeal of Alberta. The find-
ings of the Court of Appeal of Alberta, dated November 9, 1993, were 
in favor of Co-operators. Watters (and the Alberta Human Rights Com-
mission) appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. On June 2, 1994, 
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the Supreme Court of Canada stated that it would not hear this case, 
which means that the decision of the Court of Appeal of Alberta (in 
favor of Co-operators) stands. This normally implies that the Supreme 
Court could not find fault with the lower court decision, but that is not 
stated explicitly. It is worthwhile analyzing the decision of the Court of 
Appeal of Alberta. 
In summary, the Court of Appeal found that the gender-based clas-
sification system used by Co-operators in setting rates constituted dis-
crimination, but that the practice is excused as being reasonable and 
justifiable in the circumstances (section 11.1). In deciding that the 
gender-based classification system was discriminatory, the court stated 
that: 
... if a discrimination prohibited by law exists it is no less 
prohibited discrimination because it is supported by statis-
tics. 
Thus, the existence of actuarial data to support distinguishing two risk 
classes, using demographic parameters, does not, by itself, counter the 
charge of discrimination. 
The court, having decided that the action of Co-operators was dis-
criminatory, as laid out in section 3(b) of the act, then proceeded to 
section 11.1 to determine if the practice was excused by being reason-
able and justifiable in the circumstances. 
The Court of Appeal referred to the precedents set by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in both the Dickason and the Bates cases for what is 
reasonable and justified. The judgment refers to guidelines established 
in the Dickason case: 
That familiar test directs the party raising a s. 13 defense to 
demonstrate; (i) that the restriction of a right is undertaken 
in the pursuit of a pressing and substantial objective and (ii) 
that the impugned restrictive measure is proportional to the 
enacted measure as evidenced by the fact that it is (a) ratio-
nally connected, (b) constitutes a minimal impairment to the 
right and (c) is proportional in its effects. In its application, 
the Court has adopted a flexible standard of proof which re-
sponds to the varying contexts in which the state seeks to 
invoke s. 1 justification for the impugned legislation. 
3Author's note: The "s. 1" referred to here is section 1 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, which is the guideline used to determine if any government 
legislation is discriminatory. 
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The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with certain statements of the 
Supreme Court in the Bates, in particular: 
... in the insurance industry it is impractical in the extreme 
to individually assess the risk that each person brings to the 
system and that therefore grouping into risk classifications 
is necessary. It follows that this factor distinguishes it from 
most other human rights cases which call for an individual 
to be dealt with on his or her own merits. 
The Court of Appeal also felt bound to take into account the Supreme 
Court's concept of reasonableness, defined in the Bates case: 
In my opinion, a discriminatory practice is reasonable within 
the meaning of s. 21 of the Code if (a) it is based on a sound 
and accepted insurance practice; and (b) there is no prac-
tical alternative. Under (a), a practice is sound if it is one 
which it is desirable to adopt for the purpose of achieving 
the legitimate business objective of charging premiums that 
are commensurate with risk. Under (b), the availability of a 
practical alternative is a question of fact to be determined 
having regard to all of the facts of the case. 
Watters (and the Human Rights Commission of Alberta) did not ob-
ject to risk classification per se. They also accepted that gender is a 
sound actuarial rating variable correlated with loss. They did argue, 
however, that gender-based auto insurance rating was not minimally in-
trusive because reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives to the prac-
tice existed. In that matter the court directed that any practical alter-
native must meet three objectives: it must lead to a financially viable 
insurance industry; it must result in wide availability of insurance; and 
it must be fair, but it need not replicate the results of the impugned 
practice. 
The court decided that a financially viable insurance industry and 
wide availability of insurance would exist even if gender were prohibited 
as a rating factor. The annual mileage driven is a rating variable that 
could offset, to some extent, the loss of gender as a rating variable. The 
court also noted that genderless systems exist in Michigan, Montana, 
and Pennsylvania where insurance is still widely available. 
The Court of Appeal decided that fairness must take into account 
the interests of all significantly affected parties, not just young males. 
In that regard, the court noted the following statistics: 
• In Alberta if gender were removed as a rating variable, rates for 
young female drivers were expected to rise between 24 percent 
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and 29 percent and rates for young male drivers were expected to 
fall between 15 percent and 17 percent. 
• A British Columbia study revealed that 40 percent to 50 percent 
of crashes resulting in death that were not due to alcohol (about 
1/2 of all crashes overall) involved young male drivers. 
• Young men also account for approximately 40 percent of all road 
accidents resulting in death or injury. 
• Young men are seriously overrepresented in traffic crashes of any 
severity compared to females. 
• Studies have established that young male drivers pose a greater 
risk of loss and are the most at risk in the system, more so than 
more experienced drivers (be they male or female). 
Further, the court stated that: 
It is clear from the evidence that alternatives to the cur-
rent gender-based classification system would result in sig-
nificant unfairness to young females in that they would be 
asked to pay rates disproportionate to their driving record. 
Specifically, the evidence demonstrates that the insurance 
premiums of young female drivers would rise by between 
24 percent and 29 percent if the gender rating classification 
were eliminated. This is a significant increase which would 
impose an unwarranted financial impact on that group. It 
cquld even prevent members of that group from enjoying 
the privilege of driving. The fact that young females would 
pay the same rate as young males, despite their far superior 
driving record, (both as to number and seriousness of acci-
dents) would not in my view, fairly reflect the disparate risks 
of different classes of drivers. 
The next significant group one must consider is young males. 
I conclude that the gender-based rating classification is not 
unfair to that group as the rates charged to them would be 
an attempt to fairly reflect the number and severity of acci-
dents involving young males. 
The decision also notes the impact on drivers over the age of 25 and 
concludes that it is not unfair to older male and female drivers to pay 
rates based on factors other than gender because gender is relatively 
less important after the age of 25. 
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The court concludes: 
Looked at from the perspective of equity, it is inequitable to 
give a significantly higher risk group-young males-an unde-
served break by, in effect, transferring the burden of their 
driving record to other lower risk groups. 
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The Court of Appeal therefore found that Co-operators had demon-
strated that the discriminatory practice was reasonable and justified in 
the circumstances and ruled in their favor. 
5 Conclusion 
Canadian actuaries now have a clear indication of how a gender-
based risk classification system will be adjudicated by the courts in a 
post-Charter environment. While these cases are based on Canadian 
case law, the arguments should be universally applicable. 
In this regard, and given the author's personal experience in the 
Watters case, I now offer what I believe is a sound defense of a gender-
based risk classification system for automobile insurance. 
First, insurance companies do not manufacture insurance policies 
and then price them for retail sale. The insurance industry is not a part 
of the manufacturing sector. Rather, it is part of the service sector. 
The service that an insurance company offers is one of facilitation of 
a age-old process called risk sharing or risk pooling. For a set premium, 
the insurance company allows a policyholder to share his or her eco-
nomic risk (Le., variance from a expected value) with a large number of 
other independent policyholders. This risk-pooling concept was avail-
able before insurance companies through community risk sharing and 
through fraternals and other non-insurance associations. The premium 
that a policyholder pays the insurance company is commensurate with 
the expected value of the cost that the policyholder brings to the risk 
pool. 
Thus, the insurance process, once clearly understood, is not discrim-
inatory. Service is provided equally regardless of the policyholder's age, 
gender, religion, and race. The cost of insurance is the expected cost the 
policyholder brings to the risk pool-nothing more and nothing less. 
A useful analogy would be a restaurant that allows any customer to 
eat in the establishment regardless of age, gender, etc., but that charges 
a different price for Souvlaki than it does for Tandoori chicken, and a 
lower price for children's meals. This is not a discriminatory practice 
as defined in the human rights legislation. 
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Using the arguments outlined so succinctly in the Watters case, one 
can argue successfully that the manner in which rates are set (Le., using 
gender-based risk classifications) is reasonable and justifiable in the 
circumstances. No superior alternative exists, either in fact or in theory. 
I hope that the summary review of these three important cases will 
assist in future cases where gender-based risk classification systems 
are brought into question. 
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Abstract 
This commentary examines the political and economic influence of demo-
graphic groups on rationales for granting exemption from laws prohibiting 
classification by age or sex, as evidenced in the cases discussed by Robert L. 
Brown. Age is less subject than sex to manipulation for group advantage. In 
Professor Brown's discussion of auto insurance cases, only the influence of 
group dominance can explain: 
• Selective focus on young drivers; 
• Indifference to ongoing overcharging of adult women signaled by undis-
puted 2:1 ratios of cost-related averages; and 
• Avoidance of effective ways to evaluate miles of exposure to risk. 
Contrary to Professor Brown's invitation to actuaries to defend the status 
quo, they are advised to eschew group politics and to acknowledge in legal and 
public discourse all alternatives to an abuse that the car year statistical unit 
makes unavoidable-the shifting of costs from higher to lower mileage cars in 
the same risk class. 
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Introduction 
Robert L. Brown is to be commended for opening a timely discussion 
of three recent court decisions that involve challenges by one woman 
and two men to age and sex classifications. In a retirement case the 
court's opinion acknowledged the power balance in age-group politics 
by upholding the age classification. In the two auto insurance cases 
the courts ignored the power imbalance between groups in allowing 
insurance companies to win exemption from law prohibiting unequal 
treatment of individuals by age and sex. 
There are bona fide physical and psychological reasons for age clas-
sifications, as in managing motor vehicle risk. In contrast, so-called sex 
differences in data on driving risk are simply artifacts of group-average 
differences in vehicles and conditions of use. The large differences in 
accident involvement auto insurers use to defend selective sex classifi-
cations are products of misleading time-unit statistics and the fact that 
on an annual basis in each age group women drivers average markedly 
fewer miles of exposure than men drivers average. 
Professor Brown's analysis approving the auto insurance case out-
comes seems to assume that statistical information provided to sup-
port these class decisions is pure, i.e., complete, consistent, not mis-
leading, and apolitical. His analysis thus can bypass the essential fact 
that decision-making by insurance company executives, regulators, and 
courts concerning which risk classes are necessary and what measures 
of exposure are well-founded is de facto dominated by and responsive 
to the needs of members of certain age and sex groups. In particular, 
the claim by representatives of these dominant groups that sex classi-
fication favors women contradicts an axiom of political science and the 
basis for representative government. Buoyed by its emotional appeal (to 
men), the false idea that men are disadvantaging themselves to women's 
benefit in auto insurance pricing is perpetuated largely through pro-
fessional selection and interpretation of statistical information. The 
following commentary augments Professor Brown's analysis from the 
perspective of intergroup politics. 
2 First Case: Dickason 
In the non-insurance case Olive Dickason, a university full professor, 
challenged her mandatory retirement at age 65 as a violation of Cana-
dian law against unequal treatment by age. This case pits a presumably 
small class of senior faculty against a large class of junior faculty that 
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would benefit from the expanded opportunity for promotion created 
by mandatory retirement. Although age is a demographic factor that 
can be misused to excuse invidious and stereotypical treatment, age dif-
fers conclusively from the immutable factors of sex and race because 
it is a sequence through which everyone potentially passes. Therefore, 
a decision to treat individuals differently by age is not necessarily an 
instance of one group gaining an advantage over another group. Junior 
faculty are aware that any age rule they create is likely to govern their 
own retirement. 
This reality is stated in the court's opinion quoted by Professor 
Brown: 
the terms of the collective agreement relating to compulsory 
retirement will [eventually] apply to every member of the 
faculty association. (Added word and emphasis are mine.) 
Professor Brown uses the disposition of this case to bolster the argu-
ment that if bona fide reasons can be found to justify exceptions to law 
prohibiting age classification, then insurance reasons (more respectable 
than simply one group gaining an advantage at the expense of another) 
can be found to justify classification by sex. 
The political difference between age and sex classification is demon-
strated by retirement arrangements such as that in the Dickason case 
prior to enactment of laws against unequal treatment by sex. Manda-
tory retirement age commonly was set at 62 for women and at 65 for 
men. In this instance, the immutability of sex allowed academic and 
non-academic men to gain an advantage at the expense of women in 
applying an age classification. 
3 First Auto Case: Bates 
The first auto insurance case Professor Brown discusses provides a 
good example of the strong influence of age-group politics on classifica-
tion decisions. The case brought by 20 year old Michael Bates involves 
an unsuccessful challenge to price classes defined by driver age, sex, 
and marital status. Professor Brown hints that these classifiers may not 
be applied uniformly. The court, he says, 
noted that single males under the age of 25 had the highest 
claim frequency, the highest loss per car insured, and the 
highest average claim cost of any of the categories for which 
statistics were kept. (Emphasis added.) 
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The truth behind the emphasized clause is that the claim frequency, 
loss per car insured, and average claim cost are not available by driver 
sex for cars whose drivers are over age 25. Through classification by 
driver age, auto insurers have exempted the adult owners of four of five 
cars from paying costs according to the sex of a principal or occasional 
driver. Men benefit from this unisex merging of men's and women's 
annual insurance statistics for the large majority of cars. This fact be-
came apparent, but was not acknowledged, by the court's opinion in 
the Watters case. 
4 Second Auto Case: Watters 
In the second auto insurance case 19 year old Adrian Watters unsuc-
cessfully challenged sex classification as applied to cars with drivers 
under age 25. Professor Brown quotes the five insurance and public 
accident statistical comparisons by the sex of young drivers that the 
court cited to justify its decision. (The fifth comparison is from his 
own expert testimony.) It is necessary, however, to turn to the complete 
published Watters opinion for important adult-driver comparisons by 
sex. In this regard, the court wrote that 
The final interested group is male and female drivers over 
25 years of age. Although the accident ratio of male to fe-
male drivers remains constant at 2:1 across all age groups, as 
was pointed out by Mr. Brown under cross-examination, the 
severity of the accidents involving young males significantly 
exceeds the severity of accidents involving young females 
and older male and female drivers. (Dominion Law Reports, 
Volume 107, page 320. Emphasis added.) 
Professor Brown's testimony on the constancy of this ratio across 
all driver ages is validated by a review of published age and sex data on 
reported accidents during 1984 from 7 million drivers in Pennsylvania. 
In this driver population the ratio had a low of 1.8:1 at age 17, at ages 60 
to 64 and for several age groups between, and had highs of 2.2:1 at age 
25, and 2.1:1 for the 30-35 age group. The absolute involvement values 
per 100 licensed drivers decreased for women from 5 at age 17 to 1 
at age 65. Men's values followed the same pattern at about double the 
value, from 9 to 1.8 involvements per 100 drivers. At all ages the ratio 
of men's to women's involvements in severe accidents as measured by 
fatal accidents was about 3:1 (Butler, Butler, and Williams, 1988, pp. 
253, 269, 271). There is no discontinuity or marked change in relative 
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differences by driver sex in total or severe accidents below and above 
age 25. 
Because men and women apparently average about the same risk 
rates per mile (accident involvements per mile times average severity) 
when driver age and vehicle differences are controlled, the annual ac-
cident ratio is an expression of the ratio of men's to women's annual 
miles of exposure. Although average annual mileages vary strongly with 
driver age, the ratio of men's to women's average mileages is remark-
ably constant at approximately the annual accident involvement ratio. 
In 1990 men's to women's overall average mileage ratio was 1.74:1 (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1990 Nationwide Personal Transporta-
tion Survey.) 
5 Classification Alternative: Mileage 
Although the car is the unit of insurance, insurers make no bona fide 
attempt to measure the individual mileages cars are driven. What pro-
vision, therefore, is made for measuring the costs indicated by the large 
difference in group averages for annual accidents and annual mileages? 
The question of practical or superior alternatives to sex as a rating vari-
able plays a prominent part in Professor Brown's analysis. He notes 
from the Watters opinion that the "criteria of annual mileage driven 
was used as an example of a rating variable which could somewhat off-
set the loss of gender as a rating variable." Because simple classification 
of cars at one or several annual mileage break points already is used 
by some insurers (and has been discontinued by others) for providing 
nominal discounts, it is possible to consider the reasons for the opin-
ion that annual mileage classification is not practical for measuring the 
costs underlying the approximately 2:1 ratios of men's to women's an-
nual accidents and mileages. 
Professor Brown's reference to annual mileage driven as a rating 
class criterion is misleading because the class definition does not refer 
to the mileage the car was driven last year. Instead, annual mileage is 
defined in company rate and rule manuals as the mileage to be driven 
in the ensuing year or as future mileage as stated by the insured (or 
filled in by the agent) before the beginning of the policy rating period. 
Future mileage is inherently unmeasurable, and no premium adjust-
ment is made to a low mileage discount at the end of the rating period 
regardless of actual miles driven. Predictably, the resulting cost distinc-
tion between future mileage classes generally conforms to the nominal 
discount size. 
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When the subject of the car mile exposure unit is raised, some pro-
fessionals wrongly equate it with future mileage rating. Although Pro-
fessor Brown's reference is not specific, it is probably not the car mile 
exposure unit but this future mileage rating factor that he justifiably 
rejects as impractical for accurately delineating the difference between 
young men's and women's average costs. Therefore, classifying all cars 
by the sex of a driver needs to be considered as another alternative to 
unisex pricing that charges women on average about twice as much per 
mile as men at all ages for the same insurance protection for their cars. 
6 Classification Alternative: All Cars by Driver Sex 
A change to unisex pricing on the present car year unit basis rep-
resents a group overcharge to young women. The price changes for 
young men and women predicted at the top of the list of five statistics 
Professor Brown quotes from the Watters opinion are considerably less 
than what has happened to some car owners in the states where pricing 
by driver sex has been outlawed, despite efforts by regulators to cap 
the increases to young women. l On the same basis, however, women 
over 25 are being overcharged as a group. If current application of sex 
pricing to a relatively small minority of cars is necessary and justified, 
then the only question is why the accident involvement statistics do not 
require application of sex-divided pricing to all cars. 
One reason is that there is no consumer demand for more and bet-
ter sex discrimination. Both the disparity by sex in adult costs and its 
cause-men's greater average annual mileage-continue to be hidden.2 
Women have good reason in principle and experience to distrust classi-
fication by sex as an unsolicited gift for which unlimited compensation 
will be demanded. Having to pay higher surcharges for a few years as 
I The price increases predicted to occur in Alberta as a result of unisex pricing did 
affect 600,000 young women in Pennsylvania in 1989. But the adult 3 million women 
drivers in that state already were paying unisex prices. As in other states where courts 
have outlawed pricing by driver sex in auto insurance, this change to unisex youth 
prices was understood to benefit men at women's expense, but it has not been followed 
by elimination of sex-divided pricing in health insurance and annuities where insurers 
overtly charge women more than men. 
2 Although the information is available to the courts, its absence from public dis-
cussion of insurance costs apparently allows it to be discounted in court rulings. One 
of the Supreme Court justices on the dissenting side in the Bates case quoted a law 
review summary of state insurance department studies: "Male accident rates remain 
higher than those of female drivers because men, as a group, drive twice as many 
miles as women. When accident figures are calculated on a per-mile basis, the rates 
are comparable." (Dominion Law Reports, Vol. 93, page 366.) 
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young drivers currently supplies many men with a motive to find ways 
of getting even not only personally but also in supporting other public 
and business arrangements that treat women unequally. Sex-priced in-
surance is a powerful promoter of invidious attitudes. Auto insurance 
is used widely to back the threat that women will be hurt by unisex 
equality (as the dominant group defines it). 
The compelling reason for not sex pricing insurance on all cars-a 
reason consistent with established group political and economic power-
is that adult men would lose the benefit of shifting the cost of their 
greater average annual miles of exposure to adult women and insur-
ers would lose the flexibility in price competition for men's business 
that merged costs provide. For the minority of cars where insurance is 
sex-priced, men and women as groups (not individuals) are paying the 
differential costs of their different mileage averages. 
But individual cars are not driven the class average annual mileage. 
Despite the 2:1 ratio of averages, a sizable minority of men drive fewer 
miles and have fewer accidents than women's averages, and a smaller 
minority of women drive more miles and have more accidents than 
men's averages (Butler, Butler, and Williams, pp. 396, 402). Annual 
income distributions for men and women show a similar relationship 
between averages, with a 2.04:1 ratio in 1989, and in the overlaps of 
the averages by proportions of the other sex (1989 U.S. Census Statis-
tical Abstracts, Table 728). Many upper income homemaker, business, 
professional, and managerial women do well under the current car year 
exposure unit system-the cost of their excess mileage is shifted to the 
owners of below average mileage cars in their risk class. Therefore, the 
alternative of pricing all cars by driver sex makes a poor match to the 
accident risk costs of individual driving. The same severe disability, 
however, applies to priCing insurance by driver sex on any subgroup of 
cars. 
7 Alternative Statistical Unit 
Having examined two unsatisfactory alternatives-classifications by 
future mileage or by driver sex for all cars-to current risk evaluation 
practices, we turn to a third. Although Professor Brown does not dis-
cuss my work on the car mile exposure unit (Butler, 1993), he seems 
to be referring to the car mile as an alternative to the car year unit in 
allowing "that an alternative statistical base might exist in 1992," but 
not in 1983 when Bates initiated his case. Nonetheless, the property 
and casualty actuarial literature (Butler, 1993) contains discussions of 
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the car mile unit (exposure medium or base) at least as early as 1929 
when it was judged to be superior to the car year medium. The only 
question raised in 1929 and subsequently has been the practicality of 
odometer auditing. 
As Professor Brown indicates by quoting from the Watters opinion, 
the courts are currently told by experts that "it is impractical in the ex-
treme to individually assess the risk that each person brings to the sys-
tem". But courts are not told that the individual car-not its drivers-is 
the insured unit and that a car brings risk to the system only when it 
is driven. The courts also are not told that measurement of the mile 
by mile transfer of risk to an insurance class pool by individual car use 
simply requires sealing of the car's odometer and annual verification of 
seals and readings. If it is a gross overstatement that the cost of odome-
ter auditing is impractical in the extreme, it is a gross understatement 
of the inherent impossibility, regardless of cost, of measuring empirical 
probabilities for individuals.3 A statistically credible measurement of 
a class risk rate per exposure unit-in cents per car mile (or dollars per 
car year)-can be determined only from an insurer's experienced cost 
of covering a large number of insured car miles (or car years) of expo-
sure for cars in an insurance class (defined, for example, by car use, 
territory, driver age, etc.). Because the car year unit does not measure 
physical exposure to risk, however, risk rates per car year are without 
probability meaning for individuals. That is, an insurance price per car 
year provides no cost-of-risk incentive at the margins where decisions 
are made about making a given trip (Vickrey, 1968). 
In 1992 I studied, for Pennsylvania legislators, the practical aspects 
of an audited car mile exposure unit system for private passenger auto-
mobile insurance. The report was summarized in this journal (Butler, 
1993) and reprinted in full in The Casualty Actuarial Society Forum 
(Summer 1993, pp. 307-338). Noting that the actuarial literature views 
practicality and not theoretical soundness as the barrier to conversion 
to the car mile exposure unit, the reprint introduction suggests that the 
report serve as a framework for renewed, informed consideration of 
the practicality question. (Readers of this discussion can obtain copies 
from me on request.) 
3This is what the public is misled to believe that pricing by driver record can do. The 
so-called actuarial risk class justification is simply an artifact of the car year exposure 
unit: cars driven by higher mileage drivers selectively are concentrated by the random 
processes of accident involvement and traffic citation into the driver-record subclasses. 
With a raised average annual miles of exposure, the subclass claim frequency per car 
year thereby also is raised relative to the class as a whole. Actuarial modeling in 1960 
of this risk concentration process was reviewed by Butler (1993). 
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8 Conclusion 
In his conclusion Professor Brown asserts that "no superior alterna-
tive exists, either in fact or in theory" to the present use of sex cate-
gories in the risk classification system. Confining attention to driver 
classifications based on stereotypes and applied to a minority of cars 
creates an illusion of actuarial precision that obscures the lump-sum 
character of a car year exposure basis. Although the higher income, 
higher mileage beneficiaries of this cover-up are found in all demo-
graphic groups, mileage and accident statistics reveal that the predom-
inant winners are adult men. 
The power of political and economic influence to cause the disap-
pearance of criticism of auto insurance lump-sum pricing is remark-
able. For example, two eminent economists made this criticism nearly 
30 years q.go. The first paper, published in 1967 with Professor Oliver E. 
Williamson as first author, lists definitions of automobile classification 
categories (class-plan classes were more numerous then than now), but 
concludes (pp. 247-248): 
Despite this multitude of rate classifications, however, no 
effort is made to adjust rates within categories according 
to the volume of activity. Thus our judgment holds that 
the insurance premium has mainly lump-sum characteristics 
.... That the premium has a lump-sum rather than marginal 
character thus leads to the result that the individual operates 
either at the origin [zero activity] or at [an excessive level], 
but has no incentive to take up [the socially optimal level]. 
The following year, Professor William Vickrey (1968, p. 470) pub-
lished the same conclusion about the lump-sum character of premiums 
and its negative effect on incentives: 
[T]he frequently overlooked fact [is] that the manner in which 
premiums are computed and paid fails miserably to bring 
home to the automobile user the costs he imposes in a man-
ner that will appropriately influence his decisions .... [T]hey 
provide incentives that are largely inappropriate at the mar-
gins where decisions are actually made as to whether to 
maintain a car and whether to make a given trip by car. 
Although these two papers continue to be cited as authority for the eco-
nomic efficiency rationale for making auto liability insurance compul-
sory and unlimited, there has been little mention of the fact emphasized 
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by both papers that auto insurance premiums are calculated virtually 
without regard to the number of miles individual cars are driven. 
Actuaries, especially those in academia, may choose to engage in un-
critical defense of the status quo and to keep the code of silence about 
who benefits from the present system. Or they can eschew group poli-
tics and constructively engage with published well-founded criticism of 
the car year exposure unit. Car mile exposure unit analysis has the po-
tential for explaining failures in the current system, such as risk class 
dysfunction in pricing the effects of car weight and safety devices on 
risk rates. 
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Authors' Reply to Discussion 
Robert L. Brown 
I apologize to my audience as I write this response because, if 
you were to check my references, you would find them sadly outdated. 
I thought that the idea of using a classification system based on mileage 
had died a natural death. But it has not. I also apologize to Patrick 
Butler because he will find nothing new in my response. Dr. Butler 
and other proponents long have argued the legitimacy of mileage as a 
rating variable. Their ideas have been placed into the public forum at 
rate hearings, tribunals, court cases, state legislative hearings etc., etc. 
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But to no avail. Why? Perhaps it is a male conspiracy. Perhaps it is the 
logic of the opposing argument. I will let the reader decide. 
What we all agree on is that insureds who bring higher loss costs 
to the risk pool should pay higher prices; those with lower loss costs 
should pay lower prices. Prices based on loss costs are socially neutral. 
Loss costs do not involve social judgments or sexual stereotypes. 
Do insurers charge women lower rates? Yes. Under age 25, gender is 
a recognized risk variable. Over age 25, if the only operator is a woman, 
there is a discount. But should we use mileage instead of gender? 
To say that insurers do not recognize mileage in their rates is wrong. 
Insurers admit that mileage is a useful and valid indicator of exposure 
to auto rates. It is used by insurers, to the extent practical, in defining 
driver classes. For example, there are different rating categories for 
pleasure versus business use that are proxies for mileage. Most com-
panies having different rates for a long commute to work versus a short 
commute. For youthful drivers a distinction is made between principal 
operators and occasional operators, another proxy for mileage. 
Mileage cannot substitute, however, for gender as a rating variable 
in determining fair insurance prices. Why? 
Even after adjusting completely for mileage, there is still an impor-
tant gender component both in frequency and severity of accidents; see, 
for example, u.s. Department of Transportation (1973), National Asso-
ciation of Independent Insurers (1983), The California Driver Fact Book 
(several), and the Traffic Injury Research Foundation (1990). There can 
be as much as a 60 percent difference in loss costs, even after adjusting 
for mileage driven. 
Second, premium rates must be determined at the beginning of the 
exposure period, before the loss experience has unfolded. When asked 
expectations of future mileage, there is overwhelming evidence that 
consumers of auto insurance (often aided by their agents) antiselect 
against the insurer. Ask any company that has a single-break rating 
system based on mileage what percentage of their insureds expect to 
drive just a few miles less than the breakpoint in the next year. As the 
Government Accounting Office has testified: "it may be difficult to get 
reliable information from insureds on the mileage they drive once they 
realize that their insurance premiums depend on what they report". 
Mileage without gender makes no provision for determining insur-
ance premiums for more than one driver of an insured car. 
Young male drivers drive fewer miles than most adult risk classes, 
yet are disproportionately represented in claim statistics. Among young 
drivers, the actual and reported mileage differences between men and 
women are minimal, yet the accident records are measurably different. 
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Actuarial Conservatism: Not in Public Sector 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans 
Brian A. Jones* 
Abstract 
Most actuaries tend to be conservative, and most, including this writer, 
probably would be happy to be so categorized. But actuarial conservatism 
may not be the best rule in defined benefit public sector pension plans. This 
paper argues that it is not appropriate for actuaries to employ conservatism 
assumptions in such public sector plans. 
Key words and phrases: assumptions, risk, funding, generational equity 
1 Introduction 
Actuarial conservatism in the valuation of pension plans1 manifests 
itself in two basic and related areas: (i) selection of actuarial assump-
tions; and (ii) recommendations of contributions where the particular 
* Brian A. Jones has an MA in mathematics from Oxford University, England, and 
a law degree. He is an enrolled actuary and a member of a number of actuarial or-
ganizations and of the New York and D.C. Bars. He recently received an LL.M. (with 
distinction) from the Law Faculty of Leicester University, England. 
Mr. Jones's address is: 10 Clinton Street, Brooklyn NY 11201, USA. 
IThroughout this paper, pension plan will mean a defined benefit plan and public 
sector plan will mean a governmental plan as defined in § 3 (22) of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended. Although the paper focuses 
on the U.S., the arguments apply equally to foreign governmental plans (although leg-
islation in other countries may foreclose some issues raised here). 
The Code refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Interest covers 
all investment earnings including dividends and capital gains that are reflected in the 
actuarial value of assets. 
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funding method2 produces a range of possible contributions. Actuar-
ial conservatism generally is understood to mean a weighting of one or 
more assumptions intended to provide a safety margin, i.e., to deliber-
ately overstate recommended deposits to some extent.3 Conservatism 
can be introduced via an explicit margin added to recommended de-
posits, but implicit conservatism is much more common. The typical 
actuary knows that when he or she builds a model of expected future 
experience, he or she is entering the realm of speculation. The actu-
ary's crystal ball is no better than anyone else's, although the actuary's 
experience may give a greater appreciation than most of the effect of 
various alternative bases for speculation. 
When recommending contributions-when the actuary recommends 
accelerated funding, again increasing costs-the actuary often is look-
ing to ensure that the fund becomes as solvent as possible as quickly 
as possible. This emphasis on solvency must be tempered, however, 
because any additional dollar put into the pension plan may mean a 
reduction in the employer's investment opportunities. Reduced invest-
ment opportunities may lead to a reduction in expansion of job oppor-
tunities. 
Why do actuaries lean toward conservatism? To answer this ques-
tion, we will focus primarily on the economic assumptions (interest 
rate and salary progression, both heavily dependent on future infla-
tion) rather than on demographic assumptions (mortality, Withdrawal, 
etc.). This Simplifies the discussion, although much of the argument 
applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to demographic assumptions. 
2 Conservatism 
In my opinion, actuarial conservatism reflects the fact that while the 
actuary may not be expert in the economic disciplines required to accu-
rately forecast interest and inflation rates, the actuary's expertise is in 
risk analysis. The actuary understands that there are two separate fi-
2 At the risk of some loss of generality, the various actuarial cost methods-entry 
age normal, unit credit, etc.-will not be discussed in this paper. This is primarily to 
simplify the presentation, but it also reflects a conviction that detailed discussion of 
the mechanics of applying these methods to the broad issue discussed in this paper 
would result only in obscuring the main points. It also reflects the fact that many states 
mandate the funding method. 
3Not every margin or adjustment to an assumption evidences conservatism under 
this definition; for example, a projection of decreased mortality rates in future years 
(based on an expectation that mortality will continue to improve) or an interest rate 
below current earnings reflecting an expected reduction in market rates. 
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nancial risks to consider when building a model to represent a pension 
plan:4 (i) future inflation and the resulting investment yields will be 
underestimated so that when participants reach retirement the amount 
required to provide their benefits will be less than the amount assumed 
in the funding calculations and a surplus will develop; (ii) the comple-
mentary risk that future inflation and yields will be overestimated so 
that the actual cost of benefits at retirement will be greater than as-
sumed, i.e., there will be inadequate funding at retirement. These two 
alternatives are based on the fact that for the typical salary-related plan, 
comparable changes in the salary progression and interest assumption 
broadly cancel before retirement, but after retirement only interest is a 
factor, absent full cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). 5 
The first of these risks is, from the plan participant's point of view, 
much less serious than the second. Potential underfunding is a serious 
threat, especially when one remembers that no private sector enter-
prise has any guarantee of perpetual life; underfunding often becomes 
a problem at precisely the time that the plan sponsor is unable or un-
willing to make additional contributions. On the other hand, potential 
overfunding (especially in a high inflation environment where there is 
likely to be pressure to grant ad hoc COLAs and thus spend the sur-
plus) is a less serious problem.6 Also, the point where the interest 
rate standing alone becomes dominant after retirement is well in the 
future-when forecasting is hardest. For these reasons, most actuaries 
are comfortable with a conservative posture. 
Despite the clear thrust of the minimum funding standards of ERISA 
and the Code? against underfunding, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
has adopted maximizing government revenue as its main objective and 
seems hostile to the above approach. The IRS promotes high interest 
rates that have an inherent bias toward underfunding, especially in light 
of the statutory provision8 limiting (and for the highest paid and most 
expensive employees prohibiting) projection of salary increases in the 
4Jt is assumed that this model will avoid the obvious traps of inconsistent projections 
of future interest rates and salary increases; that is, that the wage and cost-of-Iiving 
inflation underlying these two key assumptions will be reasonably related. More im-
portantly, all of the above items reflect a fundamental assumption that inflation and 
yields are positively correlated over the long term. 
SMany, if not most, state pension plans have at least partial COLAs, sometimes on a 
discretionary or ad hoc basis, more often as part of the formula. 
GThe above analysis also supports a conservative approach to the demographic as-
sumptions; again, spending a surplus is far less of a problem than attempting to explain 
and deal with a deficiency. 
7ERISA §302 and Code §412, especially the recently enacted §302(d) and 412(1). 
BCode §404(1). 
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funding calculations. It bases this position on the language of ERISA9 
and the COdelO requiring the use of the actuary's best estimate in fund-
ing calculations, and (according to numerous IRS speakers at actuarial 
meetings) the IRS interprets that language to require a straight-down-
the-line interest projection with no bias toward conservatism. The case 
Vinson & Elkins v. Commissioner (1993)11 recently rejected this IRS po-
sition and strongly endorsed the use of conservative assumptions. The 
opinion notes that ERISA requires the actuary be retained "on behalf 
of the plan participants."12 Most actuaries regard this as a charge to 
act conservatively and to treat the second of the two risks as the larger 
threat to the interests of his or her statutory clients: the plan partici-
pants. 
I strongly endorse the actuarial attitude described above, i.e., a pen-
sion actuary should lean toward conservatism and should minimize 
the risk of a plan being unable to deliver promised benefits in the long 
run. 13 This view, like all such broad statements, is subject to some qual-
ification; it would be indefensible to be so conservative in an actuarial 
valuation that either benefits were held below an affordable level (and 
unreasonable surpluses were built up) or that contributions exceeded 
any reasonable level required to finance benefits. While most actuaries 
would accept the above proposition, there is a broad spectrum of opin-
ion about the appropriate definition of conservatism and the point at 
which it may become excessive. 
gCode §302(c)(3)(B). 
lOCode §412(c)(3)(B); the language also appears in Form 5500 Schedule B which the 
actuary must sign. 
II This case upheld the actuary's 5 percent interest assumption against an IRS attempt 
to impose a minimum of 8 percent. It explicitly recognized as a "particularly important" 
factor "the conservative nature of the actuarial assumption selection process;" also, it 
noted that: 
(i)f a financial analyst's predicted rate of return is higher than the actual 
rate earned, the investor simply earns less than he supposed he would 
earn (, but) (i)f an actuary makes the same mistake, there is a significant 
risk that the plan will become underfunded and the pensioners' full ben-
efits will be unpaid. 
The case dealt with small, one participant plans and, therefore, should be treated with 
some caution when applied to larger plans. 
12ERISA § 104(a)(5)(B). 
13This is to be distinguished from the situation in the early years of a plan when 
assets are being built and underfunding is part of the natural order of things and not 
to be condemned. Jones (1994) gives a lengthier discussion of this point. 
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3 Public Sector Plans 
For state or local government plans, I believe conservatism is no 
longer appropriate. Because we can assume that plan sponsors have 
perpetual life, 14 the overriding consideration should be equity between 
generations of taxpayers, not protection of participants. Participants 
are protected already by the impossibility (as a matter of practical pol-
itics) of benefit reductions. In many states, there is explicit constitu-
tional, statutory, or case-law protection. Many of the actuary's almost 
instinctive reactions of private sector experience do not hold in the 
public sector. 15 
Conservatism in assumptions is appropriate in the private sector be-
cause employers may go out of business. But why should contributions 
have a safety margin to guard against a nonexistent risk in the public 
sector? If today's taxpayers make contributions containing a safety 
margin, in all probability16 they are simply paying in advance contri-
butions more properly attributable to the next generation of taxpayers. 
Conservatism in assumptions, deliberately applied, means that average 
experience is expected to be more favorable than the assumptions over 
the long run; such an approach does not fit the public sector environ-
ment. When the objective is equity between generations of taxpayers, 
it is appropriate that the assumptions be unbiased so that long-run, 
average experience is as close as possible to the assumptions. 
This argument also applies to funding. In an ideal world all pension 
plans, both public and private, would be set at liberal levels from the 
beginning, avoiding any necessity for future benefit increases. Full con-
tributions would be made from the point where the first employee was 
14It is important to note that it is the plan sponsor, not the plan itself, that is assumed 
to have perpetual life. Public plans can be, and have been, terminated or frozen, but 
this possibility does not affect the argument of this paper. Also, as one referee pointed 
out, the argument would not hold for a very small local governmental unit that was on 
its own for pension purposes and not participating in a larger plan such as the state-
wide plans that many states maintain. Today's healthy little mining town could well 
be tomorrow's ghost town. 
15In public sector plans the choice of assumptions (and methods) often is not the 
actuary's domain. This contrasts with the situation under ERISA where the enrolled 
actuary is required to certify, on Form 5500, Schedule B, that the methods and as-
sumptions represent the actuary's "best estimate" of future experience. Therefore, 
recommendations that "the actuary" proceed in a particular way should be addressed 
to the actuarial decision maker: in some cases, this is the actuary, while in other cases 
it is a board of trustees acting on actuarial advice (or sometimes without, or in spite 
of, actuarial advice). This qualification applies throughout. 
16The expression "in all probability" is used because future experience inevitably will 
depart from projections and what is intended as today's conservative assumption could 
be tomorrow's reality. 
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hired; grants of past service would not be needed; and all plans would 
be fully funded at all times. All plans would have actuaries who could 
project future experience precisely; and plans would run indefinitely 
paying this year's cost plus expenses and avoid surpluses or deficien-
cies entirely. 
We do not live, however, in an ideal world. Pension plans-both pub-
lic and private-seldom start when the first employee is hired; plans 
usually are established later, often at modest levels, and are liberalized 
when the sponsor can afford additional benefits. Thus, most plan con-
tributions are paying the cost of benefits attributable to the current 
year (normal costs in actuarial parlance), additional catch-up amounts 
to fund the cost of benefits attributable to earlier periods (actuarial 
accrued liabilities or prior service costs), and additional contributions 
to provide a safety margin. Just as most actuaries select conserva-
tive assumptions, they also tend toward conservatism in recommending 
catch-up contributions. The objective of the actuary is to bring the plan 
to full funding and maximum benefit security as quickly as possible. I? 
Public sector plans also do not exist in an ideal world. Such plans 
were not funded from day one, and prior funding often may have been 
at relatively low levels as compared to private sector plans. Public sec-
tor plans, therefore, may have a large overhang of benefits attributable 
to prior years that must be provided eventually. Focusing on intergen-
erational equity, we should reflect that such funding did not happen 
in a way that imposes the resulting extra cost equally on all future 
taxpayers. IS This means that we should not require any later gener-
ation of taxpayers to pay high catch-up payments at the level required 
to meet the cost of these benefits in full. In actuarial terms, I suggest 
an open group aggregate funding approach where contributions pay 
only the amounts required to avoid an increase in plan liabilities as a 
percentage of payroll,I9 but that the actuary need not amortize these 
liabilities. In everyday language, future taxpayers should go some way 
17 Once again, this can be taken to extremes: it would be unreasonable to accelerate 
such payments to an extent such that benefit levels were unreasonably depressed in 
the early years. This is the major fallacy in legislation that treats maintaining a less-
than-fully-funded pension plan as an antisocial act and the sponsor of such a plan as 
a pariah. This point is developed more fully in Jones (1994). 
18There is, of course, no way to impose them on the prior taxpayers who initially 
consumed the services. 
19This is a lesser requirement than is called for in ERISA and also less than the tradi-
tional pre-ERISA standard of interest-only funding. Even that standard usually had an 
element of funding conservatism in that it maintained the liabilities at a constant level 
in dollars which usually meant a decrease as a percentage of payroll. In the private 
sector, however, there are declining (not to mention vanishing) industries, so there can 
be significant risks in such funding. This is not the case in the public sector. 
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toward making up the shortfall of interest earnings resulting from the 
shortfall of contributions in the early years, but need not make addi-
tional contributions to fully replace these missing contributions.2o 
The above recommendations cannot be absolute. In very difficult 
economic times, it may be appropriate to cut pension contributions21 
in order to avoid cuts in essential services. Intergenerational equity may 
have to take a back seat to harsh reality. On the other hand, it may be 
appropriate to fund at higher levels than are suggested above-in par-
ticular to fully or partly amortize the costs attributable to prior years-
if a plan sponsor is experiencing unusually good times. For example, 
this might be particularly desirable where a plan sponsor is enjoying 
high tax revenues from a nonrenewable natural resource. 22 
It is a fact of political life that in some situations it is necessary to 
make a gradual transition to the recommended funding levels over a 
period. This means that the shortfall described above would continue 
to increase, both in dollars and as a percentage of payroll, during the 
transition period. If so, there does not seem to be any good reason 
to treat such increases differently. The same is true of actuarial gains 
and losses. 23 All of these reflect events that cannot be carried back to 
the taxpayers on whose watch they arose-therefore, the costs of these 
events should be spread over all future generations. 
4 Summary 
The past and its effect on public sector pension plans are water over 
the dam. The public sector actuary's task is to look forward and to es-
20This would produce contributions that should remain essentially level as a percent-
age of payroll for the indefinite future; each generation of current and future taxpayers 
will pay its own costs and an equal share with other generations of prior shortfalls. 
The above proposal would not produce exactly level costs under various actuarial cost 
methods that might be used for a particular plan. The most direct method of comput-
ing a level-percentage-of-pay contribution would be an open group aggregate funding 
calculation producing a single percentage-of-pay recommended cost. These ideas on 
open group aggregate funding date back at least as far as Trowbridge (1952). 
21 Or, which amounts to the same thing, to lend plan assets back to the 
sponsor/employer. 
22It is also true that the ability of a state or municipality to borrow at low tax-exempt 
rates and to invest the proceeds in regular securities within its pension funds opens 
the possibility of a risk-free arbitrage gain, but this obviously raises questions beyond 
the scope of this paper, especially in the mind of bond analysts. 
23It is not inconsistent with the above, although it is not essential, for asset gains 
to be dampened by one of the common smoothing techniques used to determine an 
actuarial value of assets differing from pure market value before gains and losses are 
computed. 
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tablish (or recommend) a level of contributions that strikes a long-term 
balance between future generations of taxpayers. There is no reason to 
impose disproportionate costs on one group of current or future tax-
payers, regardless of whether these costs were created by a new plan, 
by an amendment liberalizing benefits under an existing plan, by past 
levels of funding or lack of funding, or by experience in gains or losses. 
Whenever possible, the objective of the actuarial exercise in the public 
sector should be to develop a level-percentage-of-payroll contribution, 
based on the most realistic possible assumptions, designed to remain 
level indefinitely. This is the way to reach intergenerational equity. 
Contributions above or below this level (however desirable they may be 
in the private sector in order to enhance participants' benefit security) 
are not appropriate in public sector actuarial work. 
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Discussion of Brian Jones' "Actuarial Conservatism: 
Not in Public Sector Defined Benefit Pension Plans" 
Richard Daskais* 
I agree entirely with Mr. Brian Jones' support for the use of unbiased 
rather than conservative assumptions. The actuarial profession will 
be more respected if actuaries avoid assumptions that obviously are 
designed to misstate costs. 
There are two aspects of the paper on which I wish to comment (i) 
conservatism in private plans, and (ii) intergenerational equity. 
Conservatism in Private Plans: I wish that I could agree with Mr. Jones' 
view that actuaries choose conservative actuarial assumptions for 
private pension plans because of their concern for security of par-
ticipants' benefits. I believe that actuaries choose conservative 
best estimate assumptions when they have been encouraged or 
directed to do so by the plan sponsor or when they anticipate the 
plan sponsor's desires. 
Most conservative assumptions typically are used for plans where 
the plan sponsor has an economic interest in maximizing con-
tributions. Two common types of plans for which the actuary 
chooses conservative assumptions are: 
• Tax-shelter pension plans of professional corporations and 
other small employers where the owner or the employer is 
the principal beneficiary of the plan; and 
• Large companies whose pension contributions are largely or 
wholly reimbursed by a third party, such as the federal gov-
ernment for defense contractors or ratepayers for regulated 
public utilities. 
* Richard Daskais, F.S.A., F.C.A., has been a consulting actuary specializing in pen-
sions since 1957, except for a period from 1985 to 1989 when he was a vice president of 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. He was a member of the firm Daskais and Walls, Inc. in Chicago 
from 1966 to 1984. 
Mr. Daskais' address is: 1174 Shellburn Lane, Ventura CA 93001-4055, USA. 
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Intergenerational Equity: Intergenerational equity often is considered 
in designing funding policy for public plans. In an efficient (and 
perhaps oversimplified) world, pension plans need not be funded 
with intergenerational equity considerations explicitly in mind. 
Intergenerational equity, however, will be reflected in the local 
taxes (such as sales taxes amI property taxes) imposed to deal 
with the benefits or problems associated with pension overfund-
ing or underfunding. 
For example, property in a political subdivision where tax rates 
are high because of past pension under funding (or where tax rates 
can be expected to rise) will sell for less than similar property in 
another political subdivision with lower tax rates due to smaller 
pension costs. The property owners who benefited from low taxes 
because of low pension costs will pay some of the deferred pen-
sion costs indirectly when they sell their property. Of course, if 
they hold on to their property they eventually will pay high taxes 
to cover the higher pension costs. Conversely, property values 
will be higher in communities with low taxes due to low pension 
costs. 
There is no free lunch. 
Authors' Reply to Discussion 
Brian A. Jones 
I thank Mr. Daskais for his discussion, though I suspect his agree-
ment in the first sentence actually buys a little more than I was selling: 
my opposition to conservative assumptions does not extend beyond 
the public sector. 
It is true that conservatism often flows from an "economic interest 
in maximizing contributions" and deductions. I think, however, abuse 
in small plans is due less to actuarial choice than to the requirement 
that the plan document spell out assumptions for options, particularly 
lump-sums, which opens the way for the drafter to distort the calcu-
lations. (I still treasure an old Private Letter Ruling in which the IRS 
National Office agreed with me that it was absurd for the Brooklyn Dis-
trict Office to demand that the assumptions appear in the document. 
Revenue Ruling 79-90 eventually went the other way and the absurdity 
ended up in the Internal Revenue Code, the home of pension absurdity.) 
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I agree that there are ripples from my recommended approach to 
intergenerational equity and that they go far beyond the pension con-
tribution. I do not think, however, this is an argument against my basic 
thrust towards a level percentage of pay as the way to achieve equity. 
I am not even sure that the factors Mr. Daskais cites would tend to 
smooth out fluctuations if pension contributions are set in some other 
way, such as a front-loaded pattern with rapid amortization; they may 
well amplify what I would see as distortions. 



